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ABSTRACT PAGE
This dissertation describes a technique for formally analyzing a firewall security policy using a
quasi-reduced multiway decision diagram model. The analysis allows a system administrator to
detect and repair errors in the configuration of the firewall without a tedious manual inspection
of the firewall rules.
We present four major contributions. First, we describe a set of algorithms for representing a
firewall rule set as a multi-way decision diagram and for solving logical queries against that
model. We demonstrate the application of these techniques in a tool for analyzing iptables
firewalls. Second, we present an extension of our work that enables analysis of systems of
connected firewalls and firewalls that use network address translation and other packet
mangling rules. Third, we demonstrate a technique for decomposing a network into classes of
equivalent hosts. These classes can be used to detect errors in a firewall policy without apriori
knowledge of potential vulnerabilities. They can also be used with other firewall testing
techniques to ensure comprehensive coverage of the test space. Fourth, we discuss a
strategy for partially automating repair of the firewall policy through the use of
counterexamples and rule history.
Using these techniques, a system administrator can detect and repair common firewall errors,
such as typos, out-of-order rules, and shadowed rules. She can also develop a specification of
the behaviors of the firewall and validate the firewall policy against that specification.
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FORMAL ANALYSIS OF FIREWALL POLICIES

Chapter 1

Introduction
System administrators rely very heavily on firewalls for protection against external and
internal threats to the network. This reliance has led to the development of sophisticated
and powerful filtering software for enforcing a security policy on the packets that enter
a network. Features such as stateful inspection and network address translation (NAT)
greatly enhance the power and flexibility of these filtering tools. Unfortunately, a packet
filter only provides adequate protection if the policy that it implements is correct. If the
policy is not sufficiently restrictive, attackers can compromise the network by exploiting
errors in the policy. On the other hand, if the policy is too restrictive, the firewall may
interfere with legitimate traffic.
A policy that contains errors exposes the network to many kinds of threats from both
sides of the network perimeter. External threats, such as denial-of-service attacks or SSH
brute force attacks can take advantage of these weaknesses to compromise important servers
and workstations. Internal threats posed by compromised systems or malicious users with
access to internal resources can amplify existing problems and extend them throughout the
network.
The importance of ensuring that the firewall policy is correct has led to the development
of formal firewall testing procedures [57, 50] that employ many different kinds of tools to
verify that the firewall policy meets the security requirements of the network. Unfortunately, detecting and repairing errors is a very difficult process, which requires a significant
3
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expenditure of time and resources. Furthermore, it is possible to introduce new errors into
the policy while attempting to repair old ones.
Inspecting the firewall policy manually is especially time-consuming for large networks
with many hosts and multiple firewalls. The difficulty of repairing a firewall often leads to
poor security practices. In order to avoid errors, some experts advocate using a sophisticated
firewall design process [35, 39] in which the firewall design passes through several testing
phases before deployment on production systems, but this approach requires a significant
allocation of resources to firewall policy development. In fact, some experts [46, 47, 20]
suggest that security can be better protected by reducing or eliminating the use of firewalls
for security and instead relying on other techniques, such as patching, to defend the network.
Some system administrators work around these problems by deploying generic firewall
policies obtained from the Internet [14, 38, 55] or using graphical firewall policy wizards [29,
54, 31, 21]. These policies protect a system against common threats, but are not tailored to a
network's particular needs. This means that they seldom implement restrictive policies and
leave important services vulnerable to attack. Adapting these policies to the requirements
of a particular environment can sometimes be as challenging as developing a correct policy
from scratch.
Configuration of the firewall can sometimes be made simpler using policy visualization
tools. Visualization tools such as PolicyVis [53] and FireVis [45] allow a system administrator to better understand the behavior of a firewall, which can make it easier to detect errors
in the policy. Unfortunately, many policies are so complicated that even these visualization
tools can be difficult to use.
There are several reasons firewall configuration is so difficult. One reason is that firewall
policies are written in a complex language which the administrator must master to be able
to maintain the policy. Another reason is that polices can be extremely long, containing
hundreds or even thousands of rules.
Maintaining a restrictive firewall policy is especially difficult on networks which change
rapidly as users demand new services and systems are brought online or removed from
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service. Securing these networks often requires the use of multiple interacting firewalls, each
of which has a long and complicated policy. Every the policy is modified, an opportunity
for error is created in which the system administrator may inadvertently introduce new and
potentially devastating problems into the policy.
Errors introduced into the policy can open the doors for a malicious intruder to compromise a server or launch a denial of service attack. Even a simple typo can expose a network
to a barrage of hostile traffic. In some firewall systems, merely reversing the order of two
rules can completely invalidate the policy.

1.1

iptables

The Linux kernel implements an interface called netfilter [58, 43, 3], which provides the
internal hooks for the iptables firewall. The iptables packet filter supports many advanced
features such as packet mangling and stateful inspection and is freely available as part
of any recent Linux distribution. This makes it an extremely cost-effective solution for
organizations that need effective security, but cannot afford expensive commercial products,
such as Cisco's PIX firewall or a Checkpoint firewall.
The rising popularity of Linux as a desktop environment has made iptables the firewall
of choice for many home users as well as business users. Unfortunately, because a restrictive
firewall policy can be difficult to construct and maintain, many of these firewalls implement
generic, minimally-restrictive, and infrequently tested policies. As a result, these policies
provide very little protection for the hosts they are deployed to secure.
In this dissertation, we will explore ways to simplify the testing, analysis, and repair of
iptables firewalls. In order to follow the algorithms and examples we will use, it is helpful
to have some understanding of the configuration and operation of an iptables firewall.
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1.1.1

Creating an iptables Policy

To create an iptables firewall policy, the system administrator constructs chains of filtering rules. Each rule in a chain identifies a filtering action and a set of packets to which
the action should be applied. The action ACCEPT indicates that the firewall should allow
the packet to pass through the firewall and enter the network. The action DROP indicates
that the firewall should discard the packet. The user can also specify that the packet should
be passed to some other firewall chain for processing.
iptables provides three built-in chains: the INPUT chain, the FORWARD chain, and
the OUTPUT chain. Packets that are intended for the firewall itself are processed by the
INPUT chain. Packets intended to pass through the firewall on their way to some other host
are processed by the FORWARD chain. The OUTPUT chain processes packets generated
by the firewall host. The rules in each of these chains can ACCEPT a packet, DROP a
packet, or pass it to a user-defined chain for further processing. The three built-in chains
also have a default policy that determines what action is taken on packets that do not match
any rule of the chain.

1.1.2

iptables Operation

When determining what action should be taken on a particular packet, the rules in a
chain are considered in first-to-last order. The first rule that matches will cause processing
of that packet to cease or pass to some other chain. This means that inserting rules in the
wrong order can seriously impact the behavior of the firewall.

1
2
3

target
ACCEPT
ACCEPT
DROP

Chain FORWARD (policy ACCEPT):
destination
prot
source
TCP 192.168.1.0/24 192.168.2.0/24
TCP
anywhere
192.168.2.0/24
all
anywhere
192.168.2.0/24

flags
TCP dpt:ssh
TCP dpt:http

Figure 1.1: Example FORWARD chain

An example FORWARD chain is shown in figure 1.1. This example policy secures a
network 192.168.2.0/24 against threats from the outside world. In the example, the default
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policy is ACCEPT. This means that a packet will be allowed to enter the network unless
show rule in the policy specifically drops it. Each of the rules in the chain has a target
and a set of match conditions. The target specifies an action that should be applied to
packets that match all of the conditions. The conditions specify criteria for determining
which packets match the rule. For instance, the first rule has the target ACCEPT. It also
has a protocol match, a source match, a destination match, and a flag match.
The protocol match specifies that only TCP packets should be considered. The source
match ensures that the rule is only applied to packets from the trusted 192.168.1.0/24 subnet. The destination match indicates that only packets sent to hosts on the 192.168.2.0/24
subnet will be processed. Finally, the additional match "TCP dpt:ssh" ensures that only
SSH packets will be matched. In other words, the first rule of the chain specifies that ssh traffic should be allowed to the protected network from hosts on trusted subnet 192.168.1.0/24.
Similarly, the second rule specifies that http traffic should be allowed from any host.
The third rule blocks all other traffic to the protected network.

1.1.3

Firewall Errors

Figure 1.2 shows the policy of a firewall that secures an internal network 192.168.2.0/24
from intrusions by hosts on an unsecured wireless network 192.168.1.0/24. All traffic, including HTTP traffic, should be dropped from that insecure network. Rule 1 drops any
incoming ICMP packets. Rule 2 drops traffic from the insecure network. The remaining
rules secure various services and allow access to the web server. All other traffic is dropped,
unless it comes from a trusted subnet 113.192.10.0/24.
Suppose the administrator decides to modify this configuration to allow trusted machines
to send IPP printing traffic (on port 631) to the secure network. If she inserts an accept
rule in the wrong place, she can produce the incorrect configuration in figure 1.3. This
configuration allows printing service from the insecure network, because the new rule has
been inserted before the rule which restricts the insecure subnet. Switching rules 2 and 3
yields a correct configuration. This sort of error becomes harder to detect as the number
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1
2
3
4
5
6

target
DROP
DROP
DROP
ACCEPT
DROP
ACCEPT

Chain FORWARD (policy DROP):
destination
prot
source
anywhere
192.168.2.0/24
ICMP
all
192.168.1.0/24 192.168.2.0/24
anywhere
192.168.2.0/24
TCP
anywhere
192.168.2.0/24
TCP
anywhere
192.168.2.0/24
TCP
all
113.192.10.0/24 192.168.2.0/24

flags

TCP dpt:domain
TCP dpt:HTTP
TCP dpt:SSH

Figure 1.2: A sample firewall that secures subnet 192.168.2.0/24 against intrusions from untrusted
network 192.168.1.0/24
of rules grows and the complexity of their structure increases.
Chain FORWARD (policy DROP)
1
2
3
4
5
6

7

target

prot

source

destination

DROP
ACCEPT
DROP
DROP
ACCEPT
DROP
ACCEPT

ICMP
all
all
TCP
TCP
TCP
all

anywhere
anywhere
192.168.1.0/24
anywhere
anywhere
anywhere
113.192.10.0/24

192.168.2.0/24
192.168.2.0/24
192.168.2.0/24
192.168.2.0/24
192.168.2.0/24
192.168.2.0/24
192.168.2.0/24

flags
TCP dpt:631
TCP dpt:domain
TCP dpt:HTTP
TCP dpt:SSH

Figure 1.3: A misconfigured firewall that allows the untrusted network to access printing services
Consider also the firewall rule set described in figure 1.4, which protects an internal
subnet 192.168.2.0/24 from the outside world. Can hosts on the protected network send
SMTP traffic through the firewall? At first glance, it appears that hosts from 192.168.2.0/24
can access SMTP (they are granted access in rule 5). That rule, however, only grants access
if the connection is in an ESTABLISHED state. In order for a host to transmit, SMTP
traffic to an outside host, it must first establish the connection. But this cannot be done,
because NEW connections will be dropped by the default policy of the firewall. If the
system administrator desires to allow SMTP traffic from protected hosts, the policy must
be changed to allow creation of new connections from hosts on the 192.168.2.0/24 subnet.
While the problems in these example policies could easily be avoided by a careful system
administrator, far more complex errors can exist in a real-world firewall policy. As the
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1
2

target
ACCEPT
ACCEPT

3
4
5

ACCEPT
ACCEPT
ACCEPT

Chain FORWARD (policy DROP)
destination
flags
source
prot
anywhere
ICMP
192.168.2.0/24
anywhere
TCP
192.168.2.0/24 TCP dpt:ssh
flags:SYN ,ACK/SYN
anywhere
UDP
192.168.2.0/24 UDP dpt:domain
113.117.1.4
all
192.168.2.0/24
anywhere
TCP dpt:smtp
all
192.168.2.0/24
state ESTABLISHED

Figure 1.4: A stateful rule set which allows SMTP access only for established connections.
firewall policy becomes longer and more complicated, it becomes more difficult to implement
and make changes to the policy without introducing mistakes. In a survey of 37 corporate
firewalls, Wool [60] discovered an average of 7 configuration errors per system. While his
study examined only Checkpoint and PIX firewalls, it is not unreasonable to assume that
other firewall systems have comparable error rates.
In this dissertation, we explore techniques for performing a detailed formal analysis of
an iptables firewall policy and for detecting errors in the firewall policy using an equivalence
class decomposition of the hosts on a network. These analytical techniques have many practical applications to the problem of detecting and correcting firewall errors. In examining
this area, we also address several theoretical issues such as how to efficiently model a firewall policy in software, how to derive useful queries for testing the firewall policy, and the
tradeoff between producing insufficiently detailed output and producing more information
than a user can easily process.
To this end, we explore four major areas.

First, we describe a multi-way decision

diagram representation of the firewall policy which allows us to answer logical queries about
the behavior of the firewall. Second, we describe the application of this MDD model to a
tool for testing Linux firewalls.

Third, we present an extension of this technique that

enables the analysis of systems of connected firewalls and firewalls that use advanced packet
mangling techniques, such as network address translation. Fourth, we discuss a technique
for generating an equivalence class representation of the firewall policy, which can be used
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to detect certain classes of errors without constructing a series of queries or test cases. Last,
we consider ways to partially automate repair of a policy.

Chapter 2

Representations of a Firewall
Policy
A firewall is a facility (which can be either hardware or software) that implements a
filtering policy for one or more network hosts. Usually, the policy is specified as a set of
rules in which each rule consists of an action and one or more conditions. The conditions
identify a set of packets to which the action should be applied. In this work, we consider
matches against the attributes source address, destination address, protocol, source port,
destination port, connection state, incoming network interface, outgoing network interface,
and the six TCP flags (SYN, ACK, URG, PSH, RST, and FIN). It is possible to extend our
work to consider other attributes, but we will focus on these attributes in order to simplify
the discussion of our techniques.
In order to perform formal analysis of the policy, we must address the issue of constructing a model of the firewall which can be used to accurately represent the policy. There have
been many approaches to this problem. We will consider first the efforts of others to produce
an analytic model and then describe our own technique.
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12

2.1

Other Models

One approach is to use linked lists of rules to describe the firewall policy.

This is

the approach used by many firewall implementations. For instance, in the LimlX iptables
system, rules are grouped into sequential lists called chains, which are further organized
into four tables. The filter table contains chains directly related to filtering. The nat table
contains chains related to network address translation. Chains in the mangle table modify
packets in more exotic ways (such as increasing the TTL of a packet). There is also a raw
table which allows processing of packets before connection tracking analysis is applied.
Internally, each rule consists of a data structure with pointers to a linked list of matches
and a linked list of targets (a linked list is necessary for implementation of user-defined
target values which perform processing and then pass control on to other targets). The
chains of the firewall are represented using doubly linked lists. Caches are used to speed
up operations on these lists. The tables are simple structures which contain pointers to the
various chains along with some additional management information [42].
The linked list approach suffers from several disadvantages. First, performance can be
poor, especially for policies with many rules, since lookups may require searching the entire
list. Caching can reduce the impact of this problem, but does not entirely eliminate it.
Second, the linked list model is not very amenable to analysis. One major drawback is the
fact that a policy can have two different linked list representations with identical behavior.
This makes it difficult to compare two policies for equivalence or perform more complex
operations on them.

2.1.1

Binary Decision Diagrams

A more sophisticated approach to modeling the firewall is to use Binary Decision Diagrams (BDDs). Hazelhurst [24, 25] demonstrated a BDD-based technique for representing
firewall policies in which each node of the BDD corresponds to exactly one bit of a match
condition. Every path through the BDD corresponds to one packet seen by the firewall.

13
Using reduction and merging operations, duplicate and redundant nodes are removed from
the BDD to produce a compact and canonical representation of the firewall policy.

2.1.2

Interval Decision Diagrams

Fleury and Christensen [9, 11, 10] extended this work to implement a Decision Diagram
based packet filter for Linux that outperforms Netfilter for policies with more than 100
rules. Their work uses Interval Decision Diagrams (IDDs), a generalization of BDDs in
which each node represents a range of values rather than a single boolean variable. This
is a more natural representation of the policy, since most of the matches in a firewall rule
correspond to integer ranges rather than boolean values.

The IDD representation is a

reduced decision diagram in which duplicate nodes are not allowed and redundant nodes

with all arcs pointing to the same descendant are removed. A major drawback to the IDD
approach is that application of the reduction rules causes generation of the IDD to require
polynomial time -

a significant cost. Furthermore, a path through the IDD can contain

multiple nodes that reference the same attribute (for instance, there may be two nodes
which impose conditions on the source address). This affects the performance of algebraic
operations on the IDD representation slightly and makes analysis drastically more difficult.

2.1.3

Firewall Decision Diagrams

Gouda, Liu, et. al [22] constructed a decision diagram representation of the policy using
Firewall Decision Diagrams (FDDs). An FDD is similar to an IDD, but does not allow any
path to contain multiple nodes corresponding to the same attribute. Using this model, they
presented a technique for detecting structural errors (such as duplicate rules) in the firewall
policy. In other work, they described a system for evaluating SQL-like queries [34] against
a firewall policy modeled using FDDs.
In a Firewall Decision Diagram, duplicate nodes and redundant nodes are removed by
the repeated application of reduction rules. While applying these reduction rules can lower
the memory requirement for storing the final decision diagram and slightly reduces the cost
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of performing lookups, other operations may incur some overhead whenever a removed node
needs to be "put back" into the MDD in the middle of an operation.

2.1.4

Quasi-Reduced Multi-way Decision Diagrams

In our work, we use quasi-reduced MDDs [12] in which redundant nodes are allowed,
but duplicate nodes are removed using a hashing algorithm. Through the efficient use of
caches, we can obtain very efficient manipulation of the firewall policy model which enables
fast and accurate analysis of the firewall policy.

2. 2

Notation

In the remainder of this chapter, we will carefully define the terms, models, and algorithms we employ in describing and constructing a representation of the firewall policy. We
will then show that the MDD model is an accurate representation of the firewall policy. To
this end, we first provide a formal characterization of an iptables firewall policy by carefully defining each of its constituent parts: match conditions, firewall rules, and chains of
rules. We will then describe Quasi-Reduced Multiway Decision Diagrams and give several
algorithms which can be used to construct a (QR)MDD model of a firewall policy. We also
demonstrate the correctness of these algorithms by proving that the MDD model accepts
(or drops) exactly those packets accepted (or dropped) by the firewall policy.
To formally describe an iptables firewall, we use the following definitions.
Definition 1 The domain of an attribute is the set of possible values that can hold. A
match condition, m, over an attribute a, is a boolean function which maps a subset of

the domain of a to the values TRUE and FALSE.
Each match condition identifies a set of packets to which a filtering rule should be
applied. Because the match condition corresponds to exactly one attribute of the firewall
rule, the user must combine several match conditions to obtain fine-grained definition of
the match set.
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For each match condition m, we let 'D(m) represent the domain of values which satisfy
the condition. For instance, if m is a match condition on the source port, 'D(m) is a set of
ports that satisfy the condition.
There are several different ways in which we can use match conditions to describe the
behavior of the firewall. For instance, to represent source address, we could construct a
single match condition over the source address attribute or we could split the source address
into octets and create separate match conditions for each octet of the source address. We
will take the latter approach in our implementation, but our theoretical results generalize
to any definition of the match conditions. To simplify discussion, we define a constant, K,
which represents the total number of attributes to be considered in modeling the policy.
This definition of a match condition allows us to formally describe both filtering rules
and filtering chains. Because these concepts are inextricably linked, we first define "filtering
rule" and use that definition to define the concept of a filtering chain.
Definition 2 A filtering rule r is a tuple (t, m1, ... , mK) in which each mi is a match
condition, and t, the target, is either the action ACCEPT, the action DROP, or a filtering
chain. The match set of r, written M(r), is the set of packets which match each of the
match conditions in r.

We sometimes use the notation r[k] to represent the kth match of rule r using the
convention that r[OJ = t and r[i] =mi. When discussing a named attribute, we may also
use the notation r.X to specify attribute X of rule r.
Definition 3 A firewall chain is an ordered sequence of firewall rules.

For iptables firewalls, chains are processed in first-match order so that when a packet
matches a rule of the chain processing halts and the packet is either accepted, dropped, or
passed to some other chain for handling.
We are interested in which packets a firewall chain will accept and which it will reject.
In order to describe this concept fully, we define two terms: the accept set of a firewall
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chain and the accept set of a firewall rule. It is necessary to employ a circular reference in
defining these concepts in order to account for the possibility that a rule targets a firewall
chain. Therefore, we first define "accept set of a rule" using the idea of "accept set of a
chain" and then define "accept set of a chain" using "accept set of a rule". The fact that
iptables does not allow a rule to reference any chain which is its own ancestor ensures that,
despite the circular reference, these definitions are well-formed.

Definition 4 The accept set of a rule r is defined as follows:

A(r)

=

0

If r[D] is "DROP"

niE[l,K(D(r[i])

If r[O] is "ACCEPT"

niE[l,K(D(r[i]) n A(r[O])

If r[O] is a chain.

Less formally, the accept set describes the set of packets which are accepted by rule r.
The reject set of a rule, R(r) is defined similarly by replacing "ACCEPT" with "DROP"
and A(r[O]) with R(r[O]).

Definition 5 The accept set of a chain c = (ro, r1, ... , rn) of size n+l is defined as follows:

= A(ro) UiE[l,n] (A(ri) n R(ri-1) n ... n R(ro))

A( c)

Or (more concisely):
A(c)

= A(ro) uiE[l,n]

(A(ri) nsE[O,i-1] R(rs)).

In other words, the accept set of a chain is the set of packets accepted by a rule in the
chain that are not dropped by any previous rule of the chain. The reject set of a chain,
R( c) is defined similarly.

2.3

Multi-way Decision Diagrams

A multi-way decision diagram (MDD) is a directed acyclic graph, M

V is a set of nodes, E

~

V x V is a set of directed edges, and L : E

= (V, E, L), where
---->

Z is a labeling

function which maps each edge to a distinct integer value. The nodes of the MDD are
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organized into K

+ 1 levels and

all edges from a node at non-terminal level k > 0 point to

nodes at level k - 1. We assign a unique index p to each node at level k. This allows us to
describe node <k:p> where k is the level and p identifies the node. We use the notation
<k:p>[i] to describe the child of node <k:p> which can be reached by following the edge
with label i.
We will frequently use lowercase subscripts to refer to the index of a node. For instance,
we sometimes use np to refer to the index of node <k : np>. Since the root node of an MD D
often requires special consideration, we will use the notation <K: Np> for the node at level

K which has index Np. When referring to the entire decision diagram, we will use the
capital letter M, for instance, we might say that the MDD Mr has root node <K: Nr>·

Figure 2.1: A rule set MDD for the chain in figure 1.2

In this application, every path through the MDD represents a packet potentially received
by the firewall. Each of the non-terminal levels of the MDD correspond to a specific attribute
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of the packet. For instance, in figure 2.1, the MDD representation of the rule set given in
figure 1.2, the top four levels represent the source address and the next four levels represent
the destination address. The next level represents the protocol. Below these levels are levels
for the source port and the destination port, the six TCP flags (URG, PSH, SYN, ACK,
RST, FIN), and the connection state. Level 0 is a special terminal level which represents
the target of the firewall rule (ACCEPT, DROP, LOG, or a user-defined chain) as a unique
integer index. We reserve terminal index 0 for the special meaning "not yet specified".
For readability, we represent the edge-labeling function, L, by drawing labels above
each arc. Although these arcs appear inside the box representing a node, they should be
interpreted as labels for the edges leading from that node to levels below.
A non-terminal node at level k represents a subset of packets that share some attributes.
An arc from a node at level k to a node at level k - 1 represents a choice of value for the
attribute represented at level k. When many arcs from a node point to the same child, we
use ellipses in the figure to save space. In the actual MDD there would be arcs for each
value we have hidden in this manner.
To see that an HTTP packet from 68.10.1.3 to 192.168.2.10 is accepted by the firewall,
start with the node at level 20 of the MDD. Since the first source octet of the packet is
68, which falls between 0 and 113, follow the first arc to the highlighted node at level 19.
Now there is only one arc to follow, since all values between 0 and 255 have been grouped
together using ellipses. Since 10 falls between 0 and 255, we follow the highlighted arc to
a node at level 18. Again, 1 falls between 0 and 255 so follow the arc to level 17. The last
octet of the source address is 3, which falls between 0 and 255, so follow the highlighted arc
to the node at level 16.
Level 16 represents the first octet of the destination address, which for our example is
192. Since there is an arc for 192, proceed to level 15. If the destination address had been
193.1.1.1, you would know that the packet is dropped by the firewall, since there is no arc
for 193 and DROP is the default policy. Instead, at level 15, examine the second octet of
the destination address. Since there is an arc for 168, proceed to level 14. Continue in this

19
manner to level 12.
At level 12, there is an arc for TCP and an arc for ICMP. Since HTTP is a TCP
protocol, follow the arc for TCP to the highlighted node at level 11. Continue in this
manner until you reach the node at terminal level 0. Since it is the ACCEPT node, the
packet will be accepted by the firewall.

2.4

Implementation

Nodes at each level are stored in a dynamic array and are referenced by a unique integer
index. At every level, we reserve index 0 for a special node, node zero, which represents the
empty set. This can be thought of as a node with all its arcs pointing to node zero at the
level below. To save a small amount of memory, we do not explicitly store node zero, but
instead handle it as a special case in our algorithms. Using the notation presented above,
we will sometimes use <k: 0> to mean node zero at level k.
Like nodes, edges are stored in a per-level dynamic array. Each element of the array
holds the index of a child node. The index of each element corresponds to the label of the
edge, offset so that the edges for each node can be stored separately. We keep track of the
offset for each node's edges in the node structure. More details on the MDD implementation
are available in [36].

2.5

Building an MDD for a Filter Rule

In order to construct an MDD for a rule, we first parse the rule into target, source address, destination address, source port, destination port, protocol, state, incoming interface,
outgoing interface, and flag components. From these components, we create a parsed rule,
which represents each component at level k as an integer range. We store these ranges in
an array of size K

+ 1.

We use the notation pr[k].low and pr[k].high to reference the lower

and upper bounds of the range. We also define an operation MakeMDDFromRule, which
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nodeJndex MakeMDDFromRule(ParsedRule pr)
1 old = LookUpTarget(pr.target).
2 for k = 1 to K:
3
n = NewNode(k).
4
fori= 0 to MaxValue(k):
5
if i 2: pr[k].low and i :S pr[k].high:
6
<k:n>[i] =old.
7
old =CheckForDuplicates(n).
8 return n.
Figure 2.2: An MDD for a rule
Algorithm for building an MDD from a rule

takes the parsed firewall rule and returns the root node of an MDD representing that rule.
Pseudocode for MakeMDDFromRule is given in figure 2.2.
The algorithm starts at level 0 and builds upward toward the root node. At each level,
it creates new nodes that represent the criteria of the parsed rule. In line 1, node <0 : n>
is calculated by finding the integer index which represents the rule target. For ACCEPT,
DROP, and LOG targets this is a predefined constant less than 4. For user-defined rules,
the index comes from a pre-generated table that maps the user-defined chains, in the order
of their discovery during parsing, to integers greater than 3.
Lines 2-7 construct nodes at levels 1 through K. The call to NewNode in line 3 creates
a new node and initializes all its arcs to point at node zero. Lines 4 - 7 examine each
potential value i of filter rule attribute k. If i falls within the range specified by the parsed
rule, arc <k: n> [i] is connected to node <k - 1: old>. Otherwise, the arc is left at its default
value, which points to node zero.
When we reach line 7, we have considered all the potential values of attribute k, so
we now call CheckForDuplicates, which uses hashing to identify any nodes that exactly
duplicate node <k:n>. If such a node exists, <k:n> is freed and CheckForDuplicates
returns the index of the duplicate node. Otherwise, it returns <k: n>.
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2.6

Correctness of MDD generation for simple terminal rules

To demonstrate that the rule generation algorithm is correct, we first define the idea of
an accept set of an MDD. We then show that the accept set of the MDD representation of
a rule generated by MakeMDDFromRule is equivalent to the accept set of the rule.

Definition 6 The accept set of an MDD node <k: p> is the set of packets s such that there
exists a path (eo, e1, ... , ek) fr:om <k:p> to the terminal node ACCEPT such that for all
0 :=:; i :=:; k, L(ei) = s[i]. The accept set of a rule set MDD M with root node <K:Np> is

given by the formula A (M) = A ( <K: Np>).
In other words, the accept set of an MDD node is the set of packets for which there is
a path from that node to the node ACCEPT, such that every edge in the path is labeled
with an attribute that corresponds to the packet. The accept set of an MDD is the accept
set of its root node.
We define R( <k: p>), the reject set of an MDD node <k: p> and R( M), the reject set
of MDD M, similarly, by replacing ACCEPT with DROP.
In order to demonstrate that the rule generation algorithm is correct, we show that the
accept set of the MDD representation is identical to the accept set of the original rule.
Lemma 1 Given a firewall ruler, let Mr be the MDD generated by MakeMDDFromRule(r ).

Then, A(Mr) = A(r).

Proof:
Step 1: A(r)

~

A(Mr)·

We must show for any packets E A(r), that s E A(Mr)·
If A(r) is the empty set (i.e. r is not an accept rule), then A(Mr) is likewise empty,

since the lookup in line 1 will never return ACCEPT. This means that the first
iteration of the loop will not create an arc to the ACCEPT node. Since no other arcs
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are created to the terminal nodes, there can be no path to the accept node and, by
the definition of the accept set of an MDD, A(Mr) will be the empty set.
Suppose that A(r) is not the empty set and let s E A(r).

We must show that

s E A(Mr)·

The loop in line 2 considers each level of the MDD in turn. For each level, the inner
loop in line 4 creates arcs from node <k: n> to node <k - 1 :old> for every value
i in the range of the kth attribute of

r.

Let

ek

be the arc labeled s[k]. The path

S =(eo, e1, ... , eK) is a path in which every edge ei is labeled s[i]. Because s E A(r),
we know that S leads to the ACCEPT node. Therefore, by definition, s E A(Mr ).
Step 2: A(Mr)

~

A(r).

If A(Mr) is empty, then A(r) must also be empty, since A(Mr) can be empty only when

the rule is not an accept rule. If A(Mr) is not empty, lets E A(Mr) be a packet in the
accept set of Mr. By the definition of A (Mr), there exists a path S

= (e0 , e 1 , ... , e K)

from the root node of the MDD to the node ACCEPT such that each edge

ek

Is

labeled with value s[k].
Now, since arcs are only created in line 6, each edge of Sis labeled with value ik. The
if statement in line 5 ensures that this label must be between pr[k].low and pr[k].high.
Since this holds true for all k, we know that s matches r. Furthermore, sis accepted
by r, since the only way a path can point to ACCEPT is when the lookup in line 1
returns ACCEPT and an arc is created to the terminal node by line 6 during the first
iteration of the loop.
Therefore, since A(Mr)

~

A(r) and A(r)

~

A(Mr), A(Mr) = A(r).

•

The proof that R(Mr) = R(r) is similar- simply replace "ACCEPT" with "DROP".
Furthermore, ifT(r) represents the set of packets that match some target t (perhaps another
chain), we can adapt this proof to show that T(Mr)

t, a fact we will make use of later.

= T(r)

by replacing "ACCEPT" with
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2.7

Inserting a Rule into the Chain MDD
nodeJndex Assign(level k, node_index ne, ParsedRule pr)
1 if k = 0:
2
return LookUpTarget(pr.target).
3 nt=NewNode(k).
4 fori= 0 to MaxValue(k):
5
if i E pr[k]:
6
nt[i]=Assign(k- l,ne[i],pr).
7
else:
8
nt[i]=ne[k][i].
9 return CheckForDuplicates(nt).
Figure 2.3: Inserting a rule
Algorithm for inserting a rule into an MDD

The assignment operator in figure 2.3 generates an MDD representing the insertion of a
new ruler into an existing chain c, where the MDD representation of cis an MDD, Me. The
insertion is performed in such a way that the new rule overrides the rules already inserted.
The algorithm is recursive, starting from node <k : ne> and descending the graph until
it reaches a terminal node at level 0. Initially, we set node ne to the index of the root node
of Me. Lines 1 and 2 of the algorithm handle the terminating case. If k = 0, we return a
node representing the target of the rule. If k > 0, the algorithm constructs a new node to
represent the result of insertion (line 3).
This result is constructed by the loop in lines 4 - 8. In each iteration of the loop we
consider a value, i, of attribute k. If i does not match the condition r[k], we create an arc
to the corresponding child of <k: ne>. If i does match the rule, we use recursion to descend
to the next level of the graph.
Because values that do not match the range of the new rule are linked to nodes from the
old MDD, packets that do not match the rule are not affected by the insertion. However,
the algorithm will create a path to the appropriate terminal node for packets which do
match the new rule.
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2.8

Correctness of Assign operator

Lemma 2 Let Mn = Assign(K, Me, r) for some MDD Me and ruler. A(Mn) = A(r) U

(A(Me) n R(r)).
Proof: We must show that the accept set of the new MDD is all packets accepted by the
new rule, plus all those accepted by the old rules that are not dropped by the new rule.
Step 1: A(Mn) ~ A(r) u (A(Me) n R(r)).
We must show that for any packet s E A(Mn), that s E A(r) U (A(Me) n R(r)). To
do this we show that sis either in A(r) or in A(Me) n R(r).
Since s E A(Mn), there exists a path e = (eo, ... , eK) from the root of Mn to the
terminal node ACCEPT such that each edge, ek, of the path is labeled with the value

s[k]. Now, arcs are only created in lines 6 and 8. We have two cases.
Case 1: Every edge in the path is labeled with a value that satisfies the match condition of the rule.
If this is the case, then s E A(r) by the definition of A(r) and the fact that since

s E A(Mn), e is a path to ACCEPT. Therefore s E A(r)U(A(Me)nR(r)), which
is what we wish to prove.
Case 2: There is an edge ek E e which is labeled with a value outside of the range

pr[k].low to pr[k].high.
If this is the case, we choose the first such arc (that is, the arc at the lowest level)
and note that the if statement in line 5 evaluates to false for this value. This
means that arc ek points to node <k: ne> [i]. But this means that s E A( Me), by
the definition of A(Me) and the fact that s E A(Mn)·
Because ek does not match pr[k], we know that s is not in R(r). Thus, s E

A(Mc)

n R(r).

Therefore, s E A(r)

Step 2: A(r) u (A(Mc) n R(r)) ~ A(Mn)·

u (A(Mc) n R(r)).
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We must show for any packet s E A(r) U (A(Mc)

n R(r)),

that s E A(Mn)· By

properties of set union, we know that either s E A(r) or s E (A(Mc)

n R(r)).

If s E A(r), then the path labeled (ACCEPT,s[1], ... ,s[K]) is in Mn. To see this,
note that each call of "Assign" will create a new node and set the arc labeled s[k] in
that node to the result of calling the algorithm at the level below. When the algorithm
reaches level 0, the lookup in line 2 will will evaluate to ACCEPT, since the target of

r is ACCEPT. Therefore, s

E

A(Mn)·

If sis not in A(r), we know that s E A(Mc)nR(r). This means that s E A(Mc) and s E

R(r). Let the path e =(eo, e1, ... , eK) be the path in Mn labeled (s[O], s[1], ... , s[K]).
Since s E A(Mc), there exists a corresponding path c

=

(co, ... , CK) in Me for which

each edge is labeled with the values (s[O], s[1], ... , s[K]).
Since s E R(r) and s is not in A(r), there is at least one level k for which s[k]
is not in the range pr[k].low to pr[k].high. Consider the highest such level, kmax·
Because s[kmax] is not in the range pr[kmax].low to pr[kmax].high, the if statement in
line 5 will fail and the algorithm will create an arc to node <kmax - 1 : nc>. Now,
let (fo,
e

h, ... , A max -1) be a path from <kmax - 1: nc> to ACCEPT. Then, the path

= (fo, ... ,fkma.x-l,ekma.x''"'eK)

in Mn is a path to the ACCEPT node from the

root of Mn. Since this path has labels (s[O], s[1], ... , s[K]), s E A(Mn)·
Therefore, since A(r) u(A(Mc) nR(r)) t:::; A(Mn) and A(Mn) t:::; A(r) u(A(Mc) nR(r)),
we have that A(Mn)

= A(r) u (A(Mc) n R(r)).

•
2.9

Intersection

The algorithms above can be used to construct an MDD representation of a chain which
only has rules with the targets ACCEPT or DROP. An iptables firewall also allows rules in
which the target is a user-defined chain. Figure 2.4 shows two chains of a policy. The chain
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myChain is a user-defined chain which allows traffic to enter the 192.168.3.0/24 subnet
and blocks all ftp traffic that is not sent to that subnet. This chain, however, will only be
applied to certain packets.
The FORWARD chain drops any SMTP packets and then passes any packets from
untrusted network 192.168.1.0/24 to the user-defined chain.

Any packets that are not

accepted or dropped by myChain will be dropped unless they match rule 3, which allows
any packets bound for subnet 192.168.2.0 to pass the firewall.

1
2

1
2
3

target
ACCEPT
DROP

target
DROP
my Chain
ACCEPT

prot
all
all

Chain myChain:
source
destination
anywhere
192.168.3.0/24
anywhere
anywhere

Chain FORWARD (policy DROP):
prot
source
destination
anywhere
anywhere
all
all
anywhere
192.168.1.0/24
anywhere
all
192.168.2.0/24

flags
dpt tcp:ftp

flags
dpt tcp:smtp

Figure 2.4: Example policy with a user-defined chain

(c) Result of Intersection
Figure 2.5: Intersection of the two chains
To represent chains with rules that link to some other chain, we implement a special
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intersection operator that combines the MDD representation of the target chain with an
MDD representing the rule which targets the chain. This special intersection operation
is illustrated in figure 2.5. An MDD representation of myChain is given in the left-most
column of the figure. The next column illustrates the MDD representing rule 2 of the
FORWARD chain, which passes packets from the 192.168.1.0/24 subnet to the user-defined
chain.

The right-most column shows the result of intersecting these two chains.

The

intersection restricts the chain MDD to only those packets that match the targeting rule,
in this case, rule 2. By examining the resulting MDD, you can see that the result does
not cause packets from 192.168.3.0/24 to be accepted, even though myChain accepts such
packets, because the targeting rule only applies to packets from the 192.168.1.0/24 subnet.
nodeJndex Speciallnt(level k, mdd nt, n 5 )
1
if n 8 = 0:
2
return 0
3
if nt = 0:
4
return 0
5
if k = 0:
6
return nt
7
nn = NewNode(k)
8
fori= 0 to MaxValue(k):
9
if nt[i] # 0 and ns[i] # 0:
10
nn[i] = Speciallnt(k- 1, nt[i], ns[i])
11 return nn[i].
Figure 2.6: Intersection Operation

Pseudocode for the special intersection algorithm is given in figure 2.6. The arguments
to Speciallnt are a level and the indices of two MDD nodes. To intersect two MDDs, Ms
and Mt, we pass the root nodes of each of the MDDs in the initial call to Specialint.
In lines 1 - 6, we check for the base cases. If n 5 is the zero node, then no corresponding
path exists in the match set of the targeting rule. Therefore, we return the empty node. If
nt is the zero node, then the target chain does not match any packets along the path we

have followed and we return 0. If neither node is the zero node and we have reached the
terminal level, then the value of Mt (the targeted chain) overrides the existing value, so we

28

return the value of nt.
Lines 7 - 10 handle nodes at the non-terminal levels. In each case, a new node is
created and populated using recursive calls. To simplify the description of the algorithm,
we assume that nx [i] is the index of the node reached by following the arc with label i from
node <k: nx> and that nx [i] = 0 ifthere is no arc labeled i in <k: nx>.

2.9.1

Correctness of the Special Intersection Algorithm

Lemma 3 Given a ruler, such that r.target

= c, where cis a chain of the firewall, let C(r)

be the set of packets that r maps to c. If <K: Ne> and <K: Nr> are the root nodes of MDDs
Me and Mr, respectively, and Nn = Speciallnt(K, Ne, Nr), then A(Mn) = C(r) n A(Me),
where Mn is the MDD rooted at <K: Nn>·

By lemma 1, we know that C(r) = C(Mr). Therefore, we must show that A(Mn) =
C(Mr) n A(Me)· It is sufficient to show that at every level k, Speciallnt(k, nt, n 8 ) returns
a node <K: nn> such that A( <k: nn>) = A( <k: nt>) n C( <k: n 8 > ), since then the node
returned by Special! nt( K, Ne, Nr), where <K: Ne> and <K: Nr> are the root nodes of Me
and Mr, respectively, will prove the lemma.

Proof:
We proceed by induction on k, the level of the MDD at which we are performing the
intersection operation.

Base Case

Consider the case that k = 0. There are three possibilities:

Case 1: n 8 = 0
If n 8

=

0, then C(ns)

return 0, so nn

=

=/=-

the definition of C(X). Lines 1 and 2 of the algorithm

0. Therefore, A( <k: nn>)

C(<k:ns>).
Case 2: ns

= 0 by

0, but nt = 0.

=0=

A( <k: nt>) n 0 = A( <k: nt>) n
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If nt

= 0, then A( <k: nt>) = 0 by definition of accept set of an MDD. Since n 5

is not 0, the if statement in line 1 will evaluate to false and we will skip line 2.
Lines 3 and 4, however, will cause the algorithm to return 0, so nn

A( <k:nn>)

=

0. Therefore,

= 0 = 0 n C( <k:ns>) =A( <k:nt>) n C( <k:ns> ).

Case 3: n 8 and nt are both non-zero.
Since n 8 and nt are both non-zero, the first two if statements will evaluate to false.
Since we are at level k = 0, the if statement in line 5 will evaluate to true and the
algorithm will return nt, so nn = nt. Now, n 5 can be one of two terminals. It can
be the terminal 0 or it can be the terminal representing chain c. We know that n 5 is
not 0, so it must be the terminal representing chain c. Now, by definition of C(X), a
packet p is an element of C (X) if there exists a path P from node X to the terminal
node c which has the property that every edge ei in the path, that L(ei)

= p[i].

When

X is the terminal node for c, this definition is trivially satisfied for every packet.

Therefore, <k: ns> is a node representing the set of all packets. This means that

A( <k :nt>) n C( <k:ns>)
A( <k:nt>)

= A( <k:nt> ).

Therefore, A( <k:nn>)

n C( <k:ns> ).

Induction Hypothesis

Assume for some integer K, that if at each level 0 < k < K,

nn

= Speciallnt(k, nt, n 5 )

then

A(<k:nn>) = A(<k:nt>) nC(<k:ns>).
Induction Step

= A( <k:nt>) =

We will show that if at level k = K > 0,

nn = Speciallnt(k, nt, n 5 )
then

A(<k:nn>) = C(<k:ns>) nA(<k:nt>).
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We have three cases.
Case 1: ns
If n 8

=0
= 0, then line 2 will return 0. Thus nn = 0 and
A( <K:nn>) = 0 = 0 n A( <K :nt>) = C( <K:ns>) n A( <K:nt> ).

Case 2: nt = 0
If nt

= 0, then line 4 will return 0. Thus nn = 0 and
A( <K :nn>) = 0 = C( <K:ns>) n 0 = C(<K :ns>) n A( <K :nt> ).

Case 3: n 8 and nt are both non-zero.
Step 1: A(<K:nn>) s;;; A(<K:nt>) nC(<K:ns>).
Let pEA( <K :nn> ). By definition of accept set of an MDD, there is a path Pn
from <K: nn> to the terminal node ACCEPT such that for every edge ek

E

Pn,

L(ek) = p[k].
Since n 8 and nt are non-zero, the if statements in lines 1 and 3 will evaluate to
false, so the algorithm will continue past them. Since K > 0, the if statement in
line 5 will evaluate to false and the algorithm will proceed to lines 7 through 10.
Now, the node <K: nn> created in lines 7 through 9 is formed by calling Speciallnt recursively to obtain a node at level K - 1. The algorithm then attached
an arc with label i to this node from <K: nn>· We refer to the child node as

<K :nn>[i]. Now consider the child node produced when i = P[K]. We know
that such a node exists, because p E A(Mn)· But this means that there is an arc
with label P [K] from <K : nt> to <K : nt > [i]. Call this arc

f K. There is also an

arc with label P[K] from <K:n 5 > to <K:ns>[i]. Call this arc 9K·
By the induction hypothesis, we know that A( <K: nn> [i]) = A( <K: nt> [i]) n

C( <K :ns>[i]). Therefore there is a path Pt = (fo, h, ... , fK-1) from <K :nt>[i]
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to the terminal node for ACCEPT such that L(fk)

= p[k] for each edge fk.

There is also a path Ps = (go, g1, ... , gK-1) from Ms to the terminal node for
chain c such that L(gk)

= p[k] for each edge gk.

Therefore, the path (fo,

JI, ... , fK)

is a path from <K :nt> to ACCEPT such

A

and the path (go, g1, ... , gK) is a path from

that L(fk) = p[k] for each edge

<K: n 8 > to the terminal node for chain c such that L(gk)

gk. Thus, p
Step 2: A(Mt)

= p[k] for each edge

E A(Mt) and p E C(Ms). Therefore, A(Mn) ~ A(Mt)

n C(Ms)

Let p E A(Mt)

~

A(Mn).

n C(M

Since p E A(Mt)

n C(Ms).

We will show that p E A(Mn)·

8 ).

n C(Ms),

p E A(Mt)· Therefore, there is a path

Pt = (eo,e1, ... ,eK) from node <K:nt> to the terminal node ACCEPT such
that for each edge

Ps = (fo, fi,

ekl

... , f K)

L (ek) = p[ k ]. Similarly, p E C ( Ms), so there is a path

from <K: n 8 > to the terminal node for chain c such that

L(fk) = p[k]. This means that p

E

A(<K:nt>[i]) and p E C(<K:ns>[i]) by

definition of accept set of an MDD and C(X).
Consider what happens when i = p[K] in the for loop in line 8. In line 9,
we create a new arc, GK, from <K :nn> to a new node <K :nn>[i] which has

= p[K]. By the induction hypothesis, we know that A( <K: nn>i) =

label i

A(<K:nt>i)

n C(<K:n

8

>i). Therefore, there is a path Pn = (go,gb ... ,gK_ 1)

from <K:nn>[i] to the terminal node ACCEPT such that for each edge gk,

L(gk)

=

p[k]. Since GK has label i

=

p[K], the path

P;t

=

(go,g1,··· ,gK) is a

path from <K:nn> to the terminal node ACCEPT such that for each edge

L(gk) = p[k]. Therefore, p
Therefore, by induction, A(Mn)

E A(Mn)· Thus, A(Mt)

n C(Ms)

~

gk,

A(Mn)·

= A(Mt) n C(Ms)·

•
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2.10

Replace Algorithm

While the intersection operation restricts the chain MDD to only those packets that
match the rule, we also need to be able to insert the result into the chain containing that
rule. We want to do this in such a way that packets that match the new rule are filtered
appropriately, but packets that don't match the rule are handled exactly as before.

(a) The original Forward chain

(b) Result of Intersection

Figure 2. 7: The Replace Algorithm

This process is illustrated by the graphics in figure 2.7. The MDD in the left column
represents the FORWARD chain of figure 2.4 before insertion of rule 2. The middle column
gives the MDD representation of rule 2 after the intersection operation has been applied.
The right column shows the effect of the replace operation.

Notice that FTP packets

from the 192.168.1.0/24 subnet are dropped, but that packets from any other network are
accepted as long as they are sent to the 192.168.2.0/24 subnet.
Pseudocode for the replace algorithm is given in figure 2.8. The algorithm takes two
MDDs. The first MDD represents the chain before the rule is inserted. The second MDD
represents the result of intersecting the rule with the targeted chain. The algorithm returns
a new MDD which applies filtering to only those packets that match the new rule.
The algorithm is recursive. In lines 1 and 2, we check for a base case in which there is
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node_index Replace(level k, mdd Vc, mdd Vr)
1
if Vc = 0:
2
return Vr.
3
if Vr = 0:
4
return Vc.
5
if k = 0:
6
return Vr.
7
vt = NewNode(k).
8
fori= 0 to MaxVals(k):
9
V't[i] = Replace(k-1, Vc[i], Vr[i]).
10 return vt.
Figure 2.8: Algorithm which inserts a filtered rule into a chain

no node representing the existing chain. If this is the case, we return a node representing
the rule MDD. In lines 3 and 4, we check for the base case in which the rule MDD is 0. If
this is the case, we return a node representing the existing chain. In lines 5 and 6, we check
to see whether we have reached the bottom level of the MDD. If so, the MDD for the new
rule takes precedence over the existing chain and we return a node representing it. If none
of the base cases intercepts control, we create a new node at level k and use recursion to
set its arcs to the result of calculating the replacement at the level below.

2.11

Correctness of Replace Algorithm

Lemma 4 Let <K: Nc> be the root node of MDD Me, <K: Nr> be the root node of MDD
Mr and Nv be the root node of the MDD, Mv, created by Nv = Replace{K, Nc, Nr)· Then

To show this, it is sufficient to prove that at every level k, that Replace(k, nc, nr) returns
a node nn that satisfies the property that A( <k: nn>) = A( <k: nr>) U (A( <k: nc>) n
R( <k: nr> )).
Proof:.

We proceed by induction on k, the level of the M DD.
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Base Case

Let k = 0. Then we have the following three possibilities:

Case 1: nc = 0.
If nc

= 0, then A(nc) = 0. The if statement in line 1 will evaluate to true, so

the algorithm will return nr. Thus A(<k:nn>) = A(<k:nr>) = A(<k:nr>) U 0 =

A(<k:nr>) u (0 n R(<k:nr>)) = A(<k:nr>) u (A(<k:nc>) n R(<k:nr>)).
Case 2: nc is non-zero, but nr = 0.
If nr

= 0, then A( <k: nr>) = 0 and R( <k: nr>) = 0. The if statement in line

3 will evaluate to true, so the algorithm will return nc. Therefore, A( <k: nn>)

=

A(<k:nc>) = 0UA(<k:nc>) = 0u(A(<k:nc>)n0) = A(<k:nr>)U(A(<k:nc>)n0) =
A( <k:nr>) u (A( <k: nc>) n R( <k:nr> )).
Case 3: nr and nc are both non-zero nodes.
If nr and nc are both non-zero, then the algorithm will proceed past the first two

if statements. Since k

=

0, the if statement in line 5 will evaluate to true and the

algorithm will return nr.
Now, since nr is non-zero and we are at the terminal level, nr is either the ACCEPT
node or the DROP node. If nr is the ACCEPT terminal, then A( <k: nr>) is the set
of all packets and R( <k: nr>) is the empty set. So

A(<k:nn>) =A( <k:nr>) =A( <k:nr>) U 0

=A( <k:nr>) U (A( <k:nc>) n 0)A( <k:nr>) U (A( <k:nc>) n R( <k :nr> )).
If nr is the DROP terminal, then A(<k:nr>)

= 0 and R(<k:nr>) is the set of all

packets. Therefore,

A(<k:nn>) = A(<k:nr>) = 0 = 0 U 0
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= 0 u (A( <k:nc>) n 0) = 0 U (A( <k:nc>) n R( <k:nr> )).
Thus,

Induction Hypothesis

Assume that for all levels 0

< k < K, if nn

= Replace(k, nc, nr ),

then A(<k:nn>) = A(<k:nr>) U (A(<k:nc>) n R(<k:nr>)).

Induction Step

There are three cases:

Case 1: nc = 0.
If nc

=- 0, then A( <k: nc>) = 0 and the if statement in line 1 evaluates to true.

Therefore, the algorithm returns nr and A( <k: nn>) = A( <k: nr>) = A( <k: nr>) U

0 = A(Nodeknr) u (A( <k :nc>) n 0) =A( <k:nr>) u (A( <k:nc>) n R( <k:nr> )).
Case 2: nc is non-zero, but nr = 0.
If nr

= 0, then A( <k: nr>) = 0 and R(() <k: nr>) = 0. The if statement in line

1 will evaluate to false, but the if statement in line 3 will evaluate to true. So the
algorithm will return nc. Thus, A(<k:nn>) = A(<k:nc>) =

A( <k:nr>) U (A( <k:nc>)

0u (A(<k:nc>) n0) =

n R( <k:nr> )).

Case 3: Both nr and nc are non-zero.
If both nr and nc are non-zero, then since k > 0, none of the if statements will evaluate

to true and the algorithm will proceed to the for loop in lines 7 through 10.
We will show that if k = K and Nn = Replace(K, Nc, Nr), then A(Mn) = A(Mr) U

(A(Mc) n R(Mr)).
Step 1: A(Mn)

~

A(Mr) U (A(Mc)

n R(Mr)).
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Let p E A(Mn)· From the definition of accept set of an MDD, we know that there
is a path Pn =(eo, e1, ... , eK) such that for each edge ek in Pn, L(ek) = p[k].
Now, the node <k: nt> created in lines 7 through 9 is formed by calling Replace
recursively to obtain nodes at level k - 1. In each iteration of the loop, we
attach an arc with label i to node <k : nt> [i] created by the recursive call. Now
consider the child node produced when i = p[k]. We know that such a node
exists, because p E A(Mn)· But this means that there is an arc with label p[k]
from Me to <K :nc>[i]. Call this arc fK· There is also an arc with label p[K]
from <K:nr> to <K:nr>[i]. Call this arc 9K·
By the induction hypothesis we know that

A(<K:nn>[i]) = A(<K:nr>[i]) u (A(<K:nc>[i]) n R(<K:nr>[i])).
Therefore, there is either a path

Pr = (fo, JI, · · ·, fK-1)
from <K:nr> to ACCEPT such that L(fo)

=

p[k] or both of the following

conditions are true:
• There is a path Pc = (go,g1, ... ,gK-1) from <K:nc> to ACCEPT such
that L(gk) = p[k].
• There is no path (ho,h1, ... ,hK-1) from <K:nr> to REJECT such that

L(hk)

= p[k]

for each edge hk on the path.

If there is a path from <K:nr>i to ACCEPT, then the path (fo,

a path from <K:nr> to ACCEPT such that L(fk)
p E A(Mr)· Thus, p E A(Mr) U (A(Mc)

= p[k]

JI, ... , fK) is

for each edge fk, so

n R(Mr)).

If there is no path from <K: nr>[i] to ACCEPT, then the path (go, g~, ... , 9K)

is a path from <K:nc> to ACCEPT such that L(gk)

= p[k]

for each edge 9k·

There can be no path (ho,h1, ... ,hK) from <K:nr> to REJECT for which
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each edge hk

= p[k],

because the only arc labeled p[k] points to <K:nr>[i] and

the induction hypothesis guarantees that there are no paths from <K: nr>[i] to

REJECT. Thus, p E A(Mr)
Therefore, A(Mn)

~

Step 2: A(Mr) U (A(Mc)

U

(A(Mc) n R(MR)).

A(Mr) u (A(Mc) n R(Mr)).

n R(Mr))

Let p E A(Mr) U (A(Mc)

~

A(Mn).

n R(Mr)).

There are two cases:
Case 1: p E A(Mr).
If p E A(Mr), then there is a path Pr =(eo, e1, ... , ex) such that L(ek) =

p[k] for each edge ek in the path. Let fx be the edge created when the for
loop reaches i = p[k] and we call Replace(k- 1, <k:nc>[i], <k:nr>[i]) to
create a node <k : nn> [i] at level k - 1. Since p E A (Mr), we know that
p E A(<k:nr>[i]). This means that

p E A(<k:nr>[i]) U (A(<k:nc>[i])

n R(<k:nr>[i])).

By the induction hypothesis,

A(<k:nn>[i]) = A(<k:nr>[i]) u (A(<k:nc>[i]) n R(<k:nr>[i]))
sop E A(<k:nn>[i]). This means that there is a path

Pn = (fo, fi, · · ·, fK-1)
from <k:nn>[i] to ACCEPT such that L(fk) = p[k] for each edge fk of Pn.
But this means that the path (/o, JI, ... , fx) is a path from <K: Nn> to

ACCEPT such that for every edge !k, L(fk) = p[k].
Therefore, p E A(Mn)·
Case 2: p

~

A(Mr) and p E A(Mc) n R(Mr).
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Since p E A(Mc)

n R(Mr),

there is a path Pc

= (eo,el, ... ,eK) such that

L(ek) = p[k] for each edge ek in the path. Let fK be the edge created when
the for loop reaches i = p[k] and we call Replace(k-l, <k:nc>[i], <k:nr>[i])
to create a node <k:nn>[i] at level k- 1. Since p ¢ R(Mc), we know
that there is no path Pc = (go, 91, ... , 9K) from <K: Nr> to DROP such
that L(gk)

= p[k]

for every edge of the path. Therefore, on any path from

<K:Nr> to DROP, there is some edge 9i such that L(gi) =1- p[k]. We
know that L(gK)

= p[k],

because i

= p[k].

Therefore, there is no path from

<K:nr>[i] to DROP for which every edge

9k

has the label p[k]. Thus,

p E R(<K:nr>[i]). Since p E A(Mc), we know that p E A(<K:Nc>[i]).
This means that

pEA( <K: Nr>[i]) U (A( <K: nc>[i]) n R( <K :nr>[i])).

By the induction hypothesis,

A(<K:Nn>[i]) = A(<K:Mr>[i]) U (A(<K:Nc>[i])

n R(<K:Nr>[i]))

so p E A( <K: N n> [i]). This means that there is a path

from <K :Nn>[i] to ACCEPT such that L(fk)

= p[k]

for each edge fk of

Pn. But this means that the path

is a path from <K:Nn> to ACCEPT such that for every edge fk, L(fk)

p[k].
We have that p E A(Mn)·

=

39

In either case, p E A(Mn)· Therefore, A(Mr) U (A(Mc)

n R(Mr))

Therefore, by induction, we know that A(Mn) = A(Mr) U (A(Mc)

~ A(Mn)·

n R(Mr)).

•
2.12

Chain Building Algorithm

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

nodeJ.ndex MakeMDDFromChain(Chain c)
Me= 0
For each rule r E c in reverse order:
if r.target =ACCEPT or r.target =DROP:
Mc=Assign(Mc, r)
else:
Mr=MakeMDDFromRule(r)
Mn =MakeMDDFromChain( r.target)
Mt=Speciallnt(Mn, Mr)
Me=Replace(Me, Mt)
return Me·

Figure 2.9: Algorithm for building an MDD from a chain

Figure 2.9 gives pseudocode for generating an MDD from a firewall chain. The algorithm
makes calls to the Speciallnt and Replace algorithms discussed previously to generate an
MDD in which rules at the beginning of the chain mask later rules.

2.13

Correctness of Chain Building Algorithm

Theorem 1 Let c be any chain of the firewall and let Me be the MDD representation of c
produced by MakeMDDFromChain. Then, A(Me) = A(c).

In order to prove that the chain building algorithm constructs an MDD which is equivalent to the original chain, we consider the call-graph of the firewall defined as follows.

Definition 7 Let F be a firewall with chains co, c1, ... , Cn and let Gp = (V, E) where V is
the set {co, c1, ... , cn} and E: V x V is the set {(co, c1) I :Jr E co such that r.target

= ci}.
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Then G F is the call-graph ofF. For each node v E V, we say the set C (v)

= {u

E V

I ::Je E

E such that e0 = v and e1 = u} represents the children of node v.
In other words, G F is the graph formed over the chains of the firewall for which there
is an edge between two chains if and only if the first chain contains a rule which targets
the second chain. Since iptables does not allow cyclic references in chains, G is a directed,
acyclic graph.
To each node v of Gp, we assign a height, H(v). If v has no outgoing edges (i.e. the
chain contains only ACCEPT and DROP statements, but does not target another chain),
then H(v) = 0. Otherwise, H(v) = (maxuEC(v) H(u))

+ 1.

Theorem 2 Let c = (ro, ... , rn) be a chain in firewall F. Then, A(Me) =A( C).
Proof:

We proceed by induction on the height of c in the call-graph.

Base Case

Consider the case that H(c) = 0.

Since H(c) = 0, c contains only ACCEPT and DROP rules. Therefore, in each iteration
of the loop in line 2, the algorithm will use the Assign operator to add one rule at a time
to the MDD.
After the first iteration of the loop, we know that A(Me) = A(rn) by lemma 2 since
A(Me)

= 0. Applying the same lemma to the next iteration yields that A(Me) = A(rn-1) U

(A(Rn)nR(rn-1)). Let Me; be the value of Me after iteration i. By continued application of

lemma 2, we obtain the recurrence relation A(MeJ = A(r(n+1)-i)u[A(Me;_ 1 )nR(r(n+l)-i)].
Expanding this recurrence, we find that in iteration i, A(Me;) = A(rn-i) UjE[(n+l)-i,n]

(Aj nsE[n-i,j-1] R(rs)).
After the last iteration (iteration n), we have that A(Me) = A(Men) = A(ro) UjE[l,n]

(Aj ns in [O,j-1] R(rs)) (by substitution of n fori).
But by the definition of A(c), we can see that this is the same as A(c).
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Induction Hypothesis

Assume that A(Mx) = A(x) for any chain x such that the height

of x in the call-graph is less than or equal to some value hx.

Induction Step

We will show that for any chain c with a call graph of height hx

+ 1,

that A(Mc) = A( c). To see this, let c = (ro, ... , rn)· Let Mci represent the value of Me
after iteration i of the loop in line 2. In each iteration, we have two cases:
Case 1: The target of ri is a terminal node.
In this case, we have that A(McJ = A(r(n+I)-i) U [A(Mci_ 1 )

n R(r(n+l)-i)]

by appli-

cation of lemma 2.
Case 2: The target of ri is a non-terminal node of height less than hx.
We have that C(rn+I-i) is the set of all packets that match Tn+I-i· By lemma 3, we
know that after line 6, C(Mr)

= C(rn+I-i)·

After line 7, we have that

A(Mn) = A(rn+l-i·target)
and that

R(Mn) = R(rn+l-i·target)
from the induction hypothesis.
After line 8, we have that

A(Mt) = C(r)

n A(Mn)

and that

R(Mt) = C(r) n R(Mn)
by lemma 3.
After line 9, we have that
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This gives us A(McJ = [M(rn+l-i) n A(Mn)] U [A(Mc;_J n M(rn+l-i) U R(Mn)] by
the above mentioned properties of A(Mt) and an application of DeMorgan's Law.
Using the induction hypothesis, we have that

A(Mc;)

= [M( r n+l-i) nA( rn+l-i·target)] U [A(Mc;_ 1 ) nM (r n+l-i) UR( rn+l-i·target) ].

But by the definition of accept set of a rule, this means that A(Mc;)

= A(rn+l-i) U

A(Mc;_ 1 ) n (R(rn+l-i)).
Therefore, in either case, we have that

Similarly, we can see that R(Mc)

= R(c).

•

Chapter 3

Linux Firewall Analysis using
Queries
Despite the increasing popularity of iptables firewalls, there are very few tools for testing
and debugging a Linux firewall policy. Some work has been done on testing iptables itself
for software bugs [26], but these tools do not provide assurance in the configuration of the
firewall.
Existing tools for testing the firewall policy fall into two categories: active testing solutions, which rely on transmitting traffic across the wire, and passive testing solutions, which
analyze a model of the firewall off-line using sophisticated data structures.
Active testing tools such as SATAN [18], nessus [32], and Ftester [4] subject a firewall
to a sequence of carefully crafted packets and see which ones get through. Active testing
can also be accomplished using port scanners such as nmap [19] and hping [6]. Since it
is impossible to test every possible packet, active tools test only a portion of the firewall
configuration. This makes them well-suited for detecting specific vulnerabilities and for
detecting implementation bugs in the firewall software, but not for generating trust in the
overall security of a firewall configuration. It also means that testing can interfere with
normal network activity.
Passive testing tools can test the entire packet space, but require the use of an analysis
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Chain INPUT (policy DROP 373K packets,
prot opt in
pkts bytes target
740K 294M external_pa.ckets
190K
79M intern.al_pa.ckets
0 internal_packets
0
0 ACCEPT
0
Chain
pkts
108
0
4709K
0
936
0
28M
29194
0
0
52M
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

0
134K
0
0

41M bytes)
out
source
eth2
0.0.0.0/0
eth1
0.0.0.0/0
ethO
0.0.0.0/0
0.0.0.0/0

FORWARD (policy DROP 0 packets, 0 bytes)
prot opt in
out
bytes target
7296 DROP
icmp -- eth1
icmp
-ethO
0 DROP
tcp
499M ACCEPT
tcp
0 ACCEPT
tcp
47842 ACCEPT
tcp
0 ACCEPT
eth1
38G ACCEPT
tcp
udp
eth1
1849K ACCEPT
ethO
tcp
0 ACCEPT
udp
ethO
0 ACCEPT
26G ACCEPT
0
eth1
0 REJECT
etbl
0 REJECT
eth1
0 REJECT
eth1
0 REJECT
eth1
0 REJECT
eth1
0 REJECT
eth1
0 REJECT
0
eth1
0
0 REJECT
eth1
0
0 REJECT
eth1
0
0 REJECT
eth1
0 REJECT
eth1
0 REJECT
eth1
0 REJECT
eth1
0 REJECT
ethl
0 REJECT
udp
etb1
0 ACCEPT
eth1
0 ACCEPT
udp
ethl
0 REJECT
udp
etbO
udp
0 REJECT
eth1
11M ACCEPT
0
ethO
0 ACCEPT
0 LOG

source

o.o.o.oto
0.0.0.0/0
0.0.0.0/0
0.0.0.0/0
0.0.0.0/0
101.92.26.68
192.168.0.0/22
192.168.0.0/22
192.168.0.0/22
192.168.0.0/22
0.0.0.0/0
192.168.5.121
192.168.5.122
192.168.5.123
192.168.5.124
192.168.5.125
192.168.5.126
192.168.5.101
192.168.5.101
192.168.5.129
192.168.5.130
192.168.5.131
192.168.5.132
192.168.5.133
192.168.5.134
192.168.5.135
192.168.5.250
192.168.5.77
192.168.0.0/22
192.168.0.0/22
192.168.0.0/22
192.168.0.0/22
0.0.0.0/0

Chain Otri'Ptrr (policy DROP 13 packets, 1009 bytes)
prot opt in
out
pkts bytes target
source
127.0.0.1
0 ACCEPT
0
0
192.168.5.1
126K 122M ACCEPT
192.168.4.1
0 ACCEPT
0
101.92.2.78
136K
52M ACCEPT
0.0.0.0/0
0
0 LOG

0

0 DROP

icmp --

.

Chain external_packets (1 references)
pk.ts bytes target
prot opt in
4213 365K ACCEPT
icm.p
7389 633K ACCEPT
tcp
udp
191K
63M ACCEPT
udp
0 ACCEPT
0
80097 118M ACCEPT
tcp
37720 2867K ACCEPT
udp
tcp -0 ACCEPT
0
12444
77H ACCEPT
0

out

•

Chain
pkts
69
0
67966
0
29892
37728
0
0
0
0
28225

internal_packets
bytes target
12294 ACCEPT
0 ACCEPT
22M ACCEPT
0 ACCEPT
44H ACCEPT
2867K ACCEPT
0 ACCEPT
0 ACCEPT
0 ACCEPT
0 ACCEPT
1811K ACCEPT

(2 references)
prot opt in
icmp -tcp
udp
udp
tcp
udp
tcp
udp
udp
udp
0

.

--

•

out

destination
0.0.0.0/0
0.0.0.0/0
0.0.0.0/0
127 .0.0.1

destinatioll
0.0.0.010
0.0.0.0/0
192.168.0.0/22
192.168.0.0/22
192.168.0.0/22
192.168.5.15
0.0.0.0/0
0.0.0.0/0
0.0.0.0/0
0.0.0.0/0
0.0.0.0/0
0.0.0.0/0
0.0.0.0/0
0.0.0.0/0

o.o.o.oto
0.0.0.0/0
0.0.0.0/0
0.0.0.0/0
0.0.0.0/0
0.0.0.0/0
0.0.0.0/0
0.0.0.0/0

o.o.o.oto
0.0.0.0/0
0.0.0.0/0
0.0.0.0/0
0.0.0.0/0
0.0.0.0/0
0.0.0.0/0
0.0.0.0/0
0.0.0.0/0
0.0.0.0/0
0.0.0.0/0

icmp type 8
icmp type 8
tcp dpt:22
tcp dpt:80
tcp dpt: 8080
tcp dpt: 3306
tcp dpt:22
udp dpt :53
tcp dpt:22
udp dpt:53
state RELATED,ESTABLISHED
reject-with icmp-port-UDreachable
reject-with icmp-port-UDreachable
reject-with icmp-port-UDreacha.ble
reject-with icmp-port-UDreachable
reject-with icmp-port-un.reachable
reject-with icmp-port-un.reachable
reject-with icmp-port-UilXeachable
reject-vi th icmp-port-un.reachable
reject-with icmp-port-UDreachable
reject-with icmp-port-Uilieachable
reject-with icmp-port-unreachable
reject-with icmp-port-Uilieachable
reject-with icmp-port-unreachable
reject-with icmp-port-un.reacbable
reject-with icmp-port-unreachable
udp dpt : 2049
udp dpt: 2049
udp dpt :2049 reject-with icm.p-port-Uilieachable
udp dpt:2049 reject-with icmp-port-unreachable

limit: avg 3/min burst 3 LOG flags 0 level 7
prefix 'IPT_FDRWARD_packet_died: •

destination

o.o.o.oto
0.0.0.0/0
0.0.0.0/0
0.0.0.0/0

o.o.o.oto

limit: avg 3/min burst 3 LOG flags 0 level 7
prefix 'IPT_atrrPUT_pack.et_died: •
state INVALID

0.0.0.0/0

0.0.0.0/0

source
0.0.0.0/0
0.0.0.0/0
0.0.0.0/0
101.92.0.0/16
101.92.0.0/16
101.92.0.0/16
101.92.0.0/16
0.0.0.0/0

destination
0.0.0.0/0
0.0.0.0/0
0.0.0.0/0
0.0.0.0/0
0.0.0.0/0
0.0.0.0/0
0.0.0.0/0
0.0.0.0/0

tcp dpt:22
udp dpt:67
udp dpt:515
tcp dpt:515
udp dpt: 123
tcp dpt: 123
state RELATED,ESTABLISHED

source
192.168.0.0/22
192.168.0.0/22
0.0.0.0/0
192.168.0.0/22
192.168.0.0/22
192.168.0.0/22
192.168.0.0/22
192.168.0.0/22
192.168.0.0/22
192.168.0.0/22
0.0.0.0/0

destination
0.0.0.0/0
0.0.0.0/0
0.0.0.0/0
0.0.0.0/0
0.0.0.0/0
0.0.0.0/0
0.0.0.0/0
0.0.0.0/0
0.0.0.0/0
0.0.0.0/0
0.0.0.0/0

tcp dpt:22
udp dpt:67
udp dpt:515
tcp dpt:515
udp dpt: 123
tcp dpt: 123
udp dpt:1812
udp dpt:1813
udp dpt:1814
state RELATED,ESTABLISIIED

Figure 3.1: An iptables firewall as printed by the iptables -L -n command
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engine. The current state of the art in passive analysis is a commercial tool produced by
Algorithmic Security called "Algosec Firewall Analyzer", which is available for Cisco's PIX
and Checkpoint's FW-1 firewalls. It is a closed-source commercial project based on Wool's
Fang [37] and Lumeta [59] engines. Fang allowed the user to perform simple queries such
as "what types of packets can reach the mail server?" In Lumeta, the developers replaced
Fang's query functionality with a graphical tool that checks for specific configuration errors.
Algosec is a more capable commercial version of Lumeta. Each of their systems is capable of
analyzing multiple firewalls in a specified network topology. Redseal [40] produces a quantitative analysis tool which is similar to the Algosec product. Given a Cisco or Checkpoint
firewall policy and a description of the network topology, it identifies each system on the
network with a risk factor that can be used to determine which hosts are most in danger of
compromise by an intruder.
Another branch of research has focused on simplifying a firewall configuration by removing redundant and conflicting rules. Gouda and Liu [22] present an algorithm for constructing a firewall decision diagram and applying reduction techniques to derive a complete,
compact, and consistent firewall. Their technique can reduce the complexity of a poorly
configured firewall and uncover some configuration errors, but has a different purpose than
such engines as Algosec and SATAN. Gouda and Liu's work focuses on errors in the structure of a firewali rule set rather than in design flaws such as typos and incorrect rule order.
Other passive analysis engines use expert systems and constraint solvers [16] or computational geometry [15] to analyze a firewall policy.
Unfortunately, none of these passive techniques is widely available in an open source
tool which can be used with iptables. The commercial tools are available only for PIX and
FW-1 firewalls and no implementations of the academic work have been made available.
This means that system administrators must use active testing techniques to evaluate Linux
firewalls. Using the quasi-reduced MDD representation of the firewall policy presented in
the previous chapter, we have implemented a passive testing tool, ITVal, which allows a
system administrator to analyze the behavior of the firewall using logical queries. This
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enables a system administrator to detect errors in the policy. For instance, the tool can
determine to which hosts the firewall permits SSH access. Using this information, the system
administrator can determine whether a host that should be protected provides unwanted
connections to the outside world. In this chapter, we will describe the basic query solving
functionality provided by the tool. More advanced features of the tool will be described in
the remaining chapters.

3.1

ITVal, An Open Source Tool

ITVal is implemented using FDDL [36], a Multi-way Decision Diagram (MDD) library.

We chose to use quasi-reduced MDDs [13] over Binary Decision Diagrams(BDDs) [7] because
they are better suited for representing integral values such as ports and IP address.
The analysis engine generates an MDD model of the firewall from the textual description
of the firewall rule set generated by the "iptables -1 -n" command. An example of this input
is given in figure 3.1. The example is taken from the filtering table of a firewall used to
isolate research machines from workstations and servers. As a security precaution, we have
modified the addresses and ports, but we have kept the structure of the firewall in place.
From the figure, you can see that working with a textual representation of the firewall is
very difficult. The policy is moderately long (about 75 lines of text containing roughly
70 rules) and uses two user-defined chains to process packets sent out over three different
ethernet interfaces and the loop back device. Debugging this policy by hand is very difficult
and time-consuming. The analysis engine allows the administrator to avoid the arduous
task of processing all 75 lines of policy manually.
To use the analysis engine, the system administrator creates a file containing queries
written in a simple specification language. In the query file, the user can ask questions
such as "What services can be reached on host X?" or "Which machines can be reached
with SSH?" The analysis engine can handle many of the features of iptables, including
stateful inspection. The tool parses this query file and generates intermediate MDDs for
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the elements of each query. These intermediate MDDs are combined to produce a result
MDD using intersection and union operations. From the result MDD, the tool obtains a
list of packets which match the query from which it can generate the query results.
Using the output produced by the query engine, a system administrator can verify the
important security invariants of the network. By running an analysis of the firewall before
and after making a change to the policy, she can ensure that the change has not violated
any important security constraints. If the query engine returns an unexpected result, she
can repair the policy and re-apply the security check to ensure that everything is working
correctly.

3.2

Query Language

The analysis tool provides a straightforward query language which allows complex
queries to be built from simple primitives.

GROUP internalnet 68.10.120.* 68.10.121.*;
GROUP wlan 68.10.122.*;
SERVICE mail TCP 25 TCP 110;
SERVICE ftp TCP 21 TCP 20;
QUERY DADDY
AND
QUERY SPORT
AND

FROM wlan AND (FOR mail OR FOR TCP 80)
ACCEPTED forward;
TO internalnet AND FOR ftp AND IN NEW
ACCEPTED output;

QUERY SADDY TO internalnet AND FOR 68.11.230.45 AND
(NOT IN NEW AND NOT IN RELATED)
AND ACCEPTED forward;
QUERY DPORT FROM internalnet AND TO wlan AND
(IN NEW OR IN ESTABLISHED)
AND ACCEPTED forward;
Figure 3.2: An example ITVal query file

An example query file is given in figure 3.2. The query file is made up of group and

48
service definitions followed by one or more query statements. In this example, the first four
lines are definitions. The next four lines are query statements.

3.3

Query Statements

Query statements begin with the word QUERY followed by a

su~ject,

a condition, and

a semicolon. The subject of the query specifies what information should be printed about
packets that match the query. For instance, the query in line 5 uses the subject "DADDY"
to indicate that the destination address should be printed. The valid subjects are:
• SADDY : Source Address
• DADDY : Destination Address
• SPORT : Source Port
• DPORT : Destination Port
• STATE : Connection State
The rest of the query statement consists of a condition which specifies the packets to
consider.

3.4

Simple Conditions

The query engine allows the user to build complex conditions out of a few simple conditions. Conditions are built from nine primitives:
• FROM <address group> : Specifies one or more source addresses to match.
• TO <address group> : Specifies one or more destination addresses to match.
• ON <service> : Specifies one or more source ports to match.
• FOR <service> : Specifies one or more destination ports to match.
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• WITH <flag>

Specifies a TCP flag (URG, SYN, ACK, PSH, RST, or FIN) to

match.
• IN <state> : Specifies a connection state to match.
• LOGGED : indicates that there is a rule which potentially logs the arrival of the
packet.
• ACCEPTED <chain> : Specifies the set of packets accepted by the firewall in chain
chain.

• DROPPED <chain>

Specifies the set of packets dropped by the firewall in chain

chain.

Each of the primitives selects those packets that are accepted and that match the specified criteria. For instance "FROM 127.0.0.1" specifies those packets accepted by the firewall
which are outbound from localhost.
In the FROM and TO queries, the address group can either be the name of a predefined
address group or the numeric IP address of a host. Asterisks or CIDR notation may be
used in numerical addresses to describe an entire subnet.
In the ON and FOR queries, the service can be either the name of a user-defined service
or the name of a protocol type (TCP, UDP, BOTH, or ICMP) followed by either the numeric
port number of the service, a range of ports expressed using the syntax "[low-high]" (where
low and high define an inclusive interval of port numbers), or an asterisk. The asterisk
signifies that all packets of the given protocol type should match the query primitive. If
the protocol ICMP is chosen, the ICMP packet type number should be specified instead
of a numerical port. If BOTH is specified, the query primitive will match TCP and UDP
packets, but not ICMP packets.
The WITH primitive allows queries against any of the significant TCP flags.
The IN primitive allows the connection state to be described as any of the following:
INVALID, NEW, ESTABLISHED, or RELATED.
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The LOGGED primitive stands on its own without any parameters. It indicates that a
packet may have been logged by the firewall. Since iptables LOG rules can specify timerelated and other external criteria for logging, there is no guarantee that every matching
packet will actually be logged.
These conditions can be combined with the ACCEPTED and DROPPED primitives to
analyze the behavior of the firewall. The ACCEPTED condition specifies all packets that
are accepted by some chain of the firewall. The DROPPED condition specifies the packets
that are dropped by a chain. The chain must be one of the three built-in chains: INPUT,
FORWARD, or OUTPUT. If no chain is explicitly given, the analysis engine assumes that
the FORWARD chain should be considered.

3.5

Complex Queries

The boolean connectives NOT, AND, and OR allow the user to posit queries of arbitrary
complexity. These operators work as one would expect. The expression "NOT FROM TCP
21" matches all packets which are not TCP packets on port 21. The combination "FOR mail
OR FROM 127.0.0.1" selects both mail packets and packets outbound from localhost. The
AND and OR operators are left associative, while the NOT operator is right associative.
Parentheses may be used to disambiguate subexpressions containing multiple operators.

3.6

Group and Service Definitions

If the user had to explicitly mention every host address in every query, creating a query

file would be a tedious and error prone process. To address this issue, we allow named groups
of addresses to be defined and used throughout the query file. The syntax for specifying
a group is the word GROUP followed by a name and a space separated list of addresses.
As with the FROM and TO primitives, subnets can be specified using asterisks or CIDR
notation. Group names must consist entirely of letters and may not match any keyword of
the query language.
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Similarly, named groups of services may be defined. The syntax for defining a service is
the word SERVICE followed by a name and a space separated list of protocols and ports.
Here are some examples of queries that can be used in ITVal:

• QUERY SADDY TO 192.168.* AND ACCEPTED forward;
List all hosts with access to subnet 192.168.0.0/16.

• QUERY DPORT FROM 113.137.10.* AND
NOT FOR TCP 993 AND ACCEPTED forward;
List all destination ports, except the secure IMAP :port(993), that can be accessed by
hosts in the 113.137.10.0/24 subnet.

• QUERY SPORT NOT FROM 192.168.1.101 AND
FOR 137.113.6.2 AND ACCEPTED forward;
List all source ports open on host 137.113.6.2 to machines other than
host 192.168.1.101.

• QUERY DADDY FOR TCP 25 AND
(IN NEW OR IN ESTABLISHED) AND ACCEPTED forward;
List all hosts that can receive packets on port 25 on a connection in the NEW or
ESTABLISHED state.

• QUERY DADDY FROM 192.168.1.* AND
(FOR TCP 25 OR FOR TCP 80 OR FOR TCP 110) AND ACCEPTED forward;
List all hosts that can receive SSH, SMTP, or HTTP traffic from hosts on the
192.168.1.0/24 subnet.

3. 7

Implementation

The MDD representation of a query is very similar to the MDD representation of a
firewall chain and we can reuse most of our notation from the previous chapter. As with
the MDD representation of a firewall chain, nodes in the query MDD represent sets of
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packets. Each arc represents a choice of value for a particular attribute. Instead of terminal
nodes for ACCEPT and DROP, however, level 0 of a query MDD consists of two special
terminal nodes. The node MATCHES represents the set of packets that match the query.
The terminal node 0 represents those packets which do not match the query. As with the
rule set MDD, we reserve index 0 at each level to store a special node symbolizing the empty
set, which is not explicitly stored, but treated as a special case by the MDD algorithms.
We will continue to use the notation <k: p> to describe the node with index p at level k
and the function L(ei) to represent the label on edge ei.
In order to create the MDD representation of a query, we associate each of the query
primitives with a set of attributes which correspond to levels of the MDD. For instance,
the primitive "FROM" corresponds to the four levels which represent the source address.
The primitive "TO" corresponds to the set of levels which encode the destination port.

3.7.1

ACCEPTED and DROPPED primitives
Project (node_index Tar get, level k, nodeJ.ndex nr):
1
if k = 0:
2
if nr=Target:
3
return MATCHES.
4
else:
5
return 0.
6
if nr = 0:
7
return 0.
8
nt = NewNode().
9
fori from 0 to maxVal[k]:
10
<k:nt>[i] = Project(Target, k -1, <k:nr>[i]).
11 return nt.
Figure 3.3: MDD Projection Algorithm

MDDs for the ACCEPTED and DROPPED primitives are created using the projection operation given in figure 3.3. The projection operation isolates only the accepted
(or rejected) packets from the rule set MDD.

For instance, if nr is index of the root

node of MDD Mr. where Mr is the representation of the a chain of the firewall, then
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Project(ACCEPT, K, nr) returns an MDD which matches the packets accepted by Mr.
Lines 1 through 5 of the algorithm handle the case in which the algorithm has reached
the terminal level. In this case, if nr is the correct terminal node, we return the index of a
terminal node which represents "matches the query". Otherwise, we return terminal node

0.
Lines 6 and 7 handle the possibility that nr is node 0. If this is the case, <k: nr>
represents the empty set, which means that none of the packets represented by that node
are accepted (or dropped) by the chain. Therefore, we return index 0, which represents the
empty set.
In lines 8 through 10, we create a new node to represent the result of projecting the subMDD rooted at <k: nr> onto the target. We look at each possible value of the attributes at
level k and create an arc <k : nr> [i] to the result of calling Project on each child of <k : nr >
at level k - 1.
Figure 3.4 demonstrates the projection algorithm. The left panel contains a copy of the
rule MDD for the firewall described in the introduction. The right panel shows the result
of the projection operation on that MDD for the primitive "ACCEPTED forward". You
can determine visually that every path in the rule MDD from the root to the terminal node
ACCEPT has a corresponding path to the terminal node MATCHES in the result MDD.
All of the paths to DROP in the rule MDD have been removed by the projection operation.

3.7.2

Correctness of the Projection Operation

To show that the Project algorithm is correct, we must demonstrate that given an MDD

Mr, the algorithm returns an MDD which matches exactly those packets accepted by Mr.
Lemma 5 Let Mr be the MDD for a firewall chain, let <K: Nr> be the root node of Mr,
and let
nt = Project(ACCEPT,K,Nr)·
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Figure 3.4: MDD For "ACCEPTED forward"

Then, A(Mr)

= M(Mt),

where Mt is the MDD with root node <K:Nt> and M(Mt)

represents the set of packets that map to the MATCHES terminal in Mt. That is, that for
every packet p, p E A(Mr) if and only if p E M(Mt)·

Proof:
Step 1: If p E A(Mr), then p E M(Mt)·
Since p E A(Mr), there is a path P =(eo, e1, ... , eK) from <K:Nr> to the terminal
node ACCEPT such that for each edge ei E P, L(ei) = p[i]. We must show that
there is a path Q =

Uo, h, ... , f K)

from <K: Nt> to the terminal node MATCHES

such that for each edge fi E Q, L(fi) = p[i]. We proceed by induction on k, the level
of the MDD.
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Base Case

Let k

= 0. To see that A(<k:nr>) = M(<k:nt>), observe that since

k = 0, the if statement in line 1 will always evaluate to true. Since p E A(Mr),
<k:nr> is the terminal node ACCEPT. Therefore, the if statement in line 2 will
also evaluate to true and the Project statement will return the node MATCHES.
Therefore, <k :nt> is the terminal node MATCHES and it is obvious that p E M(Mt)
since the path from MATCHES to MATCHES has no edges and therefore trivially
satisfies the requirement that each edge have an appropriate label.

Induction Hypothesis

(fo,

h, ... , fk)

Assume that when k < K, that there is a path Q =

from <k: nt> to the terminal node MATCHES such that for each

edge fi E Q, L(fi) = p[i].

Induction Step

Let k = K. Since p E A(Mr), there is a path P =(eo, e1, ... , eK)

from <K: nr> to the terminal node ACCEPT such that for each edge ei E P, L( ei)
p[i]. If k

= 0, by the base case we know that p

=

E M(Mt)· If k -=/= 0, then the if statement

in line 1 will be false in the first call to Project. Since p E A(Mr), nr is not node 0
and the if statement in line 6 will also be false. Therefore, the algorithm will proceed
to the for loop in lines 9 and 10.
When the for loop reaches iteration p[k], the algorithm will create an arc fn with label
p[k] from <k:nt> to the result of calling Project(ACCEPT, k -1, <k:nr>[i]). Since

k - 1 < K, by the induction hypothesis we know that there is a path (fo, h, ... , f K -1)
from the returned node to the terminal node MATCHES such that for each edge fi
in the path, L(fi)

= p[i]. Thus, the path

Q

= (fo,fi, ... ,fK-l,!K) is a path from

<K: nt> to MATCHES which satisfies the condition that for each edge fi E Q,
L(fi) = p[i].
Step 2: If p E M(Mt), then p E A(Mr)·
Since p E M(Mt), there is a path P =(eo, e1, ... , eK) from <K :Nt> to the terminal
node MATCHES such that for each edge ei E P, L(ei) = p[i].
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We will show, by induction on k, that for each level there is a path Q

= (fo, h, ... , !k)

from <k:nr> to the terminal node ACCEPT such that for each edge

fiE Q,

L(Ji)

=

p[i].

Base Case

Let k

= 0.

Since p E M(Mt), Project returned the node MATCHES.

This can only happen in line 3, which means that the if statement in line 2 evaluates
to true. Therefore, <k:nr> was the node ACCEPT. Thus, it is trivially true that
p E A(<k:nr>).

Induction Hypothesis

Assume that when k < K, that there is a path Q

=

(fo, h, ... , fk) from <k:nr> to the terminal node ACCEPT such that for each edge
fi E Q, L(fi)

= p[i].

Induction Step

Consider Project( ACCEPT, K, nr) when k

= K >

0.

Since

k > 0, we know that <k: nt> was not created by the return statement in line 2. We
also know that <k:nt> was not created in line 7, because nt

=f 0.

Therefore, nt was

created in lines 8 through 11.
We know that there is a path from <k:nt> to MATCHES for which each edge of
the path at level i is labeled with p[i]. Therefore, in iteration p[k] of the loop, the
algorithm created an edge from <k:mt>[p[k]] to a node at level k- 1 which forms a
path from <k:nt> to MATCHES.
This edge could only be created by following an arc !K with label p[K] from <K: Nr>.
Since this arc points to a node at level K- 1, by the induction hypothesis, there is
a path (fo, h, ... , !K-1) from this child node to ACCEPT such that for each edge

fi, L(fi) = p[i]. Therefore, the path (fo, h, ... , fK-1, fK) is a path from <K: Nr> to
ACCEPT such that for each edge fi, L(fi) = p[i].

•
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The proof of correctness for the DROPPED keyword is similar. Simply replace

ACCEPT with DROP and A(Mr) with R(Mr)·

3. 7.3

Other Primitives

Primitives such as FROM and TO specify sets of packets whose attributes match the
argument of the query. For instance, the query primitive FROM 192.168.1.2 specifies the
set of all packets with source address 192.168.1.2. Each of the attributes matched by a
particular query primitive is associated with a set of levels in the MDD representation of
the query. We call this set the level set of the query.

Figure 3.5: MDD for the query primitive "FROM 192.168.1.*"

To construct an MDD for a query primitive other than the ACCEPTED or DROPPED
primitives, we identify each level in the level set with a range of values that match the
argument of the query. For instance, the query primitive "FROM 192.168.1.*", can be
represented by the list of ranges

([192~192], [168~168], [1~1], [0~255]).

"FOR TCP 22" can be represented by the list of

ranges([TCP~TCP],

The query primitive
[D-0],

[22~22]).

To generate an MDD representing the primitive, we begin at the bottom level with node
MATCHES and work our way up creating a single node at each level. The node created
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at a level which is not in the level set has arcs for every value to the node created at the
level below. A node created at a level in the level set has arcs only for those values in the
corresponding range.
An example MDD for the primitive "FROM 192.168.1.*" is shown in figure 3.5. The top
four levels of the MDD correspond to the source address attributes of the query and make
up the level set of the FROM operator and have a single node with arcs only for values in
the corresponding range. The remaining levels consist of "wildcard nodes" which have arcs
for every possible value.
node_indexQuery2MDD(query q, level k):
1
if k=O:
2
return MATCHES.
3
nr = NewNode(k).
4
nj = Query2MDD(q,k-1).
5
if k ¢: LS(q):
6
fori from 0 to maxVal[k]:
7
<k :nr>[i] = j.
8
else:
fori from q[k].low to q[k].high:
9
10
<k:nr>[i] = j.
11 return nr.
Figure 3.6: Pseudocode for constructing an MDD from a query primitive

We use the algorithm given in figure 3.6 to construct a decision diagram from these
ranges. The algorithm is recursive and takes two parameters: an object representing the
elements of the query and an integer representing the level of the MDD to construct.
Lines 1 and 2 handle the base case in which the algorithm has reached level 0. In this
case, we simply return the terminal node MATCHES. Line 3 creates a new node to store
the result of the operation. In line 4, we use recursion to obtain the index of the node
created at level k - 1. The if statement in line 5 determines whether the current level is in
the level set of the query. If not, lines 6 and 7 create arcs to node <k: nj> for all possible
values of the attribute at level k. If so, lines 9 and 10 create arcs only for those values in
the appropriate range. Finally, line 11 returns the new node.
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3.7.4

Correctness of the Query MDD Generation Algorithm

To demonstrate the correctness of the query MDD produced by Query2MDD, we first
define a few terms.

Definition 8 A packet p matches a query q if for every level k in the level set of q,
q[k].low :S p[k] :S q[k].high.

We call the set of packets that match a query its match

set.
We will use the notation M(q) to represent the match set of query q.

Lemma 6 Given a query q, let Nt
node <K:Nt>· Then, M(Mt)

= Query 2M D D( q, K)

and let Mt be the MDD with root

= M(q).

Proof:
Step 1: M(q) ~ M(Mt)·
Let p E M(q).

We must show that p E M(Mt)·

That is, that there is a path

P = (eo,ei, ... ,eK) from <K:Nt> to the terminal node MATCHES such that for

each edge ei

Base Step

E

P, L(ei) = p[i]. We proceed by induction on k.

Let k

=

0. The if statement in line 1 will always evaluate to true, so

the algorithm will return the node MATCHES. Thus, <k:nt> is the terminal node
MATCHES. Since M(MATCHES) is the set of all packets, p E M(<k:nt>).

Induction Hypothesis
M(q) and nt

Assume that when k < K, for any integer K, that if p

= Query2MDD(k,q), then p

E

E

M(<k:nt>). That is, that there is a

path P =(eo, e1, ... , ek) such that for each edge ei E P, L(ei) = p[i].

Induction Step

We must show that when k = K, the algorithm produces a node

<k:nt> such that if p E M(q), then p E M(<k:nt>). Let Nt

= Query2MDD(K,q).

Since k > 0 (otherwise, the base case takes care of everything), the if statement in
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line 1 will evaluate to false. Therefore, we create a new node in line 3. There are two
cases:
Case 1: k
If k

~

~

LS(q)

LS(q), the if statement in line 4 will evaluate to true and in lines 5 through

7 we set the arcs of the new node to point to the result of calling Query2MDD at
the level below. Let ek be the arc with label p[i]. This arc points to a node formed
by calling Query2MDD at level k -1. By the induction hypothesis, we know that
P

= (e 0 , e1 , ... , ek_ 1) is a path to the terminal node MATCHES such that for

each edge ei E P, L(ei) = p[i]. Therefore, the path Q =(eo, e1, ... , en-1, ek) is a
path from <k:nt> to the terminal node MATCHES that satisfies the condition
that each edge ei E Q has label p[i].
Case 2: k E LS(q)
If k E LS(q), the if statement in line 4 will evaluate to false, so the algorithm
proceeds to lines 9 and 10. Now, q[k].low :S p[k] :S q[k].high, since p E M(q).
Therefore, the for loop will eventually create an arc ek with label p[k] to a node
at level k -1. By the induction hypothesis, there is a path P =(eo, e1, ... , ek_ 1 )
from this node to MATCHES such that for each edge ei E P, L(ei) = p[i].
Therefore, the path Q = (eo,e1, ... ,ek-1,ek) is a path from <k:nt> to the
terminal node MATCHES such that for each edge ei E Q, L(ei) = p[i].
In either case, we have that p EM( <K: Nt> ), sop E M(Mt)· Therefore, by induction,
M(q) ~ M(Mt).

Step 2: M(Mt)

~

M(q).

Let p E M(Mt). By definition, there exists a path P = (eo,e1, ... ,eK) from <K:Nt>
to the terminal node MATCHES such that for each edge ei E P, L(ei) = p[i].
We must show that p E M(q). That is, that for each level k, if k E LS(q), then
q[k].low :S p[k] :S q[k].high. We proceed by induction on k.
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Base Step

If k

= 0, it is trivially true that

p E M(q), since level 0 cannot be in the

level set of a query.

Assume that when k

Induction Hypothesis

< K, for some K, that if k E LS(q),

q[k].low ~ p[k] ~ q[k].high.

Induction Step

Consider the case that k = K. Then, since k

>

0, nt could not

have been returned by line 2. Therefore, nt was returned by line 11. Let

eK

be the

arc from <k:nt> which has label p[K]. There are two cases:
Case 1: K ¢:. LS(q).
By the induction hypothesis, we know that for every level k < K, that if k E

LS(q), q[k].low ~ p[k] ~ q[k].high. Since K ¢:. LS(q), all the levels that are in
the level set are at levels less than K. Therefore, we can say that for every level

k ~ K, if k E LS(q), q[k].low ~ p[k] ~ q[k].high.
Case 2: K E LS(q).
Since K E LS(q),

eK

must have been created in lines 9 and 10. But this can only

happen if the label on arc

eK

is between q[K].low and q[K].high, since these are

the boundaries of the for loop. Therefore, since

q[K].low

~

p[K]

every level k
for all k

~

~

eK

has label p[K], we know that

q[K].high. By the induction hypothesis, we know that at

< K in the level set of q, q[k].low

~

p[k] ~ q[k].high. Therefore,

K such that k E LS(q), we know that q[k].low

In either case, p E M(q), so M(Mt)

~

~

p[k]

~

q[k].high.

M(q).

•
3.8

Combining Queries

The MDDs created for each query primitive can be combined using MDD intersection
and union operations to construct representations of more complex queries. Pseudocode
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for the MDD intersection operator is given in figure 3.7. An MDD union algorithm can be
derived directly from the intersection operator by modifying the base cases.

1
2
3
4
5
6
7

8
9

nodeJ.ndex IntersectMDD(level k, nodeJ.ndex p, nodeJ.ndex q)
if k = 0:
if <k:p>=MATCHES and <k:q>=MATCHES then return MATCHES.
else return 0.
if p = 0 or q = 0 then return 0.
result = NewMDDNode().
for value from 0 to MaxValue(k):
Arckresultvalue =
IntersectMDD(k -1, <k:p>[value], <k:q>[value]]).
result = CheckForDuplicates( <k: result>).
return result.
Figure 3. 7: MDD Intersection Algorithm

Lines 1 - 4 of the algorithm handle the base cases. The if statement at line 1 checks to
see if the algorithm has reached the terminal level. If so, then we return MATCHES if
and only if both of the input nodes are MATCHES. If we are not at the terminal level, we
return node <0: 0>. In line 4, we handle the special case that one of the argument nodes is
node <k: 0>, which represents the empty set. If so, we indicate that the result is the empty
set by returning index 0.
Lines 5 - 9 create a new MDD node representing the intersection of the arguments.
The for loop in lines 6 and 7 examines each possible value for the attribute at level k and
recursively computes the intersection of the corresponding children of the argument nodes.
Line 8 ensures that the result node does not duplicate any existing node. Line 9 returns
the result.
The function MaxValue called in line 6 is a helper function that returns the maximum
value for the field associated with level k. For instance, the maximum value of level K is
255, since level K represents the first octet of the source IP address.
A copy of the rule set MDD from chapter 2 is given on the left panel of figure 3.8. The
middle panel shows the MDD representation of the query "FROM 68.10.122.* AND (FOR
TCP 25 OR FOR TCP 80 OR FOR TCP 110)". The result of intersecting the query MDD
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Query MDD
Figure 3.8: Intersecting a query MDD and a rule MDD
with the MDD produced from the rule MDD by the primitive "ACCEPTED forward" is
given in the right panel.
To see which packets are represented by the result MDD, we start with the top node of
the graph. This node has a single arc representing the value 68, so all packets in the result
have a source address that begins with 68.
Following the arc, we reach another node with a single arc. This node represents all
packets with second source octet equal to 10. Continuing in this manner, we see that
the source address of all packets in the result must be in the group 68.10.122. * and the
destination address must be in the group 192.168.2.*.
The protocol must be TCP and the source port can have any value, but the destination
port must be port 80, the HTTP port. When we continue down the graph, we find that the
result contains packets with any TCP flag condition and in any connection state. In other
words, the result of our query is exactly: all HTTP packets from hosts on the 68.10.122.0/24
subnet to hosts on the 192.168.2.0/24 subnet.

64
GROUP wlan 68.10.122.8;
SERVICE mail TCP 25 TCP 110;
QUERY DADDY FROM wlan AND
(FOR mail OR FOR TCP 80)
AND ACCEPTED forward;
Addresses: 192.168.2.*
256 results.
Figure 3.9: ITVal output for sample query

In the context of ITVal, the output of the sample query applied to the sample rule set
is shown in figure 3.9. Note that the human-readable output corresponds directly to the
result MDD of figure 3.8.

3.9

Correctness of the Intersection Operation

To demonstrate the correctness of the intersection algorithm in figure 3.7, we must
demonstrate that the match set of the result of intersecting two MDDs is the same as the
intersection of the match sets of those two MDDs.

Lemma 7 Let Ma be an MDD with root node <K:Na>, let Mb be an MDD with root
node <K:Nb>, and let Nt = IntersectMDD(K,Na,Nb)· If Mt is the MDD with root node

Proof:
Step 1: M(Ma)

n M(Mb) ~ M(Mt)·

Let p E A(Ma)nA(Mb)· Then, there is a path P = (eo,el, ... ,eK) from <K:Na>
to MATCHES such that for each edge ei E P, L(ei) = p[i] and there is a path

Q = (fo, JI, ... , !K) such that for each edge

fiE

Q, L(fi) = p[i].

We show by induction on k, that at each level, there is a path from <k: nt> to

MATCHES with appropriate labels on each edge.
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Base Step

Let k

=

0. Then, since P and Q are both paths to MATCHES, p

and q are both the terminal node MATCHES. Therefore, the algorithm will return

MATCHES in line 2. Thus, the trivial path consisting of the node MATCHES is
a path from <k:nt> to MATCHES with appropriate labels and p E M(Mt)·

Induction Hypothesis

Assume that for every level k < K, that there is a path

R = (eo,el, ... ,ek) from <k:nt> to MATCHES such that for each edge ei E R,
L(ei)

= p[i].

Induction Step

Let k = K. We can assume that k > 0, since otherwise the base

case demonstrates that p E M(Mt)· Since k > 0, the if statement in line 1 evaluates
to false. The if statement in line 4 also evaluates to false, because p E M(Ma) and
p E M(Mb)· Therefore, a new node is created in line 5. When the for loop in line

6 reaches the value i

=

p[K], it will create a new arc 9K with label p[K] to the

node created by intersecting the nodes obtained by following arcs eK and fK· By the
induction hypothesis, there is a path R = (go,gi, ... ,9K-I) from this new node to

MATCHES such that for each edge 9i E R, L(gi) = p[i]. The arc 9K has label p[K],
so the path (go,g1,····9K-I,9K) is a path from <K:Nt> to MATCHES for which
every edge 9i satisfies the property that L(gi) = p[i]. Therefore, p
Thus, by induction, M(Ma)

E

M(Mt)·

nM(Mb) ~ M(Mt)·

Step 2: M(Mt) ~ M(Ma) nM(Mb)·
Let

p E

M(Mt)· We know that there is a path P = (eo, e1, ... , eK) from <K: Nt> to

the terminal node MATCHES such that for each edge ei E P, L (ei)

= p[i].

We must show that there are paths Q = (fo,fl, ... ,fK) from Ma to MATCHES
and R

= (go,gl, ... ,gK)

from Mb to MATCHES such that for each edge fi E Q,

L(fi) = p[i] and for each edge 9i E R, L(gi) = p[i].
We proceed by induction on k.
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Base Step

Let k

= 0.

Then, <k: nt> is the node terminal node MATCHES. Since

k = 0, the if statement in line 1 will always be true. Since <k: nt> is not node 0, we
must have returned nt from line 2. Therefore, <k: na> and <k: nb> must also be the
node MATCHES.
This means that p E M (<k : na>) and p E M (<k : nb>), since the path consisting
solely of the node MATCHES is a path from <k: na> to MATCHES and also a
path from <k: nb> toM ATC H ES, which trivially satisfies the requirement that each
edge be labeled with an appropriate attribute of p. Thus, p E M(Ma) n M(Mb)·

Induction Hypothesis

Assume that when k < K, for some integer K, that if

p E M(<k:nt>), then p E M(<k:na>)nM(<k:nb>). That is, if there is a path
(eo,el, ... ,ek) from <k:nt> to MATCHES such that L(ei) = p[i] for all 0 :S i :S k,
then there is a path P = (fo,fl, ... ,fk) from <k:na> to MATCHES and a path

Q = (go,gl, ... ,gk) from <k:nb> to MATCHES such that fi = 9i = p[i] for all
0 :S i :S k.

Induction Step

Let k = K. We can assume that k > 0, since if k

=

0, the base

case proves that p E M(Ma) nM(Mb)· Therefore, <k:nt> was not returned by lines
2 or 3. Since nt

#- 0, it was not returned by line 4.

Therefore, <k: nt> was constructed

by lines 5 through 8. Now the loop in line 6 considers each possible value of attribute
k and creates an arc for each value. Consider the iteration which creates an arc ek
with label p[k]. We know that ek does not have label 0, since p E M(Mt)· Therefore,
neither <k: p> [i] nor <k: q> [i] points to the node <k - 1: 0>. From the induction
hypothesis, we know that they must instead point to nodes from which there are
paths Uo,fl, ... ,fk-1 and (go,g1,···,9k-d totheterminalnodeMATCHESwhich
have appropriate labels.
Let fk = <k:p>[i] and let 9k = <k:q>[i].

The paths (fo,fl, ... ,fk-l,fk) from

<k:Na> to MATCHES and (go,gl, ... ,gk) from <k:Nb> to MATCHES satisfy
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the condition that each edge at level i is labeled p[i].
Therefore, by induction, p E M(Ma)

nM(Mb)·

•
3.10

Performance

MDD operations can be performed very efficiently through the judicious use of operation
caches. Caching the MDD node created by applying an MDD operation to one or more
argument ensures that each we consider each combination of arguments exactly one and
gives us a guarantee that the algorithm is linear in the product of nodes in the argument
MDDs. For clarity of the correctness proofs, we have omitted the caching mechanism from
the description of the algorithms above. Adding caching to the operations as outlined is
straightforward and does not affect correctness.

3.11

Application of ITVal Queries
GROUP wlan 192.168.1.*;
SERVICE special ICMP * TCP 53 TCP 80 TCP 22;
QUERY DPORT FROM wlan AND ACCEPTED forward;
QUERY DADDY FOR ICMP * AND ACCEPTED forward;
QUERY SADDY FOR TCP 53 AND ACCEPTED forward;
QUERY SADDY FOR TCP 80 AND ACCEPTED forward;
QUERY SADDY FOR TCP 22 AND ACCEPTED forward;
QUERY SADDY NOT (FOR special OR FROM wlan) AND ACCEPTED forward;
Figure 3.10: Example queries

To illustrate how a hypothetical system administrator might use ITVal to detect and
correct configuration errors, we return to the rule set described in the introduction as
figure 1.2 (the MDD for this policy is reproduced in this chapter on the left side figure 3.4).
The query file shown in figure 3.10 can be used to verify the most important assertions
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about this network. For instance, the query on line 3 lists all services which can be accessed
by the wireless network. The result of this query should be the empty set, since we want
to restrict all access from that network. Similarly, the last query lists all hosts not on the
wireless network that can access a service other than those explicitly permitted or denied.
Only hosts from the trusted 113.192.10.0/24 network should appear in the answer to this
query.

GROUP wlan 192.168.1.*;
SERVICE special ICMP * TCP 53 TCP 80 TCP 22;
QUERY DPORT FROM wlan AND ACCEPTED forward;
# Ports:
# 0 results.
QUERY DADDY FOR ICMP * AND ACCEPTED forward;
# Addresses:
# 0 results.
QUERY SADDY FOR TCP 53 AND ACCEPTED forward;
# Addresses:
# 0 results.
QUERY SADDY FOR TCP 80 AND ACCEPTED forward;
#Addresses: [0-191] ·*·*·*
#
192.[0-167] ·*·*
#
192.168.0.*
#
192.168.[2-255].*
#
192.[169-255] ·*·*
#
[193-255] ·*·*·*
# 4278190080 results.
QUERY SADDY FOR TCP 22 AND ACCEPTED forward;
# Addresses:
# 0 results.
QUERY SADDY NOT (FOR special OR FROM wlan) AND ACCEPTED forward;
#Addresses: 113.192.10.*
# 256 results.
Figure 3.11: Output of ITVal when run on a rule set without errors

Running ITVal on the initial configuration gives the output shown in figure 3.11. It
is easy to verify that all the requirements are satisfied. Suppose that, as described in the
introduction (figure 1.3), the administrator incorrectly inserts a rule allowing IPP printing
traffic to the beginning of the policy. This change allows undesirable behavior in that hosts
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from untrusted network 192.168.1.0/24 are allowed to print from systems on the trusted
network.

GROUP wlan 192.168.1.*;
SERVICE special ICMP * TCP 53 TCP 80 TCP 22;
QUERY DPORT FROM wlan AND ACCEPTED forward;
#Ports: 631
#1 result.
QUERY DADDY FOR ICMP * AND ACCEPTED forward;
#Addresses:
#0 results.
QUERY SADDY FOR TCP 53 AND ACCEPTED forward;
#Addresses:
#0 results.
QUERY SADDY FOR TCP 80 AND ACCEPTED forward;
#Addresses: [0-191] ·*·*·*
#
192.[0-167] ·*·*
#
192.168.0.*
#
192.168.[2-255] ·*
#
192.[169-255].*.*
#
[193-255] ·*·*·*
# 4278190080 results.
QUERY SADDY FOR TCP 22;
# Addresses:
# 0 results.
QUERY SADDY NOT (FOR special OR FROM wlan) AND ACCEPTED forward;
# Addresses: *·*·*·*
# 4294967296 results.
Figure 3.12: Output of ITVal after an error has been introduced into the rule set
Running ITVal on this new rule set produces figure 3.12. It is evident from the fact that
the first query no longer produces an empty result that this rule set is incorrect. Realizing
her mistake, the system administrator can then move the rule to its correct location in the
rule set. Now the output of the first query will once again be the empty set.

3.12

Advantages of the Query Language

One advantage of using a query language is that generic queries generated for one
firewall system can be employed on another firewall system with only a few modifications.
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This means that even without a complete understanding of the query language syntax, a
system administrator can use ITVal to check fundamental security properties. Since manual
inspection of the firewall policy requires detailed knowledge of the policy language, this is
a significant improvement in usability.
Furthermore, queries are easier to generate correctly than the firewall rule set, because
they are more general, not order dependent, and don't involve a complex interaction between
independent chains. Therefore, it is much easier for a system administrator to test the
firewall using queries than it is to design a correct rule set initially or make manual changes
to the policy.

Chapter 4

Composition of Firewalls
Networks with a large number of hosts must defend against both external and internal
intruders. While a perimeter firewall will block many external threats, it is useless against
attacks from inside the network. With Trojan horses and viruses extremely prevalent, the
problem of intrusions from internal hosts is growing rapidly [33]. To solve this problem,
many system administrators complement the perimeter firewall with local firewalls on important internal hosts [28, 20]. On moderately complex networks, the system administrator
may place additional firewalls between the perimeter firewall and groups of related hosts to
further regulate access between important subnets.
OUTSIDE WORLD
··············~·~~--r--·~~··

····················~···

J

1Uli8.L2 192.118.1.3 192.168.1.4

""''

Server

Wob
Sarver

a.a.a.

Figure 4.1: Common firewall architecture for defeating insider threats

The resulting architecture looks something like figure 4.1, which depicts a network with
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a perimeter firewall, one unprotected host (host 113.137.10.2), two protected servers (hosts
113.137.10.3 and 113.137.10.4), and an internal network (subnet 192.168.1.0/24), which
requires additional restrictions. The protected systems could be a mail server and a web
server, while the protected subnet might include clients in an accounting department with
financial information that must be secured.
The perimeter firewall can mitigate denial of service and other external threats, while
the firewall on each workstation secures services that must be protected from an inside
intruder. The firewall separating the protected subnet from the rest of the network provides
additional protection against internal threats such as zombie hosts and rogue users. Usually,
most of the workstations have very similar filtering policies, which makes the distribution of
changes easier since the policy can be edited on a single system and then distributed across
the network. One or more of the firewalls may also use network address translation (NAT)
to further protect critical hosts or to work around the IPv4 address space problem.
The multiplicity of firewalls, in networks like the one described, greatly increases the
difficulty of avoiding configuration errors. Removing a rule at the perimeter often means
exposing hosts that are not sufficiently protected by their local firewalls. Incorrectly adding
rules to a local or intermediate firewall can unintentionally block important network services.
Firewalls with NAT are even more complex because a set of translation rules must be
considered in addition to the filtering rules.
For example, consider the filtering chains given in figure 4.2 that could be used to secure
the network shown in figure 4.1. The first chain is the forwarding chain of a perimeter firewall that protects the 113.137.10.0/24 network against intrusions from an insecure network
113.137.9.0/24. Rule 1 of the chain blocks traffic from the insecure network. Rule 2 protects
the mail server by blocking all traffic from the outside world. The remaining rules secure
various services that should be allowed to pass through the firewall.
The second chain is the INPUT chain of the internal mail server, 113.137.10.3. It permits
SMTP, secure IMAP, and SSH traffic, but blocks anything else.
There are several invariant properties that the administrator wishes to preserve on this
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target
DROP
DROP
ACCEPT
ACCEPT

1
2
3
4

Chain FORWARD (policy DROP):
prot
source
destination
anywhere
tcp
113.137.9.0/24
tcp
anywhere
113.137.10.3
anywhere
anywhere
tcp
anywhere
tcp
anywhere

flags

TCP dpt:80
TCP dpt:53

Rule Set on the Perimeter Firewall

1
2
3

target
ACCEPT
ACCEPT
ACCEPT

Chain
prot
tcp
tcp
tcp

INPUT (policy DROP):
source
destination
anywhere
anywhere
anywhere
anywhere
anywhere
anywhere

flags
TCP dpt:22
TCP dpt:993
TCP dpt:25

Rule Set on the Mail Server
Figure 4.2: Rule Sets for an Example Network

network. First, web traffic from anywhere but the insecure network should always be allowed
to host 113.137.10.4, the web server. Second, hosts from the outside world should never
be able to SSH into the mail server. Third, no traffic should ever be permitted from the
insecure network.

1
2
3
4
5

target
DROP
ACCEPT
DROP
ACCEPT
ACCEPT

Chain FORWARD (policy DROP):
prot
source
destination
tcp
anywhere
113.137.9.0/24
tcp
anywhere
113.137.8.0/24
tcp
anywhere
113.137.10.3
tcp
anywhere
anywhere
tcp
anywhere
anywhere

flags

TCP dpt:80
TCP dpt:53

Figure 4.3: An Incorrect Perimeter Rule Set
Let's assume that the administrator decides to allow SSH traffic through the perimeter
firewall for hosts on subnet 113.137.8.0/24 by adding a rule to the forwarding chain of the
perimeter firewall as shown in figure 4.3. The first rule and the last three rules are the ·
same as those in figure 4.2, but the second rule is new. This change preserves the first and
third invariant, but violates the second, because SSH traffic from the outside world can now
reach the mail server. To correct the violation, the system administrator can either add
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restrictions to the filter on the mail server or switch the order of rules two and three in the
perimeter filter.

1
2
3
4
5

target
DROP
DROP
ACCEPT
ACCEPT
ACCEPT

Chain FORWARD (policy DROP):
prot
source
destination
tcp
l13.137.9.0/24
anywhere
tcp
anywhere
l13.137.10.3
tcp
anywhere
113.137.8.0/24
tcp
anywhere
anywhere
tcp
anywhere
anywhere

Hags

TCP dpt:80
TCP dpt:53

Figure 4.4: A Correctly Modified Rule Set
A correct rule set for the perimeter firewall is show in figure 4.4. The new rule set allows
HTTP and DNS traffic from 113.137.8.0/24, but preserves all three invariants.

4.1

Analyzing Firewall Systems using Existing Tools

Active testing tools such as SATAN [18], Nessus [32, 2], ISS [27], and SARA [51] can
be used to test multiple firewalls at once and can test firewalls that use NAT. In fact,
with these tools it is often more difficult to segregate firewalls on the network than it is to
process them together. Since these tools analyze traffic on the network with little or no
information about the firewall topology, it is more difficult for them to determine which
firewall is blocking a particular set of packets.
Active tools also have the disadvantage of consuming bandwidth and interfering with
normal traffic. Sending a test packet to the wrong host might crash an important server or
cause significant delays on the network link. Furthermore, active tools are very inflexible.
Rather than providing general functionality for investigating the firewall configuration, they
are designed to test specific vulnerabilities. Since they usually simulate packets originating
from a single host or small group of hosts, they will miss errors that allow packets from an
untested host. Some tools [4] use address spoofing to mitigate this problem, but because of
bandwidth constraints, no active tool can test every possible address that might originate
a packet to the firewall.
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When using active tools with multiple firewalls and address translation, it can be very
challenging to obtain adequate coverage of the policy. Because packets dropped by one
firewall are never seen by the second, it is often difficult for an active tool to generate
a spoofed packet that will exploit configuration errors in both firewalls. Also, replies to
packets with NAT'd source addresses may never be seen by the active analysis tool.
Because active tools have these drawbacks, passive tools, which perform an offline analysis of the firewall can be more practical. Passive tools, such as Redseal [40] and Lumeta [59],
provide general query capability for offline testing of firewalls and provide support for testing
multiple firewalls. Unfortunately, these tools are closed source tools that are not designed
to work with iptables firewalls. Existing structure analysis tools [22, 34] also do not support
NAT or analysis of multiple firewalls.
Some work has been done [23, 30] on modeling NAT using passive model checking tools,
but this work is targeted at demonstrating the correctness of a few specific firewall configurations and is not easily generalizable to arbitrary firewall policies. Other research [56]
performs a passive analysis of a distributed firewall system, but handles only a limited
number of queries regarding address spoofing.
In this chapter, we show how the quasi-reduced MDD model can be extended to analysis
of groups of connected firewalls, network address translation, and more advanced packet
mangling techniques such as masquerading and redirection. We illustrate the implementation of these features in ITVal.

4.2

Composing Nested Firewalls

In order to extend our technique to work with multiple firewalls, we introduce the
concept of a meta-firewall. A meta-firewall is an imaginary firewall that represents a composition of the rule sets of two or more serially connected firewalls.
The meta-firewall has three filter chains analogous to the built-in chains of a normal
firewall. The FORWARD chain of the meta-firewall regulates traffic passing through all
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the firewalls in either direction. The INPUT chain of the meta-firewall regulates traffic
inbound to the innermost firewall through all of the outer firewalls. The OUTPUT chain
represents traffic generated by the innermost firewall that successfully passes through the
outer firewalls to the outside world.
Queries are performed against the meta-firewall as if it were a single iptables firewall.
For instance, the query

QUERY DPORT FOR 192.168.* AND IN NEW AND ACCEPTED forward;
will list the destination ports of packets bound for the 192.168.0.0/16 subnet that pass
through all the firewalls in the set.

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

Firewall* ConstructFirewall(int n, Firewall* fws)
newFW = NewFirewall()
newFW.forward = fws[O].forward
newFW.input = fws[O].input
newFW.output = fws[O].output
for i in 1 to n - 1:
newFW.forward = IntersectMDD(K, newFW.forward, fws[i].forward).
newFW.input = lntersectMDD(K, newFW.input, fws[i].forward).
newFW.output = lntersectMDD(K, newFW.output, fws[i].forward).
return newFW.
Figure 4.5: Algorithm for Constructing a Meta-Firewall

To construct the meta-firewall, ITVal joins the MDD for each chain of the component
filters using the MDD intersection operator described in chapter 2.
Pseudocode for generating the meta-firewall is shown in figure 4.5. The INPUT chain
of the meta-firewall is constructed by intersecting the FORWARD chains of the outer n -1
firewalls and the INPUT chain of the innermost firewall. The OUTPUT chain is created
by intersecting the OUTPUT chain of the innermost firewall with the FORWARD chains
of the outer n- 1 firewalls. The FORWARD chain is the intersection of all n FORWARD
chains.
An MDD depicting the meta-firewall for the rule sets in figure 4.2 is shown in figure 4.6.
In order to save space, only the levels for source address, destination address, and destination
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Source
Address 2
Source
Address 3

~~~:::.==
L.......,==~:!---.!::::::oo---1
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Figure 4.6: Combining two rule sets into a meta-firewall

port are shown. We also display only paths to the node ACCEPT.
Figure 4. 7 illustrates how ITVal might be used to detect the errors described in section 4.
We depict the results of three queries before and after the incorrect change. The original,
valid, results are shown in Roman font, while the query results for the incorrect policy are
shown in bold.
Each query corresponds to one invariant that the administrator wishes to preserve. The
first query asks which hosts, other than those on the insecure net, can access the web server.
In the original results, we see that, as expected, any host not on the insecure network can
access the web server. The new results show that this important invariant still holds in the
modified policy.
The second query asks whether the SSH port on the mail server can be accessed from
outside the firewall. The original results show that no external machine can reach the mail
server. After the modification, however, the results show that the SSH port can be accessed
from outside the firewall. The change allows SSH traffic from 113.137.8.0/24 to reach the
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>ITVal Example.fw mail.rs mail.nat perimeter.rs perimeter.nat
#First invariant: Web traffic not from insecure net
#can always reach the web server
GROUP insecure 113.137.9.•;
QUERY SADDY FOR TCP 80 AND NOT FROM insecure AND FOR 113.137.10.3 AND ACCEPTED input;
#Addresses: [0--112].*.*.* [114--255].*.*.* 113.[0--136].*.*
# 113.[138--255].*.* 113.137.[0--8].* 113.137.[10--255].*
# 4294967040 results.
# Addresses: [0--112].*.*.* [114--255].*.*.* 113.[0--136].*.*
# 113.[138--255].*.* 113.137.[0--8].* 113.137.[10--255].*
# 4294967040 results.

#Second invariant: External hosts should never be able to SSH to the mail
# server.
GROUP internal 113.137.10.•;
QUERY DPORT NOT FROM internal AND FOR TCP 22 AND TO 113.137.10.3 AND ACCEPTED input;
#Ports:
# 0 results.
#Ports: 22
# 1 results.

#Third invariant: No traffic from the insecure network can reach the
mail server.
QUERY DPORT FROM 113.137.9.* AND TO 113.137.10.3 AND ACCEPTED input;
#Ports:
# 0 results.
#Ports:
# 0 results.

Figure 4. 7: Query results before and after the change
mail server. By comparing these results, the administrator will realize that she has made
a mistake and take steps to correct it. The last query tests whether services on the mail
server are available to the insecure network. For both policies, the answer is no.

4.2.1

Correctness of the Composition Operation

To show that the composition algorithm is correct, we must demonstrate that the traffic
accepted by the FORWARD chain of the meta-firewall is exactly that accepted by the
FORWARD chain of every intermediate firewall, that the traffic accepted by the INPUT
chain of the meta-firewall is exactly that accepted by the INPUT chain of the innermost
firewall and by the FORWARD chains of the other n- 1 firewalls, and that the OUTPUT
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chain of the meta-firewall is exactly that accepted by the OUTPUT chain of the innermost
firewall and by the FORWARD chains of the other n- 1 firewalls.

Theorem 4.1 Given an ordered list FW = (Fo, F1, ... , Fn-1), ofn firewalls, let Fm be the
meta-firewall created by ConstructFirewall(n, FW). Then, for every packet s such that
s E A(Fi.forward) for all 0 ::; i ::; n- 1, s E A(Fm.forward). Also, for each packet
t E A(Fm.forward), t E A(Fi.forward) for all 0 ~ i ~ n- 1.
Proof:
Let s E A(Fi.forward) for all 0 ::; i ::; n- 1. Line 2 copies the FORWARD chain of

Fo into Fm. Thus, since s E A(Fo.forward), s E A(Fm.forward) immediately after line
2 has executed. The for loop in lines 5 and 6 intersects Fm.forward with each firewall

Fi.forward and stores the result in Fm.forward. However, since s E A(Fi.forward) for
all i, these intersections cannot removes from A(Fm.forward). Therefore, when we return
in line 9, s E A(Fm.forward).
Now, let t E A(Fm.forward). Since Fm.forward is created by the intersection of the
FORWARD chains of each firewall of FW in lines 5 through 8, we know that

A(Fm.forward) =

U

A(Fi.forward)

O~i~n-1

But the correctness proof of the intersection operator from chapter 2 implies that

A(Fm.forward)

~

A(Fi.forward) for 0 ::; i ::; n- 1. Thus, t E A(Fi.forward) for each

firewall Fi E FW.

•
This means that the FORWARD chain of the meta-firewall is exactly the intersection of
the FORWARD chains of the constituent firewalls. By trivial modification of the proof, we
can also see that the algorithm correctly sets the OUTPUT chain of the meta-firewall to be
the intersection of the OUTPUT chain of the innermost firewall with the FORWARD chains
of the other firewalls and the INPUT chain of the meta-firewall to be the intersection of the
INPUT chain of the innermost firewall with the FORWARD chains of the other firewalls.
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4.2.2

Network Address Translation

In addition to filtering packets that pass through the firewall, iptables provides a mechanism for modifying a packet's destination address and destination port before filtering or
source address and source port after filtering. Properly handling network address translation (NAT) in the query engine is important, because the modified packet may be treated
differently by the filtering rules than the original packet. In order for our queries to take
NAT into account, we must modify the rule set MDD to reflect each of the NAT rules.
A NAT rule is a function which maps certain packets seen by the firewall to new,
translated, packets.

These new packets may differ from the original packets in source

address, source port, destination address, or any other attribute. The most common types
of NAT rules are "source NAT" rules, which modify the source address and/or source port
of a packet and "destination NAT" rules, which modify the destination address and/or
destination port of the packet.
In practice, the translation rule is described as a set of match conditions that identify
a set of packets which should be modified (just as every filtering rule has a set of match
conditions which specify which packets should be filtered) and a set of target values which
specify the attributes of the new packet produced by translation. Often, most of the target
values will be the same as the original packet and only a few of the attributes will change.
The match conditions describe a "match set" of packets which satisfy all of the conditions. The translation rule maps packets which are not in the match set to themselves.
That is, it leaves them unchanged. Packets which are in the match set are mapped to new
packets. These new packets are usually identical to the original packet, except that some
of the attributes have been set to new target values.
Like filtering rules, translation rules are stored using chains. Destination NAT (DNAT)
rules for incoming packets are specified in the PREROUTING chain, which is processed before filtering. In addition to the PREROUTING chain, iptables provides a POSTROUTING chain, processed after filtering, which is the appropriate place for source NAT (SNAT)
rules, and an OUTPUT chain for performing DNAT on locally generated packets.
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1
2
3
4

target
DNAT
DNAT
DNAT
DNAT

prot
all
all
all
all

Chain PREROUTING (policy ACCEPT):
flags
source
destination
anywhere 113.137.10.101
TCP dpt:2002 to:192.168.1.2:22
TCP dpt:2003 to:192.168.1.3:22
anywhere 113.137.10.101
TCP dpt:2004 to:192.168.1.4:22
anywhere 113.137.10.101
anywhere 113.137.10.101 TCP dpt:3000 to 192.168.1.2:9999
NAT rules for the intermediate firewall
Chain FORWARD (policy ACCEPT):

I target I prot I source I destination I flags
1 I DROP I tcp I 113.137.10.4 I 192.168.1.0/24 I
Filter rules for the intermediate firewall

Figure 4.8: Rule set of a NAT'ing firewall
An example rule set for a firewall which uses NAT, is shown in figure 4.8. This rule
set might represent the policy of the intermediate firewall, depicted at the beginning of the
chapter in figure 4.1, which protects internal network 192.168.1.0/24 from the outside world
by allowing internal hosts to use non-routable IP addresses. To access a host, an external
system must connect directly to the NAT'ing firewall on a designated port. The firewall
will then forward the connection to the appropriate machine.
The PREROUTING chain given in figure 4.8 contains several NAT rules. The first
three rules map packets arriving on ports 2002-2004 of the firewall host to the SSH ports of
various internal hosts. The last rule of the chain maps incoming connections on port 3000 to
port 9999 of machine 192.168.1.2 (a proprietary financial database is running on that port).
The FORWARD chain prevents internal hosts from accessing the web server. The match
set of the first rule in the PREROUTING chain is "all TCP packets from 113.137.10.101 on
port 2002". The output of the rule is a new packet which is identical to the original packet
except that the destination address is now 192.168.1.2 and the destination port has been
changed to TCP port 22(the SSH port).
To access host 192.168.1.2, a user must connect to port 2002 of the firewall host (host
113.137.10.101). The firewall will then replace the destination address of the packet with
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"192.168.1.2" and the destination port with "22" before applying the filter rules and handing
the packet over to the router.

1
2

target
DROP
DROP

Chain FORWARD (policy ACCEPT):
source
destination
flags
prot
113.137.10.4 192.168.1.0/24
tcp
tcp
113.137.10.3 113.137.10.101 TCP dpt:3000

Figure 4.9: Incorrectly Configured Filter on the NAT'ing firewall
NAT adds another layer of complexity to the configuration of a firewall. One common
mistake is to add filtering rules for the original address rather than the NAT'd address. For
instance, if the system administrator decides to further restrict access to the internal hosts,
she might add rule 2 of figure 4.9 to the FORWARD chain. This change should prevent the
mail server from accessing the proprietary database. The new rule fails to block forwarded
connections to the internal hosts, however, because filtering rules are not applied until
processing of the translation rules has been performed. Such a mistake is difficult to catch,
since it involves the complex interplay of rules in two different tables of the firewall policy.

Rule Set Before NAT

Rule Set After NAT

Figure 4.10: Applying NAT to the Example Rule Set
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To model network address translation using MDDs, we create an operator which takes
as inputs a NAT rule and the MDD representation of a set of packets. It produces as
output an MDD which has been modified in such a manner that rules which applied to the
original, unmodified packets apply instead to the translated packets. This enables us to
perform analysis of the policy which takes into account the effects of address translation.
Figure 4.10 shows the MDD for a filtering policy before and after application of the
NAT algorithm. Tracing a path through the MDD along the edges representing "a packet
from address 113.137.10.3 to port 3000 of host 113.137.10.101" shows that such a packet
will be accepted by the firewall.
node_index NAT(NAT_RULE tr, level k, nodejndex p, nodejndex q)
1
if k = 0:
2
return q.
3
r = NewNode(k).
4
let j = tr[k].target.
5
for each arc i E <k:p>:
6
if i tf. (tr[k].low, tr[k].high):
7
<k:r>[i] = <k:p>[i].
8
otherwise:
<k:r>[i] = NAT(tr, k -1, <k:p>[i], <k:q>[j]).
9
10 return r.
Figure 4.11: Algorithm for NAT of MDDs

Pseudocode for applying a NAT transformation on the MDD representation of the rule
set of a single firewall is shown in figure 4.11. The algorithm takes as parameters a NAT
rule and two MDD nodes. The first node, <k :p>, represents the set of rules which apply
to untranslated packets. The second node, <k: q>, represents the rules which apply to
translated packets. To apply a NAT rule, tr to an MDD Mp which represents a filtering
chain, we call NAT (tr, K, p, p) where <K : p> is the root node of Mp.
The NAT rule is represented as an array of structures of size K. Each structure consists
of two parts: a match interval and a target value. The match interval at position k of the
array identifies a range (tr[k].low, tr[k].high) of values for the attribute at level k. These
ranges are chosen in such a manner that every packet s matching the NAT rule will satisfy
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the condition that at every level k, low[k] :S s[k] :S high[k].
In general, we are not guaranteed that it is possible to decompose the NAT rule into
independent ranges for which this condition will hold. However, for the special case of
iptables firewalls, the syntax of the policy language ensures that it is always possible to do
so. We can extend this technique to other types of firewalls by splitting each NAT rule
up into a list of arrays, rather than a single array of structures (in fact, ITVal implements
NAT translation in this matter), but since this process significantly complicates discussion
of the algorithm, we will treat the NAT rule as a single array.
The target value at level k, tr[k].target, specifies a new value for the attribute at that
level which should be applied to packets that match the NAT rule.
Using this representation of a NAT rule, tr, we have the property that for any packet

s such that tr[k].low :S s[k] :S tr[k].high, tr(s)[k] = tr[k].target. For all other packets,
tr(s)[k]

= s[k].

As we descend the graph recursively, we use index p to track the rules currently applied
to a set of packets and index q to track the rules which should be applied to those packets
after NAT.
Lines 1 and 2 (see figure 4.11) check for the base case condition in which we have reached
level 0. If this has happened, we don't need to do any more work as all the NAT related
information is contained in the preceding levels. We return q, the index of the terminal
node representing the action applied to the NAT'd packets.
TheN ewNode operation in line 3 creates a new MDD node <k: r> and returns its index.
This new node will represent the result of the NAT operation. Line 4 sets a temporary
variable j to the target value of the translation rule for level k.
In lines 5 through 10, we consider each possible value i of the attribute represented by
level k. If the value is not in the match interval of the NAT rule, the node reached by arc i
represents rules applied to packets which do not match the NAT rule. Line 7 handles this
case by copying the arc with label i from <k : p> into <k : r>.
If i is in the match set of the NAT rule, line 9 creates a new node at level k -1. This node
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is constructed by a recursive call of the NAT operation on nodes <k:p>[i] and <k:q>[j].
It represents the set of translated filtering rules which apply to packets with value i for

attribute k. We create an arc with label i to this node from <k: r>. Finally, in line 10 we
return r.

GROUP insecure 113.137.10.3;
QUERY SADDY FROM insecure
AND FOR TCP 3000 AND
ACCEPTED forward;
# Addresses:
# 0 results.
Figure 4.12: Query for detecting errors in the NAT'ing firewall

GROUP insecure 113.137.10.3 113.137.10.4;
QUERY SADDY FROM insecure
AND FOR TCP 3000
AND ACCEPTED forward;
#Addresses:
# 1 result.

113.137.10.4

Figure 4.13: Results for an Incorrectly Configured Firewall
Figure 4.12 provides a query that might be used to detect the error in figure 4.9. The
group "insecure" is a list of hosts that should be prevented from accessing the secure
server. A correctly configured firewall should always return an empty result, as in the
figure. After making the incorrect change to the filtering rules, the system administrator
adds 113.137.10.3 to the group. If she now runs the query a second time, she will see the
results in figure 4.13 and detect the error.

4.2.3

Correctness of the NAT algorithm

To prove the NAT algorithm is correct, we will show that every packet that is accepted by
firewall after translation is accepted by the MDD for the translated rule set and vice-versa.
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Theorem 4.2 Let Mp be a rule set MDD with root node <K :p> and let Mr be the MDD
produced by NAT(tr,K,p,p). For every packets such that s E A(Mr), tr(s) E A(Mp)·
Also, for every packet t such that tr(t) E A(Ms), t E A(Mr)·

Proof:
Step 1: If s E A(Mr), then tr(s) E A(Mp)·
Since s E A(Mr ), there exists a pathS= (eo, e1, ... , eK) from the root node of Mr to
the terminal ACCEPT such that L(ei)
that there is a path T = (fo,

=

s[i] for each edge ei in S. We must show

h, ... , fK) from the root node of Mp to ACCEPT such

that L(fa) = tr(s )[a] for each edge fa in T.
To show this, we use induction on k to show that at any level, for some node <k: p>
of Mp, there is a path T = (fo, ... , fk) from <k:p> to the terminal ACCEPT such
that L(fa) = tr( s )[a] for each edge fa in T.

Base Case

Let k = 0. Then since s E A(Mr), Mr consists of the terminal node

ACCEPT. This can only happen if q was returned in line 2. Thus, <k:q> was also
the terminal node ACCEPT. But since, initially, <K :q> = <K :p>, this means
that the trivial path containing only the node ACCEPT is a path from <k:p> to
ACCEPT such that for every edge fa in the path, L(fa) = tr(s)[a].

Induction Hypothesis
T

= (fo, JI, ... , fk)

Assume that at every level 0 < k < n, there is a path

from <k:p> to ACCEPT such that L(fa)

= tr(s)[a]

for each

edge fa E T.

Induction Step

Let k

=

n > 0. Since k > 0, the algorithm will skip lines 1 and

2. Therefore, <k: r> was created in line 3 and returned by line 10. Let i be the arc
from <k: r> which has label s[k]. We know that i was created in the for loop of lines
5 through 9.
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There are two cases.
Case 1: Arc i was created in line 7.
In this case, the if statement in line 6 must have been true. This means that
s[k] > tr[k].high or s[k] < tr[k].low. In either case, we know that s did not
match the NAT rule, so s[a] = tr(s)[a] for all 0 ~a~ k.
Now, line 7 copied an arc from node <k:p>, so there is an arc

fk with label

tr (s) [k] from node <k : p> that points to the same child as arc i of node <k : r>.
Thus, the path T = (eo, e1, ... , ek-1, h) is a path from <k :p> to ACCEPT
which satisfies the condition that L(fa) = tr(s)[a] for each edge fa in the path.
Case 2: Arc i was created in line 9.
In this case, the if statement in line 6 was false, so tr[k].low ~ s[k] ~ tr[k].high.
Line 9 created an arc with label s[k] to the result of performing NAT at level

k- 1 by following the arc from <k:q> with label j = tr(s)[k] to a node at level
k-1.
By the induction hypothesis, we know that there is a path T = (fo,

JI, ... , fk_ 1 )

from this node to ACCEPT such that L(fa) = tr(s)[a] for each edge fa in the
path. Thus, the path (fo,

JI, ... , fk)

is a path from <k: q> to ACCEPT such

that L(fa) = tr(s)[a] for each edge fa in the path.
Since in the initial call to NAT, <K: p> = <K: q>, this path is also a path from

<k:p> to ACCEPT.
In either case, we have that tr(s) E A(Mp)·
Step 2: If tr(s) E A(Mp), then s E A(Mr)·
lftr(s) E A(Mp), then there exists a pathS= (eo,e 1, ... ,eK) from <k:p> to the
terminal node ACCEPT such that L(ea) = tr(s)[a] for every edge ea E P. We must
show that there is a path T = (fo,

L(fa) = s[a] for every edge fa E T.

JI, ... , fK)

from <k:r> to ACCEPT such that
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We proceed by induction.

Base Case

Let k = 0. Then, the if statement in line 1 will be true and we will

return the terminal node ACCEPT in line 2. This means that <k:r> =ACCEPT.
Thus, the trivial path containing only the terminal node ACCEPT is a path from
<k :r> to ACCEPT such that for each edge fa in the path, L(fa)

Induction Hypothesis

= s[a].

Assume that for 0 < k < n, there is a path

T=(fo,fi, ... ,fk)

from <k:r> to ACCEPT such that L(fa) = s[a] for each edge fa E T.

Induction Step

Let K

=

n > 0. Since k > 0, we skip lines 1 and 2 and proceed

immediately to line 3. This line creates a new node <k: r>. We then proceed to the
for loop in lines 5 through 9, which examines each possible value, i, of the attribute
at level k. When the for loop reaches i = s[k], we have two possibilities:
Case 1: tr[k].low :S s[k] :S tr[k].high
If this is the case, line 9 creates an arc fk with label s [k J from node <k: r> to

the node created by performing NAT at level k- 1. By the induction hypothesis
there is a path (!0 , JI, ... , fk_ 1 ) from this node to ACCEPT such that for each
edge fa in the path, L(fa) = s[a].
Thus, the path T = (fo,

JI, ... , fk-1, !k) is a path from

<k:r> to ACCEPT

such that L(fa) = s[a] for each edge fa E T.
Case 2: s[k] < tr[k].low or s[k] > tr[k].high
In this case, s does not match the NAT rule, so we know that s[a]

= tr(s)[a]

for

all 0 :S a :S k. Line 7 creates an arc fk with label s [k] from <k: r> to a child of
<k:p>. But since (eo,el, ... ,ek-l) is a path from this child to ACCEPT such
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that L(ea)

= tr(s)[a] = s[a], we know that the path

T

= (eo, e1, ... , ek-1, fk) is

a path from <k:r> to ACCEPT such that for each edge fa E T, L(fa) = s[a].
Thus, in either case, s E A(Mr).

4.3

•

Nested Composition with Network Address Translation

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18

Firewall* NAT(int n, Firewall** FW)
newFW = NewFirewall()
newFW.forward = DNAT_ALL(fws[O].dnat, fws[O].forward).
newFW.input = DNAT_ALL(fws[O].dnat, fws[O].input).
newFW.output = DNAT_ALL(fws[n -l].nat, fws[n- l].output).
for i in 1 to n - 1:
newFW.forward =
IntersectMDD(K, newFW.forward, fws[i].forward).
newFW.forward = SNAT_ALL(fws[i- l].snat, newFw.forward).
newFW.forward = DNAT_ALL(fws[i].dnat, newFW.forward).
newFW.input =
IntersectMDD(K, newFW.input, fws[i].forward).
newFW.input = SNAT _ALL(fws[i- l].snat, newFw.input).
newFW.input = DNAT_ALL(fws[i].dnat, newFW.input).
newFW.output =
IntersectMDD(K, newFW.output, fws[(n- i)- !).forward).
newFW.output = SNAT_ALL(fws[(n- -i)].snat, newFw.output).
newFW.output = DNAT_ALL(fws[(n- i)- l].output, newFW.output).
newFW.forward = SNAT _ALL(fws[n- l]:snat, newFw.forward).
newFW.input = SNAT_ALL(fws[n -l].snat, newFw.input).
newFW.output = SNAT_ALL(fws[O].snat, newFw.output).
return newFW.
Figure 4.14: NAT with multiple firewalls

The pseudocode in figure 4.14 combines NAT with analysis of multiple firewalls. The
procedure DNAT _ALL applies the chain of DNAT rules pointed to by its first parameter
to the rule set MDD specified by the second parameter. The procedure SNAT _ALL works
similarly for SNAT.
In order to correctly derive the output chain of the meta-firewall, we work from the
outermost firewall toward the innermost firewall combining pairs of firewalls. We DNAT
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the outermost firewall, then enter a loop in which we intersect the result with the unNAT'd
filter rules of the next firewall to be considered. In each iteration of the loop, we perform
SNAT on the result of the intersection using the SNAT rules of the first firewall. We then
DNAT using the DNAT rules of the second firewall. This alternating behavior simulates
the traversal of a packet first through the PREROUTING chain, then through the filtering
rules, and finally through the POSTROUTING chain.
To derive the input and forward chains, we perform the same operations in reverse order,
working from the innermost firewall to the outermost firewall.

4.3.1

Correctness of NAT with Composition Operations

Correctness of the algorithm in figure 4.14 follows directly from the proofs presented for
the correctness of the NAT algorithm and the MDD intersection.
From the correctness of the DNAT algorithm, we know that after line 2, newFW.forward
contains an MDD which accepts exactly those packets accepted by firewall 0.
To see that the for loop in lines 5 through 14 correctly merges the remaining firewalls
into newFW.forward, notice that since the intersection algorithm is correct, we know that
after line 6, newFW.f orward is an MDD which accepts exactly those packets which are
have passed through firewalls 0 through i - 1 and through the forward chain of firewall i,
but have not yet been processed by the POSTROUTING chain. From the correctness of
the SNAT algorithm, we know that after line 7, newFW.forward accepts those packets
which have passed through all chains of firewalls 0 through i. Therefore, at the end of the
algorithm, the newFWforward is an MDD which accepts exactly those packets which can
pass through the filtering and translation chains of all of the firewalls.
Similarly, we know that the MDD for newFW.input accepts exactly those packets which
pass through the n- 1 outermost firewalls and the input chain of the innermost firewall and
the MDD for newFW.output accepts exactly those packets which pass from the innermost
firewall through the remaining n- 1 firewalls.
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4.4

Analyzing Firewall Systems with ITVal

The techniques described in this chapter have been implemented by extending our tool,
ITVal, to allow analysis of multiple firewalls and firewalls that use address translation.

To analyze a meta-firewall, the user passes the names of several rule set description files
on the command line. The order of the filenames must reflect the topology of the firewalls,
with the innermost filter first on the command line and the outermost filter last. The user
may optionally specify a topology file that identifies the IP addresses of each interface on
any firewall host.
In addition to supporting destination and source NAT, iptables provides two special
case NAT targets. The REDIRECT target rewrites the destination address of a packet
so that it will be routed to the firewall itself. The MASQUERADE target rewrites the
source address of a packet so that it appears to have been originated by the firewall. The
REDIRECT and MASQUERADE targets are extremely useful for environments in which
addresses are assigned dynamically, since the address of the original host need not be known
apriori when designing the rule set. In order to represent REDIRECT and MASQUERADE
rules, ITVal looks up the IP address of the host in the topology table provided by the user
and performs SNAT or DNAT using the correct address for that interface.

Chapter 5

An Equivalence Class Approach to
Policy Testing
Passive tools such as ITVal can make the process of testing and debugging the firewall
much easier. Writing queries is simpler than constructing the policy, because the queries
only need to provide a partial specification of the firewall policy. Furthermore, the query
file is less complex than the rule set, because queries are order independent, while rules in
a rule set often have very complicated dependencies.
In theory, passive tools can test every possible behavior of the firewall. In practice,
however, such a test produces too much unstructured output to be useful. Testing all
eventualities would produce output for every possible packet seen by the network. Since
there are 255 4 possible source addresses and the same number of destination addresses,
there are billions of packets to consider -

an overwhelming amount of output. Since the

decision of which behaviors are desirable and which are undesirable must be made by the
user, the tool is unable to structure these outputs in a way that makes it easy to identify
incorrect behavior.
To avoid this problem, the user must carefully construct a set of queries that test for
specific vulnerabilities. While it is often easier to construct these tests than to inspect the
rule set manually, it can be difficult to create queries that test enough interesting behaviors
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to provide confidence in the policy and also produce useful output.
There is no way to guarantee that all important behaviors have been tested. To obtain
an ideal set of queries in which exactly those behaviors are tested that could lead to a
security violation, the administrator would need to be omniscient.
This means that query-based tools may miss important vulnerabilities. If the system
administrator fails to provide a test for an important threat, the testing software cannot
detect that the firewall is vulnerable. Since mistakes that are difficult to catch by manually
inspecting the rule set are also likely to be overlooked when writing queries, it is likely that
the query tool will fail to detect a significant number of errors.
Furthermore, constructing a set of comprehensive and effective queries can be an extremely challenging task, which requires a significant investment of time and resources.
Designing good queries requires apriori knowledge of potential firewall problems and familiarity with the subtleties of firewall design.
This problem is not unique to passive testing tools that use query engines. Active tools
require the user to decide which behaviors to test. For instance, to use a port scanner,
the system administrator must provide a list of hosts to analyze. Scanning all ports on
a few important servers will often catch the most critical vulnerabilities, but it is often
helpful to also scan individual workstations for less obvious errors. To check for as many
vulnerabilities as possible, the user must craft a testing pattern that balances running time
against the number of hosts to scan, the number of ports to check, and the number of
spoofed source addresses to employ.
Vulnerability scanners such as Nessus [32] also require a significant amount of user input.
These tools make use of a database of pre-designed tests. While well-known vulnerabilities
can usually be caught using the scripts provided with the scanner, creating new tests requires
learning a sophisticated scripting language.
One reason firewalls are so difficult to manage is that slight differences in the rule
set can cause dramatic changes in the behavior of the firewall. For instance, on iptables
firewalls [17], the filtering policy is specified using ordered chains of rules. In each chain, the
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first rule that matches a packet is used to determine the fate of the packet. Reversing two
rules can introduce an error that is difficult to detect, but significantly modifies the behavior
of the firewall. Other firewall systems have similarly deceptive semantics. For instance, the
firewall policy on an ipfilters system uses a "last-match" policy to determine the fate of
the packet [41]. Features such as network address translation and stateful filtering can also
create opportunities for introducing difficult-to-detect errors.
Another problem is that subtleties in the syntax of the query language can cause the
query engine to generate unexpected results. This means that in addition to understanding
the structure of a firewall policy, the user must learn the intricacies of the query language
in order to employ the tool effectively.

QUERY DADDY
FOR TCP 80 AND
NOT FROM 192.168.1.*;
#

Addresses:

*·*·*·*

Figure 5.1: Query for detecting web hits from outside an internal network
The ITVal query given in figure 5.1 might be used to discover which servers provide
web access to hosts outside the network. The "DADDY" subject tells ITVal to list the
destination addresses of these machines. The query condition "FOR TCP 80" specifies a
match against all HTTP packets while the condition "NOT FROM 192.168.1.*" excludes
internal hosts from consideration.

1

2

target
ACCEPT
ACCEPT

prot
all
all

Chain FORWARD
source
192.168.1.0/24
Anywhere

(policy DROP):
destination
flags
Anywhere
TCP dpt:80
state ESTABLISHED
Anywhere

Figure 5.2: Forwarding chain of a stateful firewall
For many firewalls, the query in figure 5.1 will work as expected. However, for a stateful
firewall, such as the iptables rule set of figure 5.2, it is likely that this query will generate
many false positives.
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QUERY DADDY
FOR TCP 80 AND
NOT FROM 192.168.1.*
AND IN NEW;
#Addresses:

192.168.1.*

Figure 5.3: A better query for stateful firewalls

When ITVal processes the query against the stateful firewall of figure 5.2, it will report
that any host can send web traffic through the firewall. This surprising result is correct
because of a technicality in how stateful filtering works. The rule on line 2 allows arbitrary
access on established connections. A careful examination of the rule set, however, reveals
that only machines on the internal network can initiate new connections to the web server.
A more precise query that examines only new connections is given in figure 5.3. The
new query correctly reports that only internal hosts can initiate new HTTP connections.
Although query-based testing tools can be a significant help to the system administrator, they are limited by the user's ability to construct a comprehensive set of useful queries.
It is difficult to tell whether a set of queries tests every important behavior of the fire-

wall. Furthermore, testing techniques often generate too much output for the user to easily
distinguish dangerous vulnerabilities from desired behavior.
Another approach to firewall analysis is to look for errors in the structure of the policy
specification. Structure analysis tools [1, 22] detect problems such as duplicate or conflicting
rules. Although these tools do not directly identify vulnerabilities, they often uncover fundamental weaknesses in the policy that can produce more significant errors. Some of these
tools also generate a simpler version of the policy that removes these structural weaknesses.
The generated policy is often easier to inspect manually than the original policy.
One significant advantage of structure analysis tools is that they can be fully automatic.
The only input the user must provide is the firewall policy itself. The tool builds a list of
anomalies and outputs a report or a restructured version of the policy. Unfortunately, there
are many types of vulnerabilities that cannot be detected using these tools. For instance,
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allowing mail traffic from the outside world to certain workstations could be undesirable
behavior on some networks. A structure analysis tool would not detect a problem of that
nature unless the rule that permitted the flow of such traffic also conflicted with another
rule or violated the structural criteria in some other way.

5.1

Host Classification

The "Lumeta Firewall Analyzer" [59], a commercially available tool derived from
FANG [37], combines some of the advantages of a structure analysis tool with the flexibility
of a passive analysis tool. Lumeta automatically generates a comprehensive set of queries
by using routing information to classify hosts into groups [59]. This reduces the amount
of output since results can be provided on a per-subnet or per-zone basis rather than a
per-host basis. It also automates the process of designing good queries by providing a set
of hard-coded default tests that cover most of the interesting behaviors on the network.
The idea of classifying hosts into groups allows a query engine to provide much simpler
output and addresses the problem of creating good queries. Using the topology of the network to classify hosts, however, has the drawback that hosts with very different properties,
but that have similar addresses, are grouped together.

1

2

target
ACCEPT
ACCEPT

Chain FORWARD (policy DROP):
destination
prot
source
all
10.239.202.38
Anywhere
all
10.239.202.0/24 10.239.202.38

flags
dpt tcp:25
dpt tcp:25

Figure 5.4: Controlling mail with a packet filter

Consider, for instance, the filtering policy shown in figure 5.4. This simple policy restricts outgoing mail from an internal network 10.239.202.0/24. Outgoing traffic is only
allowed from the mail server, host 10.239.202.38. Other hosts on the subnet are allowed to
send mail to the mail server, but cannot send mail to each other or to the outside world.
Incoming SMTP mail traffic from the outside world is also dropped unless it is destined for
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the mail server.
A classification based on the network topology would break the network into two groups:
the set of hosts on 10.239.202.0/24 and the set of all other hosts. However, the mail server is
a different type of host from the other machines on the network. As a result, queries about
mail traffic will return imprecise results. For instance, the answer to the query "Can a host
in 10.239.202.0/24 send mail to the outside world?" will be "yes" since the mail server is
allowed to forward mail through the firewall. The query "Can all hosts in 10.239.202.0/24
send mail to the outside world?" will be "no" since the client machines are not allowed to
send mail to anywhere but the mail server.
Neither of these queries accurately describes the fundamental organization of the network: a special mail server which can send mail to the outside world and a set of clients
which cannot. To improve the precision of these queries, we must use a different classification scheme that allows us to group hosts by their function as well as by their placement in
the network topology.

5.2

Policy-Based Host Classification

Hosts on a network play a variety of roles. Some hosts are workstations. Some are
database servers. Some are web servers. Some provide multiple services. The firewall
policy usually treats these various types of hosts very differently from each other, but treats
hosts of the same type similarly. This means that the firewall implicitly classifies hosts into
various groups based on their function. Sometimes the implicit classification of the firewall
policy is not quite as straightforward as simply sorting hosts by the services they provide.
For instance, the network may have web servers that provide service exclusively to hosts
inside the network and a separate block of general purpose web servers that anyone can
access. The filtering policy for these two kinds of hosts could be drastically different even
though all of the hosts are web servers.
The rule set in figure 5.5 prevents hosts on an untrusted network 192.168.2.0/24 from
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Chain FORWARD (policy DROP):
1
2

target

prot

source

destination

flags

DROP
ACCEPT

all
all

192.168.2.0/24
Anywhere

192.168.1.0/24
192.168.1.1

dpt tcp:80

Figure 5.5: A simple network with four host classes
accessing systems on a protected network 192.168.1.0/24. Rule 1 divides the set of hosts
into three groups. One group consists of hosts in the untrusted network. The second group
contains hosts from the protected network. The third group contains all other hosts on the
Internet. Rule 2 refines this classification by further restricting which services are available
to the web server. This defines a fourth group by distinguishing the web server from other
hosts on the protected network. The fourth group contains only the web server, while the
third group contains all other protected hosts.
This classification scheme has many advantages over a topological classification. An
error in the firewall policy will often cause the firewall to treat similar hosts differently or to
treat different hosts alike. This means that a classification scheme based on the structure
of the firewall policy can be used to directly detect many kinds of errors. Furthermore,
classifying hosts according to their treatment by the firewall produces groups of hosts that
can be used to increase the precision of query-based testing techniques.

5.2.1

Calculating Host Classes

There are several possible ways in which we might use the structure of the firewall policy
to categorize the hosts on a network. One approach is to search through the firewall policy
and record every address or group of addresses mentioned in a rule as a separate host class.
Unfortunately, this naive approach has some serious drawbacks.
The core difficulty is that the algorithm may generate overlapping classes. For instance,
the host 192.168.1.1 in figure 5.5 would be represented twice: once in its own class and
once in the class containing all hosts from the 192.168.1.0/24 subnet. This is undesirable
because it decreases the precision we can obtain in our analysis.
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A host that appears in two classes is fundamentally different from the other hosts in
those classes. To preserve this information, it is preferable to separate these hosts into their
own classes. This will enable us to obtain more accurate and useful results.

set CalculateClasses(Policy P):
1 set C = 0.0.0.0/0.
2 for each rule r in P:
for each addr_range S in r:
3
C = InsertAddr(C, S).
4
5 return C.
set InsertAddr(set C, addr_range S):
for each element T of C:
1
2
I= IntersectAddress(S,t).
if I is empty:
3
C = SetAdd(C, S).
4
return C.
5
c = SetDelete(C, T).
6
7
c = InsertAddr(C, S-I).
8
c = InsertAddr(C, I).
c = InsertAddr(C, T-I).
9
10 return C.
Figure 5.6: Naive algorithm for computing host classes

The algorithms in figure 5.6 reduce the amount of overlap by splitting overlapping
classes into smaller pieces using set operations. The algorithm examines every host and set
of addresses mentioned explicitly in the rule set. Each new range of addresses is added to
a set of potential classes, C.

If a new set of addresses overlaps with an existing class, we break both classes into three
non-overlapping pieces and replace both original classes with the result. When we have
considered every address of every rule, the elements of C describe a set of classes that can
be used to analyze the behavior of the firewall.
This approach yields an approximation of the firewall designer's view of the network.
Addresses that are explicitly mentioned usually correspond to important components that
the designer intended to control.

Unfortunately, the technique does not give a perfect

picture of the actual behavior of the firewall. For instance, the firewall rule set in figure 5. 7
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1
2
3

Chain FORWARD (policy DROP):
destination
target
prot
source
Anywhere
DROP
all
192.168.2.0/24
ACCEPT
all
Anywhere
192.168.2.0/24
ACCEPT
all
192.168.2.0/24 192.168.3.0/24

flags

Figure 5. 7: Rule set with a shadowed network

seems at first glance to have three groups. The algorithm will create a group for subnet
192.168.2.0/24 and for subnet 192.168.3.0/24. It will also create a group representing "all
other addresses" .
In reality, hosts on the 192.168.3.0/24 subnet are treated exactly the same as hosts in
the "all other addresses" group, because rule 3 of the firewall policy is an unreachable rule.
Since all packets from 192.168.2.0/24 will be dropped in rule 1, no packet can ever match
rule 3. This is probably an error in the firewall configuration, but the naive algorithm will
happily report that 192.168.3.0/24 is a separate class. Since this is what the user expects,
the error will go undetected.
To correct this problem we need to more carefully define the concept of a host class. We
do this by constructing an equivalence relation over the set of all network hosts. The equivalence classes determined by this relation will give us a precise and complete characterization
of the policy that we can use for performing vulnerability analysis.

5.2.2

Structure-Based Classification

Every firewall policy can be described as a function, F, that maps the set of all network
packets to the set {ACCEPT, DROP} of filtering decisions. For a specific packet s, we
say F(s) =ACCEPT if the packet would be accepted by the firewall and F(s) =DROP
if the packet would be dropped by the firewall.
We define an equivalence relation, =so , as follows: let x and y be any two hosts. We
say that x =s y (pronounced "x and y are source equivalent") if and only if for any two
packets s from x and t from y that differ only by source address, F(s) = F(t). Similarly,
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x =o y (pronounced "x andy are destination equivalent") if and only if F(s) = F(t) for
any two packets s from x and t from y that differ only by destination address. If x =s y
and x =o y, then we say that x =so y ("x andy are source and destination equivalent").
Informally, two hosts are source equivalent if replacing the source address of a packet
from one host with the source address of the other does not affect the filtering decision of
the firewall. They are destination equivalent if replacing the destination address does not
affect the filtering decision. If they are both source and destination equivalent, we say that
they are equivalent under the relation =so . The relation =so is derived directly from
the function F, which describes the filtering policy of the firewall and can be computed
without any other input from the user.
It can be shown that =so is an equivalence relation, since it is reflexive, transitive,

and symmetric. This means that =so partitions the set of network hosts into equivalence
classes. In other words, a packet from a host in a particular equivalence class will only be
accepted if identical packets from other hosts in the class would also be accepted.
This means that if one host in the class has a vulnerability, all hosts in the class are
vulnerable. On the other hand, if that host is adequately protected by the firewall, then all
the others are too. This guarantee makes the equivalence class paradigm much more useful
than the naive classification algorithm or a classification based on topology.

5.2.3

Implementation

We can use the reduction properties of MDDs to compute the equivalence classes of the
firewall. Since we are using quasi-reduced MDDs, duplicate nodes are not allowed. This
means that each node in the MDD represents a distinct class of packets from the other
nodes at its level.
In ITVal, we use quasi-reduced MDDs in which duplicate nodes, with all arcs the same,
are not allowed. This requirement means that each node at level k represents an equivalence
class over the set of attributes K through k + 1, where level K is the top level of the MDD.
For instance, node <2: 1> of figure 5.8 represents the source equivalence class containing
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Source
Address

Destination
Address

Port

Action

Figure 5.8: A simplified rule set MDD
addresses 0 and 1. Node <2: 2> represents the class containing source address 2.

By

reordering the levels of the MDD, we can calculate equivalence classes over first the source
address and then the destination address. We can use these intermediate classes to construct
classes of hosts that are equivalent under the =so relation.
An extremely simplified example MDD is given in figure 5.8. The top level of the MDD
corresponds to the source address of a packet, while the second level corresponds to the
destination address of the packet. The bottom level is a special terminal level representing
the action that the firewall should take on a packet. The integer value 0 means to drop the
packet. The integer value 1 means to accept the packet.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7

Construct the MDD representation of each firewall chain.
For each chain:
Reorder the levels of the chain MDD so that source address is on top.
Record the source equivalence classes.
Reorder the levels of the chain MDD so that destination address is on top.
Record the destination equivalence classes.
Merge the source and destination classes of all three chains together.

Figure 5.9: Outline of the equivalence class computation algorithm
An outline of the class generation procedure is given in figure 5.9. In step 1, wegenerate an MDD representation for each of the three built-in chains. The MDD representation
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takes into consideration network address translation and other packet mangling rules, We
then consider each chain in turn. In steps 3 and 4, we compute a list of source equivalent
addresses. To do this, we first use a level swapping algorithm to bring the levels encoding
source address to the top of the graph. The reduction properties of the MDD now guarantee that each node at the level immediately below the source address levels represents an
equivalence class with respect to source address. Each path from the root node to a node at
that level represents one element of the equivalence class associated with that node. Step 4
extracts these equivalence classes and stores them in a new MDD.

Host Class 0 0.0,0.1,1.0

Source Class 0 0.0, 0.1, 1.0

Destination Class 0
0.0,0.1,1.0,2.0

Source Class 1 1.1, 2.0, 2.1

Destination Class 1 1.1

Host Class 2 2.0

Destination Class 2 2.1

Host Class 3 2.1

We reorder the MDD so that
the destination address levels
are at the top, followed by the
source address levels. Each
node in the third level now defines a destination equivalence
class. The members of each
class can be found by collecting all paths from the root to
the nodes at that level.

By merging and splitting the
source and destination classes,
we create three new sets for
each pair of classes. One set
is constructed from the intersection of the two classes. Another consists of addresses in
the destination class, but not
in the source class. The last
set contains the source addresses not in the destination
class. Empty sets are discarded. The remaining sets
are the equivalence classes.

In the initial MDD, the two
source address fields are at the
top, so we do not need to reorder the levels. Each node
at the level below these levels
defines a source equivalence
class. To find the members of
that class, we enumerate all
paths from the root node to
the node at that level.

Host Class 1 1.1

Figure 5.10: Step by step construction of the equivalence classes
In steps 5 and 6 we perform an identical operation to collect a list of equivalence classes
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with respect to destination address.

When we have considered source and destination

address in every chain, we now merge the various classes together using MDD union, intersection and difference operators. Finally, we print the result.
A more detailed illustration of the algorithm is given in figure 5.10.

5.3

Correctness of Equivalence Class Generation

To show that the equivalence class generation algorithm is correct, we first establish
that if the top four levels of the MDD represent the source address attributes, each node at
level K - 4 represents an equivalence class under the =s relation.

Theorem 5.1 Let 9 be a host with address 90·91·92·93 and let h be a host with address

ho.h1.h2.h3. Then 9 =s h if and only if, there is a node <(K- 4) :s> such that there exist
two paths Ps = (eo,e1,e2,e3) and Q8 = Uo,fi,h,h) from the root node <K:r> to node
<(K- 4): s> for which L(ei) = 9i and L(fi) = hi for all 0 ::; i ::; 3.
We will first show that each node at level K- 4 defines an equivalence class over the
attributes at levels K through K - 3.

We will then show that each equivalence class

corresponds to exactly one node at level K - 4.

Proof:
Step 1: Let

and
Qs

= (fo, !I, h, h)

be paths from <K :r> to <(K- 4) :s>. Further, let L(ei) = 9i and L(fi) =hi for all
0 ::; i ::; 3. Then 9 =s h.
Let p be and q be any two packets such that pis from host 9, q is from host h, and p
and q differ only by source address. To demonstrate that g =s h, we must show that

F(p) = F(q).
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Let Pp = (CK -4, CK -3, ... , CD) be a path from <(K- 4): s> to the terminal node
representing F(p) such that L(ci) = p[i] for all 0

~

i

~

K- 4. Since p and q differ

only by source address, we also know that L( Ci) = q[i] for all 0 ~ i ~ K- 3. Since Pp
is a path from <(K- 4): s> to the terminal node for F(p), and Q5 is a path from the
root node to <(K- 4): s>, the path P

= (fo, JI, h, h, CK-4, Ck-3, ... , CD)

is a path

from the root node to the terminal node for F(p) . But this means that F(p) = F(q).
Since this is true for any packets p from g and q from h that differ only by source
address, g =s h.
Step 2: Let g =s h. Then there is a node <(K- 4) :p> such that for every packets from g
and every packet t from h that differ only by source address, node <(K- 4) :p> lies
on both the path Ps = (eo, e1, ... , eK) and Pt = (fo,

JI, ... , fK)

where L(ei) = s[i]

and L(fi) = t[i] for all 0 ~ i ~ K.
In order to prove that each equivalence class corresponds to a node at level K - 4,
we prove the more general proposition that at every level k, and for every pair of
packets s from g and t from h that differ only by source address, the paths Ps and

Pt pass through some node <k :p>, where Ps =(eo, e1, ... , eK ), Pt = (fo,

L(ei)

= s[i] for all 0 ~ i ~

K and L(fi)

= t[i] for all 0 ~ i ~

JI, ... , fK ),

K.

We proceed by induction k.

Base Case

Let k

=

0. Then, for all packets s from g and t from h that differ

only by source address, the path P5 = (eo,ei, ... ,eK) such that L(ei) = s[i] for all
0 ::=:; i ::=:; K passes through terminal node <0 : s> and the path Pt
passes through terminal node <O:t>.

=

(fo, h, ... , f K)

Since g =s h, we know that F(s) = F(t).

Therefore, <0: s> = <0: t>, so both paths pass through the same node.

Induction Hypothesis

Let k

=

n

~

K - 4. Then, for all packets s from g and t

from h, the path P5 =(eo, e1, ... , eK) such that L(ei) = s[i] for all 0

~

i

~

K passes
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through node <k: s>, and the path Pt

= (fo, h, ... , eK) such that L(fi) = t[i] for all

0 :::; i :::; K passes through the same node, node <k: p>.

Induction Step

Let k = n

+ 1.

Then, for all packets s from g and t from h, the

path Ps =(eo, e1, ... , eK) such that L(ei) = s[i] for all 0:::; i:::; K passes through node

<( n + 1): s>, and the path Pt = (fo, h, ... , !K) such that L(fi) = t[i] for all 0 :::; i :::;
K passes through node <( n

+ 1) : t>.

Suppose, in order to obtain a contradiction, that

<( n + 1): s> i- <( n + 1): t>. Then, since we do not allow duplicate nodes in a quasireduced MDD, there exists some value j such that <(n + 1) :s>[j]
Now consider the packet
the packet

s obtained from

i obtained from t

t only by source address,

i- <(n + 1) :t>[j].

s by changing attribute k to value j and

by changing attribute k to value j. Since s differs from

s differs from i only by source address.

By the induction hypothesis, we have that the path Ps = (ao, a1, ... , aK) such that

L(ai) = s[i] for all 0 :::; i :::; K and the path Pi = (bo, b1, ... , bK) for all 0 :::;
i :::; K both pass through node <n:p>. But this contradicts the conclusion that

<(n+1):s>[j] i- <(n+1):t>[j], since <(n+1):s>[j] = <n:s> = <n:p> and
<(n + 1) :t>[j] = <n:i> = <n:p>.
Therefore, for all packets s from g and t from h that differ only by source address,
we have that Ps = (eo,el, ... ,eK) and Pt =

Uo,JI, ... ,JK), where

L(ei) = s[i] and

L(fi) = t[i] for all 0:::; i:::; K, both pass through some node <K- 4: s>.

•

Thus, each class of the relation =s corresponds to a unique node at level K - 4 and
each node at level K - 4 represents exactly one equivalence class of the =s relation.

Using the same strategy as in the proof above, we can show that if the top four levels
represent the destination address, each class of the relation =n corresponds to a node at
level K- 4. This means that we can obtain both the =s relation and the relation =n by
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enumerating nodes of the quasi-reduced MDD. By combining these results, we can compute
all classes of the =so relation.

5.4

Error Detection

The information provided by the host classification algorithm can be extremely useful
for detecting errors in the firewall policy. The list of classes is usually much shorter and
simpler than the rule set, so it is easier for a system administrator to examine. Also, since
the hosts tend to be categorized according to their intended functionality, the class list
reinforces intuition and makes discovery of the error a much more straightforward process
for the administrator.

5.4.1

Detecting Remotely Accessible Services

1
2
3
4
5

target
ACCEPT
ACCEPT
DROP
ACCEPT
ACCEPT

Chain FORWARD (policy DROP):
prot
destination
source
all
Anywhere
192.168.3.0/24
Anywhere
all
192.168.2.0/24
Anywhere
all
168.192.1.0/24
192.168.2.20
all
Anywhere
Anywhere
all
192.168.1.0/24

flags
TCP dpt:80

TCP dpt:25

Figure 5.11: Rule set with errors

Simple errors such as typos and rule transpositions can often be detected by the presence
of a strange and unexpected class of hosts. The policy in figure 5.11 is intended to protect
networks 192.168.1.0/24, 192.168.2.0/24, and 192.168.3.0/24 by restricting access from the
outside world. Because 192.168.1.0/24 contains several hosts with important financial information, outgoing traffic from that subnet should also be restricted. Mail traffic from the
other subnets is allowed only to the mail server (host 192.168.2.20) to prevent compromised
machines from becoming spam relays. The rule set also allows arbitrary web access to a
group of web application servers located on the 192.168.3.0/24 subnet. The policy contains
several errors, including a typo in rule 3 that allows remote access to a protected service.
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Class 0:
Class 1:
Class 2:

Class 3:
Class 4:

192.168.3.*
168.192.1.*
192.168.1.*
192.168.2. [0-19]
192.168.2. [21-255]
192.168.2.20
[0.0.0.0]-[168.192.0.255]
[168.192.2.0]-[192.168.0.255]
[192.168.4.0]-[255.255.255.255]

Figure 5.12: Equivalence classes for figure 5.11

The equivalence classes of this example network are listed in figure 5.12. There are five
classes of hosts identified by the algorithm. Class 0 represents the group of web servers.
Class 1 represents a strange class of hosts that is created by the typo in rule 3. The strange,
unexpected class makes the effect of the typo immediately obvious to the administrator.
While this may not directly allow him to diagnose and repair the problem, it does provide
a significant amount of information about the error. In this case, the user can look for rules
which refer to the 168.192.1.0/24 network, rather than pouring over the entire policy to
discover the cause of the error.
Class 2 combines the protected financial network and the unprotected 192.168.2.0 network, minus the mail server. This should also arouse the analyst's suspicion since the financial network is supposed to have much stricter protection than the unprotected subnet.
The fact that they are treated the same by the firewall indicates that a serious vulnerability
exists. Class 3 contains the mail server. It is in a class by itself since it requires special
privileges in order to accept and relay mail. Everything else belongs to class 4.
Using the equivalence classes to detect these errors is much easier than using query
based tools. The presence of a class of hosts consisting entirely of strange addresses is a
clear indication of an error in the policy. Since the tool requires no input but the policy, all
the user has to do to discover the error is "fire and forget".
A small amount of work is required to interpret the results of the classification system,
but compared to the effort of constructing precise queries or compiling a list of hosts for
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active testing, using the equivalence classes is fairly simple. For large installations, the gain
is even greater due to the number of rules required to administer a large number of hosts
and the greater difficulty of specifying a comprehensive set of queries that covers all the
services provided by the network.

5.4.2

Detecting Shadowed Rules

If a packet matches more than one rule in the policy, the firewall will use the first rule

that matches. This can mean that the policy contains useless or unreachable rules. The
presence of these rules usually indicates an error in the policy.

1
2
3

target
ACCEPT
ACCEPT
DROP

Chain FORWARD (policy DROP):
source
destination
prot
all
Anywhere
192.168.2.0/24
all
192.168.2.0/24 192.168.3.0/24
all
192.168.2.0/24 192.168.4.0/24

flags
TCP dpt:80
TCP dpt:80
TCP dpt:80

Figure 5.13: Rule set with shadowed rules

When one rule shadows another, the class list will often contain fewer classes than
expected. For instance, the rule set in figure 5.13 contains two rules that are shadowed
by rule 1. Rule 2 is a useless rule. Web packets from 192.168.2.0/24 to 192.168.3.0/24
are already accepted by rule 1. Rule 3 is also unreachable. The class list for the example
network is given in figure 5.14.
Class 0:
Class 1:

192.168.2.*
[0.0.0.0]-[192.168.1.255]
[192.168.3.0]-[255.255.255.255]

Figure 5.14: Equivalence classes for figure 5.13

Notice that there are no classes for the networks 192.168.3.0/24 and 192.168.4.0/24
mentioned in rules 2 and 3. These networks are included in class 1, the "all other hosts"
class. When the system administrator discovers that the policy produces fewer classes than
expected, she will examine the policy more closely and find the error or errors. Shadowed
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rules often indicate that a rule contains an incorrect address. For instance, one way in which
rules 2 and 3 may have become shadowed is if the source address in rule 1 was supposed to
be 192.168.3.0/24, but was typed incorrectly.

5.4.3

Detecting Outdated Services

1
2
3

target
ACCEPT
ACCEPT
DROP

Chain FORWARD (policy DROP):
source
destination
prot
Anywhere
all
192.168.2.0/24
Anywhere
all
192.168.4.0/24
all
192.168.4.0/24 192.168.2.0/24

flags
TCP dpt:22
TCP dpt:8080
TCP dpt:25

Figure 5.15: Rule set with outdated rules
Host classification can solve real world problems. One of our firewalls originally supported a wireless network on subnet 192.168.4.0/24. When wireless service was transferred
to another network, we neglected to update the firewall rules. A portion of our rule set
looked something like figure 5.15. A quick analysis using host classification immediately
identified subnet 192.168.4.0 as a host group, enabling us to correct the problem. This
error would have been very difficult to detect using query-based analysis tools. Without
apriori knowledge of the error, we had no reason to create a query testing for service on
that subnet. Active analysis tools like Nessus would have detected no vulnerabilities, since
no hosts were available on that subnet. Using host classification, however, we were able to
immediately identify a serious weakness in our policy.

5.5

Using Equivalence Classes with Other Tools

While a system administrator can detect many important vulnerabilities simply by
studying the host equivalence classes of a firewall policy, even greater gains can be achieved
by combining the equivalence class analysis with active and passive testing techniques. To
combine the analysis with other testing paradigms, we can use the equivalence classes to
determine which groups of systems to test. We can then perform active or passive testing
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on a small selection of systems from each class, rather than on each host individually. By
taking one or two systems from each equivalence class, rather than testing a random selection of hosts, we decrease the number of tests that we must perform, while increasing the
probability that we have tested all the important behaviors of the firewall.
Chain FORWARD (policy DROP):
target
prot
source
Anywhere
all
1 ACCEPT
10.239.202.13
2 ACCEPT
all
all
192.168.2.3
3 ACCEPT
all
192.168.2.3
4 ACCEPT
DROP
all
192.168.2.0/24
5

destination
10.239.202.13
Anywhere
Anywhere
Anywhere
Anywhere

flags
TCP dpt:25
TCP dpt:25
TCP dpt:25
TCP dpt:22
TCP dpt:25

Figure 5.16: Rule set for preventing spam relays

The filtering policy in figure 5.16 secures the mail service on an internal network
192.168.2.0/24. Mail from the internal network can only be sent to the mail server, host
10.239.202.13. The mail server is allowed to distribute mail to both internal and external
hosts. All other mail traffic should be dropped. Unfortunately, a copy and paste error
created rule 3 of the policy, which allows mail traffic from a workstation, host 192.168.2.3
to escape the network. If that workstation is compromised, an intruder can set up a spam
relay on that host and transmit thousands of unauthorized messages through the firewall.
Class 0:
Class 1:
Class 2:
Class 3:

10.239.202.13
192.168.2.3
192.168.2. [0-2]
192.168.2.[4-255]
[0.0.0.0]- [10.239.202.13]
[10.239.202.14-192.168.1.255]
(192.168.3.0-255.255.255.255]

Figure 5.17: Equivalence classes for figure 5.16

The system administrator can easily detect this problem by combining host classification
with a passive testing tool. The host classes for the example network are listed in figure 5.17.
Class 0 contains the mail server. Class 1 contains the workstation which can circumvent
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QUERY DPORT TO
10.239.202.13
AND FROM
10.239.202.13
AND IN NEW;
1 Port: 25
QUERY DPORT TO
192.168.2.3
AND FROM
10.239.202.13
AND IN NEW;
1 Port: 25
QUERY DPORT TO
192.168.2.1
AND FROM
10.239.202.13
AND IN NEW;
1 Port: 25
QUERY DPORT TO
192.168.3.0
AND FROM
10.239.202.13
AND IN NEW;
1 Port: 25

QUERY DPORT TO
10.239.202.13
AND FROM
192.168.2.3
AND IN NEW;
2 Ports: 22 25

QUERY DPORT TO
10.239.202.13
AND FROM
192.168.2.1
AND IN NEW;
1 Port: 25

QUERY DPORT TO
10.239.202.13
AND FROM
192.168.3.0
AND IN NEW;
1 Port: 25

QUERY DPORT TO
192.168.2.3 AND
FROM 192.168.2.3
AND IN NEW;
2 Ports: 22 25

QUERY DPORT TO
192.168.2.3 AND
FROM 192.168.2.1
AND IN NEW;
0 Ports:

QUERY DPORT TO
192.168.2.3 AND
FROM 192.168.3.0
AND IN NEW;
0 Ports:

QUERY DPORT TO
192.168.2.1 AND
FROM 192.168.2.3
AND IN NEW;
2 Ports: 22 25

QUERY DPORT TO
192.168.2.1 AND
FROM 192.168.2.1
AND IN NEW;
0 Ports:

QUERY DPORT TO
192. 168.2. 1 AND
FROM 192.168.3.0
AND IN NEW;
0 Ports:

QUERY DPORT TO
192.168. 3. 0 AND
FROM 192.168.2.3
AND IN NEW;

QUERY DPORT TO
192.168.3.0 AND
FROM 192.168.2.1
AND IN NEW;
0 Ports:

QUERY DPORT TO
192.168.3.0 AND
FROM 192.168.3.0
AND IN NEW;
0 Ports:

2 Ports: 22 25

Figure 5.18: Queries auto-generated using host classes
the security policy. Class 2 contains the remainder of the 192.168.2.0/24 subnet. Class 3
contains all other hosts on the Internet.
By taking a source address from each of these groups and matching it with a destination
address from each of the groups, we can construct the sixteen ITVal queries described
in figure 5.18. While the increased amount of output makes it slightly more difficult to
interpret these results, combining equivalence class analysis with the query analysis does
help us find the problem. The query results show that the SMTP port on host 192.168.3.0
can be accessed by host 192.168.2.3. Since 192.168.3.0 is an external host, the system
administrator should recognize this as a legitimate security concern.
Using the query tools by themselves would either have produced an enormous amount
of data or required a large time investment in writing queries. However, by combining
classification with passive testing, we are able to limit the scope of the query to the important
distinctions between hosts. This combination also requires very little work by the user.
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5.6

Advantages of Policy-based Classification

Policy-based host classification has several significant advantages over existing firewall
analysis techniques. Examining the classes implicitly defined by the firewall policy allows a
system administrator to detect many kinds of firewall errors and anomalies. When combined
with active or passive testing tools, the technique can be even more powerful. Using the
equivalence classes significantly decreases the amount of the work required to verify the
policy and is a step toward a fully automatic firewall analysis solution. The equivalence
classes are also easy to extend. A recently published paper [52] adapts our technique to
"packet classification automata", a formalism similar to fully-reduced MDDs. This allows
them to produce classes over attributes other than the source and destination address.

Chapter 6

Guided Repair of Firewall Policies
Queries and equivalence class analysis address the problem of detecting errors in a firewall policy. Using this information, the system administrator can examine the firewall rule
set and attempt to repair the firewall. To accomplish this, however, the system administrator must not only discover the existence of an error but determine which rules in the
policy are incorrect. For policies with hundreds of rules, or policies distributed across multiple firewalls, tracing a problem to its source can be tedious and expensive, even when the
existence of an error is obvious. This is a significant burden. Tracing through dozens or
perhaps hundreds of correct rules to find the two or three critical inconsistencies can take
hours or even days.
To address this issue, we present two novel techniques for performing a "directed repair"
of the firewall policy. Using these techniques, a system administrator can trace an error to
its root causes without an expensive manual inspection of the rule set.

6.1

Existing Techniques

Both active and passive tools can be used for error detection in a policy, but most of
these tools provide only a limited amount of information about each error. For instance, if
the system administrator uses passive tools to analyze the query "Which hosts can connect
to the mail server?", the analysis engine will list those hosts that have unwanted access to
114
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the server, but will not provide any additional information that can be used to understand
why the firewall failed to deny them access. It may be that the error only occurs when
connections are made on a particular network interface or for a particular type of network
traffic. While access to this information could greatly assist the system administrator in
repairing the policy, traditional tools do not provide these helpful clues.
The system administrator can sometimes obtain helpful information by refining a query
to provide more information or by using multiple queries to obtain additional data. Unfortunately, the process of developing a sufficiently detailed set of queries requires almost as
much effort as manual repair of the policy. Furthermore, effective refinement of the query
set requires apriori knowledge both of significant threats to the network and potential weaknesses in the firewall. If the system administrator does not have enough information to be
able to pose a useful query, he is out of luck.
This means that query tools are usually limited to detecting whether an error exists and
have only limited utility for guiding repair of the policy. To repair the policy by hand, the
system administrator must carefully consider each filtering rule to determine whether it is
relevant to the error and, if so, whether it is correct. Since most of the rules will usually
be irrelevant or already correct, manual repair is a very inefficient and time consuming
process. When an error has many potential causes, debugging the policy can be especially
difficult, since it may be challenging to distinguish the real cause of the problem from other
possibilities.
Active tools also provide only a limited amount of information about an error. For
instance, suppose the system administrator uses a port scanner to detect that SSH traffic
is blocked to a critical host. There are several reasons the port may be blocked: the SSH
daemon may have crashed, the hosts.allow file may contain errors, or the firewall may be
blocking the port. The port scanner does not provide any information that will enable the
administrator to distinguish between these scenarios. When the problem is caused by an
error in the policy, the port scanner can provide no information about which chain of the
policy is responsible for the error. Therefore, the system administrator must investigate all
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of these potential problems manually. This process is almost as tedious and error prone as
manual inspection of the firewall policy.

1
2
3
4
5

target
DROP
DROP
ACCEPT
DROP
ACCEPT

prot
all
all
all
all
all

Chain FORWARD (policy DROP):
source
destination
input interface
anywhere
eth1
192.168.1.0/24
anywhere
any
192.168.3.0/22
any
anywhere
192.168.1.4
anywhere
any
192.168.1.0/24
any
anywhere
192.168.1.0/24

flags

dpt:tcp 80

Figure 6.1: An example rule set

Figure 6.1 shows how difficult it can be to trace an error in the policy to its source. This
rule set protects subnet 192.168.1.0/24 against attacks from the outside world. The system
administrator wants to allow access to the web server, host 192.168.1.4, from any system in
the outside world except those on an unsecured wireless network 192.168.3.0/24.
An attempt to access the web server from a host on the 192.168.1.0/24 subnet will very
quickly demonstrate that the rule set given in the figure fails to enforce the desired policy.
Instead, hosts on the trusted subnet are prevented from accessing the web server.
Determining the cause of the error is far more difficult. Almost any rule of the policy
could be at fault. An error in rule 4, which drops traffic to the protected subnet, could be
the source of the error. An error in rule 3, which overrides rule 4 to allow web traffic to
enter the network could also cause the problem. Rule 1, an anti-spoofing rule which blocks
traffic from the "wrong" interface, could also be to blame.
As it turns out, none of these rules causes the error. The error is created by an incorrect
subnet mask in rule 2, which causes the firewall to block traffic from the protected network
as well as the untrusted net. A manual analysis of the policy would require a careful and
tedious inspection of every rule in the policy to identify this problem. While this process
might not take long for the five rule policy shown here, a policy with more than a few dozen
rules would be much more difficult to inspect. Partially automating the repair process in
a way that narrows down the potential sources of the error to just one or two rules could
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save the administrator a significant amount of effort.

6.2

Partially Automated Firewall Repair

Unfortunately, it is impossible to fully automate repair of a generic firewall policy because incorrect behavior on one network may be expected behavior on another. For instance,
on one network it may be desirable to allow SMTP traffic to reach certain hosts, such as the
mail servers. On another network, however, a policy that permits SMTP traffic may enable
infected machines to send spam to systems outside the network. Without input from the
user, a repair algorithm cannot distinguish between these two cases.
While a fully automatic strategy for firewall repair is impossible, partial automation is
possible. Gouda, Liu, et al. [22] have done significant work on repair of structural errors
in the firewall policy. Their technique uses transformation of decision diagrams to produce
an improved rule set in which problems such as shadowed or duplicate rules have been
eliminated without any input from the user. Unfortunately, these techniques do not address
repair of logical errors such as typos or out-of-order rules.
Ariother approach is to allow the user to make the final decision about how to repair the
policy, but automate the process of determining the root causes of the error. By providing
information about the possible causes of the problem, we can guide her toward a limited
set of solutions from which she can choose the one best suited to her network and policy
goals. This "directed repair" of the policy alleviates much of the tedious work required to
fix the policy.

6.3

Directed Repair

In previous chapters, we explored ways to detect errors in a firewall configuration using
logical queries and an equivalence class decomposition of the network. In this chapter,
we describe two novel techniques that enable directed repair of the firewall policy. One
technique generates relevant counterexamples from which the system administrator can
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obtain detailed information about security failures in the policy. The second technique
provides an extensive "history analysis" that identifies potential sources of the error and
lists rules which should be considered for modification.
To use these techniques, the user specifies the desired behavior of the firewall using
logical assertions. The syntax for assertions is derived from the query language explained
in previous chapters. The right and left conditions of the assertion are built from the same
primitives as those in chapter 3.
For example, we can match all accepted SSH packets from subnet 192.168.1.0/24 on
interface ethO with the condition "FOR TCP 22 AND FROM 192.168.1.* AND INFACE
ethO AND (ACCEPTED forward OR ACCEPTED input)".
Using these conditions, the user can construct two types of assertions to describe the
expected behavior of the packet filter. These assertions allow the user to describe important
high-level security invariants which the policy should always satisfy. Equality assertions have
the form: ASSERT <A> IS <B> where A and B are conditions. Containment assertions
have the form ASSERT <A> SUBSET OF <B>.
Equality assertions specify that those packets which match condition A are exactly
those that match condition B. Containment assertions specify that the match set of A is
(non-strictly) contained in match set B.
For instance, the containment assertion "ASSERT FROM 192. 168. 2. *
SUBSET OF DROPPED FORWARD;"

specifies that any packet from subnet 192.168.2.0/24 is

dropped. The equality assertion "ASSERT FROM 192 .168. 1. * IS (FOR TCP 80
AND ACCEPTED forward)"

can be used to check that only HTTP packets are allowed to

enter the network from the 192.168.1.0/24 subnet and that no other web connections are
allowed by the firewall.
We call the set of packets that match a condition its "match set" and the set of packets
that cause an assertion to fail the assertion's "fail set". We can easily represent each match
set as an MDD using the technique given in chapter 3 for creating an MDD representation
of a query condition.
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We can then combine the match set MDDs together to generate an MDD representation
of the fail set. By examining the fail set MD D, we can determine whether or not the assertion
evaluates to true or false.

bool testContainmentAssertion(condition A, condition B):
condition_toJMDD(A)
1 mddA
2 mddB = condition_toJMDD(B)
3 notB = MDD_complement(mddB)
4 resultMDD = MDD_intersect(mddA, notB)
5 if notEmpty(resultMDD) then:
6
return ASSERTION_FAILED
7 else:
8
return ASSERTIONJHELD
Figure 6.2: Checking a containment assertion

Figure 6.2 gives pseudocode for determining whether a containment assertion holds.
Lines 1 and 2 of the algorithm generate MDD representations of each condition in the
assertion. Line 3 uses an MDD complement operation in to find the set of packets which
do not match condition B, the right-hand side of the assertion. Line 4 intersects the MDD
returned by the complement operation with the MDD representing condition A, the lefthand side of the assertion, to find the fail set of the assertion. If the assertion fails, this
resulting set will be non-empty, as illustrated by the left hand side of figure 6.3. If the
assertion holds, we obtain the situation on the right hand side, in which the fail set is
empty.

Assertion fails.

Assertion holds.

Figure 6.3: Fail sets for the SUBSET OF operator

Pseudocode for testing an equality assertion is given in figure 6.4. As in the algorithm for
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evaluating a containment assertion, we use MDD complement and intersection operations,
as above, to find the set of packets which match condition A, but not condition B, as
above. However, in lines 3 and 6, we repeat the process, switching A and B, to find the
set of packets which match condition B but not condition A. Line 7 combines the resulting
MDDs together using the MDD union operation to obtain the fail set for the assertion.

bool TestiSAssertion(condition A, condition B):
1
mddA = condition_toJMDD(A)
2
mddB = condition_toJMDD(B)
3
notA = MDD_complement(mddA)
4
notB = MDD_complement(mddB)
5
resultA = MDD_intersect(mddA, notB)
resultB = MDD_intersect(notA, mddB)
6
7
resultMDD = MDD_union(resultA, resultB)
8
if notEmpty(resultMDD) then:
9
return ASSERTION_FAILED
10 else:
11
return ASSERTIONJHELD
Figure 6.4: Checking an equality assertion

If the fail set is non-empty, we have the situation illustrated by the left hand side of
figure 6.5 and the assertion fails. If the fail set is empty, we have the situation given on the
right hand side and the assertion holds true.

Assertion fails.

Assertion holds.

Figure 6.5: Fail sets for the IS operator
Using these techniques, we can determine whether or not a firewall policy satisfies a set
of assertions. We can also extend these techniques to provide detailed information about
the firewall policy and enable directed repair.
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6.4

Relevant Counterexamples

One useful extension of our MDD techniques is the generation of relevant counterexamples that illustrate the failure of an assertion. These counterexamples provide a context for
the error which can often help the administrator discover why a failure has occurred.

1
2
3
4
5

target
ACCEPT
ACCEPT
DROP
DROP
ACCEPT

prot
all
all
all
all
all

Chain FORWARD (policy DROP):
destination input interface
source
ethO
anywhere
192.168.1.0/24
anywhere
131.106.3.253
eth1
63.118.7.16
anywhere
ethO
any
anywhere
192.168.2.0/24
anywhere
anywhere
any

flags
dpt:tcp 22

dpt:tcp 80

Figure 6.6: An incorrect forwarding chain
The example policy in figure 6.6 isolates an untrusted research network 192.168.2.0/24
from the outside world. SSH traffic from the untrusted network to hosts on subnet
192.168.1.0/24 is accepted, but all other traffic from that network is denied. The
192.168.1.0/24 subnet contains several world-accessible web servers to which the policy
grants access. The rule set blocks connections from 63.118.7.16, a malicious host. Trusted
hosts are allowed to make connections to the web servers and an external server, host
131.106.3.253, but cannot make any other connections.
To test whether the untrusted hosts are sufficiently restricted by the firewall, the administrator uses the assertion "ASSERT (FROM 192.168.2. * AND NOT FOR TCP 22)
SUBSET OF DROPPED FORWARD" which specifies that only SSH traffic is accepted
from hosts on the untrusted network. Due to an error in the ordering of rules 2 and 4, the
assertion will fail. This subtle error could be very difficult to detect manually in a lengthier
policy in which the rules were much further apart. Using ITVal, however, the administrator
can easily discover that the assertion fails.
Knowing that the assertion does not hold is an important first step, but does not give
much information about the cause of the error. To give the user more information about
the source of the error, we generate a counterexample - a packet that demonstrates the
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ASSERT EXAMPLE (FROM 192.128.2.* AND NOT FOR TCP 22)
SUBSET OF DROPPED FORWARD;
Assertion failed. Counterexample:
TCP packet from 192.168.2.1:6362[eth1] to 131.106.3.253:25[eth1]
in state NEW with flags[].
Figure 6. 7: Counterexample for the example assertion

falsity of the assertion. Figure 6. 7 shows the generation of one possible counterexample.
Examination of the counterexample gives the system administrator important information about the assertion failure. One significant clue is that the example packet arrived on
interface ethl. Since only rule 2 mentions ethl, this fact draws the administrator's immediate attention to rule ordering error. The destination address is also a helpful clue, since
only rule 2 allows traffic specifically to host 131.106.3.353. Using either of these clues, the
user can now correct the error by moving rule 2 to the correct location in the policy.

packet testContainmentAssertion(condition A, condition B):
1 mddA = condition_toJMDD(A).
2 mddB = condition_toJMDD(B).
3 notB = MDD_complement(mddB).
4 resultMDD = MDD_intersect(mddA, notB).
5 if notEmpty(resultMDD) then:
6
return choose_element(resultMDD).
7 else:
8
return choose_element(mddA).
Figure 6.8: Generating an example for a subset assertion

To generate the counterexample for an assertion, we change the algorithms in figure 6.2
and figure 6.4 to return an arbitrary element from the fail set by replacing the last four
lines of each algorithm as shown in figure 6.8.
The function choose_element(X) picks an arbitrary element from the set represented by
MDD X. If the assertion fails, we choose an element from the fail set as the counterexample.
If the assertion succeeds, we choose an element from the match set of the left-hand condition

as a witness, since the elements of that set must match both conditions. To select an element,
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the choose_element function walks the MDD from the root node to the bottom of the graph,
arbitrarily selecting arcs at each level (in practice, we select the first non-zero arc of each
node) and storing each selected attribute in a "packet" structure which can be printed at
the end of the traversal.

6.5

Rule History

Counterexamples provide the system administrator with a great deal of information
about the causes of an assertion failure. Nevertheless, tracing an error to the rules that cause
the problem can be difficult even when a good counterexample is available. Fortunately,
we can extend the example generation technique to provide the user with even more useful
information about the potential causes of the firewall error. We do this by using MDDs to
create a "history map" that allows us to remember which packets match each rule of the
policy.
Using the history map, we associate packets in an assertion's fail set with a small number
of filtering rules, which the administrator should examine for errors. This permits the
administrator to narrow his inspection of the policy to just a few critical areas. Since the
set of rules to examine includes every rule that may match a packet in the assertion's critical
set, it is possible that we may list some correct rules as well as the incorrect ones. However,
constructing the history map allows the system administrator to ignore many rules that are
completely unrelated to the problem.
Given a packet p, we define the history set of p, H(p), to be the set of rules in the
firewall that match p. Formally, we say H(p) = {ripE M(r)}. Given a set of packets, P,
the history set of p is given by H(P) =

upEP

H(p), that is, the history set of p is the

union of the history sets of each member of p. Another way to say this is that the history
set contains all the rules that match any packet of P.
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6.6

Implementing Rule History

In order to build the history map, assign a unique identifier to each of the firewall policies
provided by the user. For each firewall, we also assign a unique identifier to each chain of
the policy and give each rule of the chain an integer index.
During construction of the MDD for each chain of the firewall, we construct a "history
MDD" representing the rule set of the policy. The history MDDs are constructed similarly
to the rule set MDDs, but have three extra levels at the bottom of the graph. The extra
levels store the firewall identifier, chain identifier, and index for each rule. We assign index
0 to the default policy and index the remaining rules in each chain sequentially starting
from 1. Pseudocode for constructing a history MDD for a rule is given in figure 6.9.
node_index MakeHistMDD(ParsedRule pr, int rule.index, int chain.index, int fw_index)
old = MATCHES.
1
2
node n =NewNode(1).
3
<1 :n>[rule_index] =old.
4
old =CheckForDuplicates( n).
5
n =NewNode(2).
6
<2:n>[chain_index] =old.
7
old =CheckForDuplicates(n).
8
n =NewNode(3).
9
<3:n>[fw_index] =old.
10 old =CheckForDuplicates(n).
11 fork= 4 to K + 3:
12
n = NewNode(k).
13
fori= 0 to MaxValue(k- 3):
14
if i 2:: pr[k- 3].low and i:::; pr[k- 3].high:
15
<k: n> [i] = old.
16
old =CheckForDuplicates(n).
17 return n.
Figure 6.9: Algorithm for building a history MDD for a rule

Lines 1 through 10 of the algorithm create nodes to represent the rule index, chain
index, and firewall index. The for loop in lines 11 through 16 creates one new node at each
level of the MDD which identifies which packets match the rule.
We construct the history MDD for a chain using an MDD union operation to combine
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the history MDDs of each rule in the chain. The history MDD for each rule is created
on-the-fly during generation of the rule set MDD for a chain. If we encounter a rule which
matches packets already matched by some other rule, the union operation ensures that the
history MDD for the chain maps those packets to both rules.

1
2
3

target
ACCEPT
DROP
ACCEPT

Chain FORWARD (policy DROP):
destination
prot
source
all
anywhere
192.168.2.0/24
anywhere
all
192.168.3.0/23
anywhere
anywhere
all

flags

dpt:tcp 25

Figure 6.10: Example Rule Set
An example history MDD for the rule set of figure 6.10 is given in figure 6.11. To
save space, only the levels for source address, destination address, protocol, destination
port, firewall index, chain index, and rule index are represented in the figure. The source
address and destination address are each represented by four levels of the MDD. These
levels correspond to each octet of the address. The destination port is represented using
two levels. The top level corresponds to the most-significant byte of the port and the level
below it corresponds to the least-significant byte. By following the right-most path of the
MDD, you can see that a packet from 192.168.2.4 to 192.168.4.9 on TCP port 25 will match
rules 0, 1, 2, and 3 of chain 2 (in this example chain 2 is the FORWARD chain of the
firewall).
In addition to constructing history MDDs for the built-in chains of the firewall, we create
history MDDs for each assertion by simply appending "wildcard nodes" to the bottom of
the MDDs for the fail set. These wildcard nodes match every rule in every chain.
By intersecting the fail set history MDD with the history MDD for a rule set, we obtain
a MDD which represents a mapping from the critical packets that cause an assertion to fail
to the rules that they match. This history map can be used to generate a list of rules which
the system administrator should consider as important to the failure of the assertion.
An example MDD for the assertion "NOT FROM 192.168.2 AND TO 192.168.4.* AND
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Figure 6.11: History MDD for a firewall chain

FOR TCP 25 SUBSET OF FORWARD ACCEPTED" is given on the left side of figure 6.12.
When applied to the rule set given in the example, the assertion fails. The source of this
error is non-obvious. A typo in the subnet mask of rule 2 causes the firewall to drop packets
from the 192.168.4.0/24 subnet. Intersecting the extended fail set MDD for this assertion
with the rule set MDD gives us the history map MDD on the right side of figure 6.12.
Before

After

Figure 6.12: Using the history MDDs

An examination of the result MDD shows that rules 2 and 3 match the packets which
cause the assertion to fail (the default policy, rule 0 also matches, but since that is always
true, it is not very significant). Therefore, the system administrator can ignore rule 1, which
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is not relevant to the failure of the policy. Instead, he will focus on rule 2, which contains
the error, and rule 3, the rule which should have accepted the incorrectly discarded packet.

6. 7

Correctness of the History MDD representation

To show that the MDD representation of the rule history accurately lists those rules
which match a packet, we formally define the term "history set of an MDD" and then prove
that the history set of an MDD for a rule is equivalent to the history set of the rule.
We use the notation Trid, reid and Tfid to denote the rule index, chain index, and firewall
index of rule r in the MDD.
Definition 9 Given an MDD Mr and a packet p, we define the history set of Mr on
p, H(Mr,p), to be the set of rules r in the firewall such that there exists a path P

=

(eo,el,· .. ,eK+3) from the root of Mr to the terminal node MATCHES such that L(eo) =
rrid, L(el) =reid, L(e2)

= rfid, and for each edge

j

> 2, L(ej) = p[j- 3].

We can now show the equivalence of H(p) and H(Mr,P) for a given ruler.
Theorem 6.1 For each ruler such that r E H(p), r E H(Mnp). Similarly, for each rule
r such that r E H(Mnp), r E H(p).

Proof:
Step 1: Given an arbitrary packet p, let r E H(p) be any rule of the firewall policy, with
rule index rid, chain index cid, and firewall index fid, and let

Mr

= MakeHistMDD(r,rid,cid,fid).

Then, r E H(Mr,p).
From the definition of H (Mn p), we see that it is sufficient to show that there is a path

P = (eo, e1, e2, ... , ek) from the root node of Mr to the terminal node MATCHES
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such that L( eo)

2 < j ::; K

= rid, L( el) = cid, L( e2) = fid,

+ 3, L( ej) = p[j -

and for each edge ej such that

3].

We proceed by induction on K, the number of attributes in a packet.

Base Case Let K = 0. To see that MakeHistMdd creates a path (eo,el,e2) from
node <3:n> to MATCHES such that L(eo) =rid, L(el) = cid, and L(e2) = fid,
consider that line 3 creates an arc from node <1 : n> to MATCHES with label rid.
Similarly, line 6 creates an arc from node <2: n> to <1 : n> with label cid and line 9
creates an arc with label fid from <3:n> to <2:n>. Therefore, when K

= 0,

there

is a path from <3:n>, the root node of Mr, to MATCHES such that which has the
appropriate labels on each edge.

Induction Hypothesis

Assume that for all 0 < k < K, that is a path Q =

(eo, e1, ... , ek+3) in Mr from node <k + 3: n> to MATCHES such that L( eo) = rid,
L(el)

= cid, L(e2) = fid,

Induction Step

Let k

and L(ej)

= K.

= p[j-3] for every edge ej such that 2 < j

~

k+3.

Consider node <K + 3: n> created at line 12 in the

last iteration of the for loop in line 11. To see that there is a path from this node to

MATCHES with appropriate labels, note when the inner for loop of line 13 reaches
value p[K], the if statement in line 14 will evaluate to true, since p E M(r). Therefore,
line 15 will create an arc to node old= <((K + 3)- 1) :n> with label p[K]. Call this
arc enew·
By the induction hypothesis, there is a path

from <((k + 3)- 1) :n> toM ATCH ES such that L(eo) =rid, L(e1) = cid,

L(e2) = fid, and L(ej) = p[j- 3] for every edge ej such that 2 < j

~

(k

+ 3) -

1.
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Therefore, when k = K, there is a path

from root node <K + 3:n> to MATCHES such that L(eo)
L(e 2 )

=

fid, and L(ej)

= p[j- 3]

=

rid, L(e 1 )

for each edge ej such that 2 < j < K

cid,

+ 3.

Thus, by the definition of H(Mr,P), r E H(Mr,p).
Step 2: Let Mr

= M akeHistM DD(r, rid, cid, fid) for some values rid, cid, fid, and some

ruler. Let p be a packet such that r E H(Mr,p). Then, r E H(p).
Since r E H(Mnp), there is a path P

= (eo, e1, ... , eK+3) from the root of Mr to

MATCHES such that L(eo) =rid, L(e1) = cid, L(e2) = fid, and L(ej) = p[j- 3]
for 2 < j :::; K

+ 3.

To show that p E M(r), we must show that pr.low :::; p[k] :::; pr.high for each value
0 :::; k :::; K. Consider that the only way M akeHistM D D can create an arc at levels
3 through K

+3

is in line 15. But the if statement in line 14 guarantees that this

can only happen when pr.low :::; p[k] :::; pr.high. Since we know that there is a path
from the root of Mr to MATCHES, we know that pr.low:::; p[k]:::; pr.high for all
0:::; k:::; K. Therefore, p E M(r).

•
This demonstrates that given a ruler, the history MDD, Mr, is a faithful representation
of the history mapping for that rule. From this and from the proof of correctness of the
MDD union and intersection operations given in chapters 2 and 3, it is trivial to show that
the history MDD for a chain is correct and that the intersection of the fail set history MDD
with the history MDD for a chain produces an MDD which maps packets in the fail set to
all of the rules which they match.
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6.8

Directed Repair and Equivalence Classes

It is often much easier to use assertions than to perform a manual inspection of the

policy. For one thing, the rules in a policy interact with each other in ways that can be
confusing to the user. One rule in the policy might mask another rule or cause the rule to
be applied only in certain, unusual, circumstances.
Because assertions are independent of each other, writing and understanding a list of
assertions is often easier than manually correcting the rule set. More importantly, it is
possible to construct a partial or high-level specification of the policy using assertions. This
partial specification can ignore many of the details of the policy, which allows it to be
simpler than the rule set to which it is applied.
Nevertheless, debugging the firewall using assertions has certain limitations. There is a
tradeoff between the completeness of a specification and how easy the specification can be
constructed. Deriving assertions that are both useful and effective can be a very challenging
task.

1
2

target
DROP
ACCEPT

Chain FORWARD (policy DROP):
prot
source
destination
anywhere
all
192.168.1.0/24
anywhere
all
192.186.2.0/24

Hags
tcp dpt:22

Figure 6.13: A fault that history mapping misses
Another limitation of the assertion approach is that certain kinds of faults cannot easily
be identified using history maps for an assertion. The policy in figure 6.13 is supposed to proteet a secure subnet 192.168.2.0/24 from intrusions on an untrusted network 192.168.1.0/24.

ASSERT HISTORY TO 192.168.2.* AND
FOR TCP 22 AND
NOT FROM 192.168.1.*
SUBSET OF ACCEPTED forward;
Figure 6.14: Combining assertions with history
An assertion checking that legitimate SSH traffic can reach the protected network is
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also given in figure 6.14. A typo in rule 2 causes the assertion to fail. Unfortunately, the
history map for the assertion will show only the default policy. None of the other rules in
the policy match any packets in the fail set. In particular, rule 2, which contains the fault,
does not match any packets from the 192.168.2.0/24 subnet and, therefore, is not listed.
One way to address this problem is to create a new assertion that checks whether packets
from 192.186.2.0/24 are accepted. The history map for such an assertion would immediately
identify the typo in rule 2. The problem with this is that the system administrator has no
way of knowing such an assertion is needed. It is not practical to create assertions for all of
the possible typos in a policy, since doing so would require at least as much work as manual
inspection of the policy.
A better way to address the problem is to extend the technique described in the previous
chapter to provide history information that can be used to discover faults in the policy.
Figure 6.15 lists three classes derived from the assertion in figure 6.13. Class 2 corresponds
to the untrusted subnet 192.168.1.0/24. Class 3 is an anomalous class of hosts caused by the
typo in rule 2. The existence of this class is an immediate clue to the system administrator
that the firewall policy contains a serious error. Class 1 corresponds to all other hosts on
the network.

QUERY HISTORY CLASSES;
There are 3 total host classes:
Class 1:
<Everything not in the other classes>
Class 2:
192.168.1. [0-255]
Class 3:
192.186.2. [0-255]
Figure 6.15: Equivalence class decomposition of a policy
As described in the previous chapter, partitioning the hosts on a network into equivalence
classes allows us to generate a "policy map" that shows functional groupings of the hosts on
a network. When the policy contains a fault, it will often be manifested in the policy map
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as a missing class or by the presence of an unexpected class of hosts. Unfortunately, while
the policy map assists the system administrator in detecting these problems, it provides
him with little information that can be used to identify the rules that must be changed to
repair the issue.

Source [
Address

Destination[
Address

.. . .
Destination Port -

Chain
Rule

192
186
2

*
*
*
*
*
*

*
*

*

Figure 6.16: History MDD for class three

We can enhance the policy map by annotating each class of hosts with a list of rules
that match packets to and from a host in the class. To do this, we extend each class MDD
with wildcard nodes. The resulting graph is similar in structure to the history MDDs used
to represent the fail set of an assertion, but has wildcards at every level except the source
address levels. This MDD matches the set of all packets whose source address matches
a host in the class. We then repeat the procedure to produce an MDD with wildcards
everywhere except the destination address levels. We can now intersect these class MDDs
with the history MDDs for each chain to determine which rules match these packets. This
intersection generates a result MDD which can be translated into a human-readable history
map.
An MDD representing all packets with source address from class 3 is given in figure 6.16.
The top four levels of the MDD correspond to source addresses on subnet 192.186.2.0/24.
The remaining levels contain wildcard nodes.
A portion of the history map for the equivalence classes of the policy in figure 6.13
is given in figure 6.17. The existence of an anomalous class containing hosts from the

133
Class 3:
Firewall 0 Chain 1 Default Policy.
Firewall 0 Chain 1 Rule 2:
ACCEPT all -- * * 0.0.0.0/0 192.186.2.0/24
tcp dpt:22
Figure 6.17: History Map for class three

192.186.2.0/24 subnet immediately alerts the system administrator to a serious error. A
quick glance at the history map for class 3 reveals that only two rules are of interest: the
default policy and rule 2. The system administrator now takes a careful look at rule 2 and
discovers the fault, which enables her to repair the policy.

Chapter 7

Conclusion and Future Work
In this dissertation, we considered the problem of constructing a formal model of a firewall policy using multi-way decision diagrams. We presented several techniques for creating
and analyzing such a model. The most significant theoretical contributions of this dissertation are a quasi-reduced multi-way decision diagram representation of a firewall policy
and an algorithm for deriving classes of equivalent hosts from the MDD representation. We
applied these techniques to the development of tools for analyzing, testing, and repairing a
firewall policy.
We also demonstrated that network address translation can be incorporated into the
MDD model by application of a special MDD operator. We show that the MDD representations of connected firewalls can be combined to allow for analysis of distributed firewalls.
We extended this work to provide counter-examples and rule history, which enable a
directed repair of a firewall policy. These tools enable a system administrator to trace an
error in the policy to the particular faults that cause those errors.
We applied these techniques to the development of ITVal, a tool for testing and repairing
iptables firewalls. This analysis can be performed on policies that use advanced features
such as state-based filtering and packet-mangling. The equivalence class techniques all an
ITVal user to perform an analysis without generating a large and complicated set of test

cases or queries. This means that, using ITVal, a Linux firewall administrator can quickly
and easily discover errors in a firewall policy without a tedious manual inspection of the
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rule set.
There are several interesting areas in which both the theory and application of this
work might be extended. One possible extension of this work is support for proxy firewalls.
The work described in this thesis addresses packet filtering firewalls in which filtering is
performed at the data and transport layers. Proxy firewalls operate at higher levels of the
protocol stack and provide a system administrator with a lot more power in deciding what
traffic should be filtered. Because the MDD model described in this paper provides a fixed
number of levels, it is not suitable for representing application-level data in which there can
be a varying number of fields (keywords of various sizes, for instance). A new data structure,
based on the filtering MDD, but which allows for a flexible number of levels, could address
these needs. Extending these techniques to application layer information would also require
the development of new types of queries and new operations on the MDD.
The composition operator which enables analysis of connected firewalls currently only
supports firewalls connected in series. By using the algorithm repeatedly with different
inputs, it is possible to perform an analysis on more general topologies, but this is awkward
and inefficient. Extending the to more general topologies would require some innovations
in the design of the composition operation, but would significantly improve the usability of
the algorithm.
Dynamic firewalls, which adapt to changes in network conditions by modifying the
policy, are becoming increasing popular. The query and assertion language we use to analyze
the firewall provides MDD operations for basic logic manipulations. This is suitable for
answering basic questions about the behavior of a static firewall. Expanding the language
and the model to allow temporal logic queries would enable our model to analyze dynamic
firewalls.
There are several areas in which the equivalence class generation techniques might be
extended. For instance, packet classifiers, which organize packets into related streams for
traffic shaping define an equivalence relation which is very similar to the host-equivalence
relation for packet filtering. It might be possible to adapt our MDD algorithms to provide
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correctness and performance analysis of packet classifiers.
It might also be interesting to explore the use of the equivalence class technique with
other analysis strategies. For instance, while active testing tools have many disadvantages,
they can be used to solve problems that passive testing tools cannot, such as verifying that
the firewall software (rather than just the policy of the firewall) is correct. We have already
investigated the combination of equivalence class generation with passive testing tools, but
have not yet developed techniques for using the equivalence classes with active testing tools.
An interesting hybrid between active and passive tools is Russell's netfilter simulator [44].
The simulator is intended to be used for debugging kernel hooks in netfilter, and provides
very low-level access to the internals of netfilter, so it is not by itself suitable as a query
tool for non-developers, but could perhaps be used as the basis of a more general query
library. Integrating the simulator with the equivalence class technique could produce a
hybrid testing technique that combines elements of active analysis with passive analysis.
Another area in which the work might be extended is to further develop the possibilities
of the guided-repair techniques. For instance, it might be possible to develop, from an
assertion's critical set, a list of candidate solutions for repairing the firewall. The user could
then select an appropriate remedy from these choices, which could be immediately applied
to the firewall. Providing a reasonably short list of candidate solutions would require some
means of winnowing down the extremely large number of permutations of rules to a few
likely solutions. This might be done by combining the equivalence class analysis with the
counter-example generation technique.
There are also many ways in which the development of ITVal can be extended. One area
in which the tool could be significantly improved is visualization of query results. Queries
often generate a significant amount of unstructured output which can ·be difficult for a
human reader to parse. The output of the equivalence class queries is usually much more
structured and easier to read. Developing a technique which uses the equivalence classes
to add structure to the output of other queries could lead to significant enhancements in
the usability of the tool. Another possible solution to this problem is the development of a
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graphical interface.
Currently, ITVal supports basic data/link layer filtering and network address translation. There are many other features of iptables that are potentially amenable to analysis.
For instance, it is possible to use the netfilter framework to create rules that match against
the MAC address, or to modify the TTL of a packet. Extending ITVal to accommodate
more of the features of .the firewall is another potential direction for future work.
Another way in which ITVal could be enhanced is by extending it to new types of firewalls on a more diverse set of platforms. Although the tool currently supports only iptables
firewalls, a user can perform analysis on ipfwm and ipchains firewalls using scripts [49]
which translate between the various formats. Supporting other firewalls, such as Checkpoint's FW-1 firewall, or BSD's "pf" firewall, would open the tool up to a wider user base.
One way to do that would be to convert firewall policies into a common intermediate representation that could be easily parsed by ITVal and other firewall tools. We are currently
developing an application which will convert iptables firewalls to an XML-based format
used by the Redseal Security Risk Manager [40] and it should be possible to create a parser
for their XML format which would allow ITVal to support all of the firewalls supported by
their tool, including Cisco PIX firewalls. An alternative solution would be support for the
MDL language used by the Firmato [5] framework.

Appendix A

Query Selection for Effective
Analysis
Designing effective queries for a passive testing tool can be challenging and error-prone.
Queries that are too narrow can miss important anomalies in the firewall policy. Queries
that are too broad can produce too much information to be usefully analyzed.
In this appendix, we present some solutions for constructing a broad range of firewall
policy tests. These paradigms are drawn from well known firewall design practices. We
implement several of these tests as a set of generic query files that can be easily adapted to
the needs of a particular network or system.

A.l

Using ITVal

In this work, we will concentrate on how to use ITVal effectively, rather than on its
implementation and design. With a little work, it should be possible to use our examples
with other tools, such as active testing utilities.
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A.2

Constructing Queries

There is a fairly sizable body of work available on configuring a packet filter to avoid
various kinds of vulnerabilities. Rather than simply repeat what is readily available, we will
focus on how to use these sources of information to derive tests for the firewall policy.
In order to illustrate our technique, we use the example network shown in figure A.l.
The example network has two mail servers and a large number of client machines. The
firewall acts as a perimeter defense separating servers and clients on the 128.40.10.0/24
subnet from the outside world.
128.140.10.2
128.140.10.1

Outside
World

Backup
Mail Server

128.140.10.0/24

Figure A.l: A simple perimeter firewall

Suppose that we know that the packet filter should block packets of type X given a
certain condition Y. There are several ways to construct a query that tests whether the
packet filter meets this criteria. One possibility is to produce a list of hosts or services
that satisfy the criteria. A better way is to produce a list of all hosts that fail to meet the
criteria.
To see this, consider figure A.2. In order to prevent client machines from becoming
spam relays, it is usually advisable to prevent outgoing SMTP traffic from any host but the
mail server. This can be stated as: "The packet filter should always block packets of type
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SMTP given the condition that the source address of those packets is not a mail server".
Figure A.2 gives two possible queries for checking this property.

QUERY DPORT FROM 128.140.10.* AND
NOT FROM 128.140.10.2 AND
NOT FROM 128.140.10.3 AND ACCEPTED forward;
QUERY SADDY FROM 128.140.10.* AND
FOR TCP 25 AND ACCEPTED forward;
Figure A.2: Queries for finding rogue mail servers
Both queries can be used to check whether hosts other than the mail server are allowed
to send SMTP traffic on the network describe in figure A.l. The first query produces a list
of allowed destination ports from hosts other than the mail server. If the SMTP port does
not appear in this list, the firewall is correctly configured. The second query produces a
list of hosts that are allowed to send SMTP traffic. If any host but the mail server appears
in the output, the firewall is incorrectly configured. While either query could correctly
determine whether a client machine is allowed to send mail, the second query generates far
less output and identifies which hosts the firewall incorrectly allows to send mail traffic.

A.3

A voiding pitfalls

Although creating queries for testing best practice is usually straightforward, there are a
few pitfalls to avoid. Consider for instance, the simple ITVal query file shown in figure A.3.
This query set is a more general version of the queries shown above that test whether the
example firewall contains adequate protections against internal and external spam relays.
Line 1 defines a named group of hosts that represents the mail servers of the network. Line 2
defines a named group of mail related services. The query in line 3 lists all services provided
by the mail server other than mail service. Line 4 lists all hosts, other than the mail servers
themselves, that are allowed to transmit mail related traffic that is not destined for one of
the mail servers.
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GROUP mailservers 128.140.10.2 128.140.10.3;
SERVICE mail TCP 25 TCP 110 TCP 993;
QUERY DPORT TO mailservers AND
NOT FOR mail AND ACCEPTED forward;
QUERY SADDY FOR mail AND
NOT FROM mailservers AND
NOT TO mailservers AND ACCEPTED forward;
Figure A.3: Example ITVal query

This query file can be easily adapted to fit almost any network by changing the addresses
in lines 1 and 2 and will catch some interesting behaviors of a poorly configured firewall.
For instance, it is good practice to secure important servers so that only services provided
by that server are allowed from outside the network (see for example, [8], pp. 56, 75-76,
and [48], pp. 183). The query on line 3 lists all services allowed to the mail server that are
not strictly necessary for mail service.
A well-configured packet filter can block most traffic from spam relays by only accepting
mail traffic that originates from the mail servers. However, for the mail server to function,
incoming traffic to the mail server must also be permitted. The query on line 4 checks
whether the firewall meets these specifications. If mail traffic is allowed from a host not
listed in the mailservers list, that host will appear in the query results.
While these queries are very useful for ensuring that the firewall controls unwanted
traffic, both of these queries have significant problems. The query on line 3 will return a
large number of false positives on a stateful firewall. The query on line 4 ensures that the
firewall defeats most spam relays, but doesn't check whether a host that uses spoofing can
circumvent that protection.

A.3.1

Accounting for State

Many packet filters are configured to accept traffic from established or related connections. Accepting established connections allows the firewall to handle incoming replies
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caused by legitimate outgoing traffic. Accepting related connections allows protocols such
as FTP to successfully navigate the packet filter.

QUERY DPORT TO mailservers AND
NOT FOR mail AND
IN NEW AND ACCEPTED forward;
Figure A.4: Adding state to a typical query

Since established and related connections can potentially use any source or destination
port, the query on line 3 of figure A.3 will list every network port even if the firewall
is adequately protected against spam relays. To eliminate these false positives, we must
be careful to consider only new connections. In ITVal, we can do this by adding an IN

NEW condition as shown in figure A.4. This forces the query to match only incoming new
connections.

A.3.2

Accounting for Spoofing

Because a packet filter has no way of identifying the authentic source of a packet, address
spoofing can defeat any filtering policy. A common strategy for preventing most spoofing
attempts is to drop packets that arrive on a network interface and have source addresses
from the wrong side of the interface [8]. Before we test for individual vulnerabilities, we
should check to make sure that the firewall has this kind of spoofing protection in place.
The easiest way to test for this is to write a query for each interface. The query will list all
hosts that can access the network from the wrong side of the interface.

QUERY SADDY FROM 128.140.10.* AND
INFACE ethO AND ACCEPTED forward;
QUERY SADDY NOT FROM 128.140.10.* AND
INFACE eth1 AND ACCEPTED forward;
Figure A.5: Queries to check for spoofing on the example network

Figure A.5 introduces two queries that could be used to verify that the example network
is protected from spoofing attacks. Another well known precaution against spoofing attacks
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is to block access from non-routable addresses and other illegal addresses such as broadcast
addresses (see [48], pp. 186-190). These addresses are commonly used as spoofed source
addresses by malicious programs.

GROUP illegal *·*·*.255 10.*.*·*
172. [16-31] ·*·* 192.168.*.*
169.254.*.* 224.*.*·* 0.*.*·*
[240-255] ·*·*·* 127.*.*·*i
QUERY SADDY FROM illegal AND
((INFACE ethO AND OUTFACE eth1) OR
(INFACE eth1 AND OUTFACE ethO)) AND ACCEPTED forward;
Figure A.6: Queries to check for illegal source addresses

It is usually very simple to check that the firewall correctly restricts packets from these
addresses. Figure A.6 illustrates how this might be done for the example network. Line 1
creates a named group consisting of special addresses to check. Line 2 tests whether the
firewall blocks network traffic from those addresses that crosses the network perimeter.

A.4

Putting it All Together

We now illustrate our technique with a sophisticated example derived from guidelines
in "Linux Network Security" [48] and "Firewalls and Internet Security" [8]. The example
includes the previously mentioned checks for spoofing and use of illegal addresses and also
verifies that the firewall adequately protects three important servers.

GROUP firewall 128.40.10.1;
GROUP dns_server 128.40.9.101;
GROUP mailservers 128.40.10.2
128.40.10.3;
GROUP webserver 128.40.10.4;

GROUP illegal *·*·*.255 10.*.*·*
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172. [16-31].*.* 192.168.*.*
169.254.*.* 224.*.*·* 0.*.*·*
[240-255] ·*·*·* 127.*.*·*;

#Check for packets that appear on the each
#interface with the wrong addresses.

QUERY SADDY INFACE ethO AND
FROM 128.40.10.* AND ACCEPTED forward;

QUERY SADDY OUTFACE ethO AND
NOT FROM 128.40.10.* AND ACCEPTED forward;

QUERY SADDY INFACE eth1 AND
NOT FROM 128.40.10.* AND ACCEPTED forward;

QUERY SADDY OUTFACE eth1 AND
FROM 128.40.10.* AND ACCEPTED forward;

#Check that broadcast addresses are
#blocked.

This can

#discourage SMURF and FRAGGLE attacks.
#Also check other non-routable and
#illegal addresses.

QUERY SADDY FROM illegal AND
((INFACE ethO AND
OUTFACE eth1) OR
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(INFACE eth1 AND
OUTFACE ethO)) AND ACCEPTED forward;

#Ensure that UDP traffic to and from the
#firewall box itself is blocked, except
#for NTP traffic and DNS.

QUERY SADDY (FOR UDP

*

AND

NOT FOR UDP 123 AND
NOT FOR BOTH 53) OR
(ON UDP

*

AND

NOT ON UDP 123 AND
NOT FOR BOTH 53) AND
IN NEW AND ACCEPTED input;

QUERY SADDY (FOR UDP

*

AND

NOT FOR UDP 123) OR
(ON UDP

* AND

NOT ON UDP 123) AND
IN NEW AND ACCEPTED output;

#Check that SSH to the firewall box
#is only allowed from internal
#hosts.

QUERY SADDY (FOR TCP 22 AND
TO firewall AND
NOT FROM ethO)
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AND IN NEW AND ACCEPTED input;

#Check that DNS traffic can only
#come from the correct external
#server.

QUERY DADDY (FOR BOTH 53) AND
NOT (TO dns_server OR
FROM dns_server) AND
IN NEW AND ACCEPTED forward;

#Check that Only allow HTTP and
#HTTPS traffic is allowed into
#the webserver.

QUERY SADDY TO webserver AND
(NOT FOR TCP 80 AND
NOT FOR TCP 443 AND
NOT FOR BOTH 53) AND
IN NEW AND ACCEPTED forward;

#Check that only SMTP and POP
#traffic is allowed to
#the mailservers (and DNS replies).

QUERY SADDY TO mailservers AND
(NOT FOR TCP 25 AND
NOT FOR TCP 110
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AND NOT FOR TCP 993
AND NOT FOR BOTH 53
AND IN NEW AND ACCEPTED forward;

This example can be used as a boilerplate for creating security policy validation queries.
It can be easily adapted to a new network simply by changing the IP addresses in the

predefined groups.

By making slight modifications to some of the queries, the syst.em

administrator can tweak the example to account for variations in the security policy (to
allow the web server to provide additional services, perhaps).

A.5

Conclusion

In addition to the sources already mentioned, there are several other places to find good
information on locking down a firewall. Among them is a list of guidelines published by
the CERT coordination center at http:/ /www.cert.org/tech_tipsjpacketJiltering.html and
a list of ports that most firewalls should block at
http:/ /www.doshelp.com/Ports/Trojan_Forts.htm. Information from these sources can be
easily converted into firewall compliance checks.
While these techniques can significantly reduce the risk of leaving a significant hole in
the firewall policy, they also have some disadvantages. Traditional penetration testing tools
can test both the firewall and the server for vulnerabilities. They can test whether buggy
firewall software has compromised the security policy. Rigorous testing should use both
techniques side by side to ensure that the firewall correctly applies the security policy.
The latest version of ITVal and several more examples of how to use it for verifying
a security policy can be obtained from http:/ /itval.sourceforge.net. The examples are designed to be easily modified for use in a variety of settings and provide checks for many
known vulnerabilities.

Bibliography
[1] EHAB S. AL-SHAER AND HAZEM H. HAMED. Modeling and management of firewall
policies. Transactions on Network and Service Management, April 2004.
[2] HARRY ANDERSON. Introduction to Nessus, October 2003.
http://www.securityfocus.com/infocus/1741/.
[3] 0SKAR ANDREASSON. iptables tutorial, 2001.
http://iptables-tutorial.frozentux.net/iptables-tutorial.btml.
[4] ANDREA BARISANI. Testing firewalls and IDS with ftester. In Insight, Newsletter of
the Internet Security Conference, volume 5, 2001.
http://www.tisc2001.com/newsletters/56.btml.
[5] YAIR BARTAL, ALAIN MAYER, KOBBI NISSIM, AND AVISHAI WOOL. Firmato: A
novel firewall management toolkit. ACM Trans. Comput. Syst., 22(4):381-420, 2004.
[6] PHILIPPE BOGAERTS. HPING tutorial, August 2003.
http://www.radarhack.com/dir/papers/hping2_v1.5.pdf.
[7] RANDAL E. BRYANT. Graph-based algorithms for Boolean function manipulation.
IEEE Transactions on Computers, C-35(8):677-691, August 1986.
http://citeseer.ist.psu.edu/bryant86graphbased.html.
[8] WILLIAM R. CHESWICK AND STEVEN M. BELLOVIN. Firewalls and Internet Security:
Repelling the Wily Hacker. Addison Wesley, 1994.
[9] M. CHRISTIANSEN, E. FLEURY, AND D. AALBORG. An Interval Decision Diagram
Based Firewall. Proceedings of 3rd IEEE International Conference on Networking
{ICN04). University of Haute Alsace, Colmar, France. ISBN 0-86341-325-0, 2004.

[10] MIKKEL CHRISTIANSEN AND EMMANUEL FLEURY.
Improving firewalls using
BRIC(K)S. BRIGS Newsletter, 11:56-59, December 2001.
[11] MIKKEL CHRISTIANSEN AND EMMANUEL FLEURY. An MTIDD based firewall. Telecummunications Systems, 27(2-4):219-319, 2004.
[12] G. CIARDO, R. MARMORSTEIN, AND R. SIMINICEANU. Saturation unbound, 2003.

148

149
[13] GIANFRANCO CIARDO, GERALD LUETTGEN, AND RADU 8IMINICEANU. Efficient symbolic state-space construction for asynchronous systems. Application and Theory of
Petri Nets, 1825:103-122, June 2000.

http:llciteseer.ist.psu.edularticlelciardoOOefficient.html.
[14] TOM EASTEP. Introduction to Shorewall, 2005.

http:/lwww.shorewall.net.
[15] DAVID EPPSTEIN AND S. MUTHUKRISHNAN. Internet packet filter management and
rectangle geometry. In Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, pages 827-835, 2001.
[16] PAS! ERONEN AND JUKKA ZITTING. An expert system for analyzing firewall rules.
Proceedings of the 6th Nordic Workshop on Secure IT Systems, 2001.
[17] HERVE EYCHENNE. iptables man page, March 2002.
[18] DAN FARMER AND WIETSE VENEMA.
Analyzing Networks, 1995.

SATAN: Security Administrator's Tool for

http:llwww.fish.coml-zenlsatanl.
[19] FYODOR. The art of port scanning. Phrack, 7(51), September 1997.
[20] SIMSON GARFINKEL. Firewall follies. Technology Review, September 2002.

http:/lwww.technologyreview.com.
[21] LUIGI GENONI, SHEER EL-SHOWK, AND MICHELE BALDESSARI. knetfilter website.

http:llvenom.oltrelinux.com.
[22] MOHAMED G. GOUDA AND ALEX X. LIU. Firewall design: Consistency, completeness, and compactness. In Proceedings of the International Conference on Distributed
Computing Systems. IEEE Computer Society, March 2004.
[23] ROBERT J. HALL. Specification modeling and validation applied to a family of network
security products. In Proceedings of the 16th Annual International Conference on
Automated Software Engineering, 2001.
[24] ScOTT HAZELHURST. A proposal for dynamic access lists for tcpjip packet filtering.
Technical Report TR-Wits-CS-2001-2, University of Witwatersrand, April 2001.
[25] ScoTT HAZELHURST, ANTON FATTI, AND ANDREW HENWOOD. Binary decision
diagram representation of firewall and router access lists. Technical Report TR-WitsCS-1998-3, University of Witwatersrand, October 1998.
[26] DANIEL HOFFMAN, DURGA PRABHAKAR, AND PAUL STROOPER. Testing iptables. In
GASCON '03: Proceedings of the 2003 conference of the Centre for Advanced Studies
on Collaborative research, pages 80-91. IBM Press, 2003.
[27] Internet Security Systems. Internet Scanner User Guide Version 7. 0 SP 2, 2005.

http: I I documents. iss. netlli teratureiinternetScanner I IS_UG_7. Q_SP2. pdf.

150
[28] KEVIN JONAH. Multiple firewalls defend against multiplying threats.
Technology, 18(8), July 2003.
http://www.washingtontecbnology.com.

Washington

[29] TOMAS JUNNONEN. Firestarter Manual, January 2005.
http://www.fs-security.com.
[30] PADMANABHAN KRISHNAN AND DANITA HARTLEY. Using model checking to test a
firewall: A case study. In Proceedings of the 28th Euromicro Conference (EuroMicro
'02), 2002.
[31] VADIM KURLAND. Firewall builder. In Proceedings of the 11th DFN-CERT Workshop,
Hamburg, Germany, February 2004.
[32] JOHN
LAMPE.
Nessus
http://www.nessus.org.

3.0

Advanced

User

Guide,

October

2005.

[33] MARK LEON. Inside the firewall: Will bigger encryption keys keep your data safe from
harm. Intelligent Enterprise, May 2005.
http://www.intelligententerprise.com/
showArticle.jhtml? articleiD=159907849.
[34] ALEX X. Lru, MOHAMED G. GOUDA, Huli3o HEIDI MA, AND ANNE H. NGU. Firewall
queries. In Proceedings of the 8th International Conference on Principles of Distributed
Systems (OPODIS-04), LNCS 3544· Springer-Verlag, December 2004.
http://www.cs.utexas.edu/users/alex/publications/
FirewallQueries/query.pdf.
[35] ALEX X. LIU AND MOHAMMED G. GOUDA. Diverse firewall design. Transactions on
Parallel and Distributed Systems: Accepted for future publication, 2007.
[36] RoBERT MARMORSTEIN. Designing and implementing a user library for manipulation
of multi-way decision diagrams. MS Project Report, Computer Science Department,
The College of William and Mary, 2004.
http://www.cs.wm.edu/-rmmarm/Pubs/710paper.pdf.
[37] ALAIN MAYER, AVISHAI WOOL, AND ELISHA ZISKIND. Fang: A firewall analysis
engine. In Proceedings of the IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, May 2000.
[38] MoNMOTHA. Man Motha Reference Guide, August 2004.
http://www.hosef.org/wiki/MonMothaReferenceGuide.
[39] PHILIP R. MOYER AND E. EUGENE SCHULTZ. A systematic methodology for firewall
penetration testing. Network Security, March 1996.
[40] REDSEAL WHITE PAPER. How to reduce your IT security exposure in three steps,
April 2007.
http://www.infosecurityproductsguide.com/technology/
2007/RedSealSystems.html.

151
[41] REG QUINTON. Using Solaris ipfilters.
http:/list.waterloo.ca/security/howto/2005-08-19/paper.pdf.
[42] RUSTY RUSSEL AND MICHAEL NEULING. iptables source code.
http://lxr.linux.no/source/include/linux/netfilter/x_tables.h.
[43] RUSTY RusSELL. Linux 2.4 Packet Filtering HOWTO Revision 1.26, January 2002.
http://www.netfilter.org/documentation/HOWTO/
packet-filtering-HOWTO.html.
[44] RusTY RussELL AND JEREMY KERR. Netfilter Simulation Environment, 2004.
http://ozlabs.org/-jk/projects/nfsim/howto/.
[45] NIDHI SHARMA. Fireviz: A personal firewall visualizing tool. MS Thesis, Computer Science and Engineering Department, The Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2005.
http://groups.csail.mit.edu/uid/projects/fireviz/nidhi-thesis.pdf.
[46] ABE SINGER. Life without firewalls. ; login:, 28(6):27-30, December 2003.
[47] ABE SINGER. Tempting fate. ; login:, 30(1):27-30, February 2005.
[48] PETER G. SMITH. Linux Network Security. Charles River Media, 2005.
[49] BILL STEARNS.
i2i:
The firewall
http:/ jwww.stearns.org/i2i/.

conversion routines,

September

1999.

[50] BENNETT TODD. Auditing Firewalls: A Practical Guide, June 2004.
http://www.itsecurity.com/papers/p5.html.
[51] BOB TODD. SARA man page.
http://www-arc.com/sara/sara8.html.
[52] ALOK TONGAONKAR, NIRANJAN INAMDAR, AND R. SEKAR. Inferring higher level
policies from firewall rules. In 21st Large Installations System Administration Conference, pages 17-26, 2007.
[53] TUNG TRAN, EHAB AL-SHAER, AND RAOUF BOUTABA. Policyvis: Firewall security
policy visualization and inspection. In 21st Large Installations System Administration
Conference, pages 1-16, 2007.
[54] COSTA TSAOUSIS. FireHOL Tutorial, November 2004.
http://firehol.sourceforge.net.
[55] ARNO VAN AMERSFOORT. Arno 's iptables firewall, 2004.
http://rocky.eld.leidenuniv.nl.
[56] PAVAN VERMA AND ATUL PRAKASH. Face: A firewall analysis and configuration
engine. In SAINT '05: Proceedings of the 2005 Symposium on Applications and the
Internet, 2005.
[57] JACK WALSH. ICSA Labs Firewall Testing: An In Depth Analysis, June 2004.

152
[58]

HARALD WELTE. netfilterjiptables FAQ, 2003.
http://www.netfilter.org/documentation/FAQ/netfilter-faq.html.

[59] AVISHAI

WOOL. Architecting the Lumeta firewall analyzer. In Proceedings of the 10th
USENIX Security Symposium, August 2001.

[60] AVISHAI WOOL. A quantitative study of firewall configuration errors. IEEE Computer,
37(6):62-67, June 2004.

153

VITA

Robert Mathias Marmorstein

Robert Marmorstein was born in Sacramento, California on March 6, 1979. After graduating
from Central High School in Aberdeen, South Dakota, he enrolled at Washington and Lee
University. In May 2000, He graduated with a Bachelor of Arts in Computer Science and
a Bachelor of Arts in Mathematics. He completed his Master of Science at the College of
William and Mary in the spring of 2003.

